Since the financial crisis, growth has slowed in the developed world. It is often assumed that this is an example of cause and effect. I showed in my previous post that this assumption is improbable, as much of the slowdown is the result of changes in demography — changes which are themselves largely the result of birth rates, which predate the crisis by many years. The other major cause of the slowdown has been a decline in productivity. Taken together, demography and productivity appear responsible for a minimum of 79 per cent of the decline in growth among the five developed economies I focused on — the US, UK, France, Germany and Japan.

Increases in productivity usually require investment in new equipment, but the extent of any productivity improvement will depend not only on the amount of the investment, but also its effectiveness. Where investment declines, a fall in productivity is likely unless the change is offset by a rise in the efficiency of new capitalRead more

The worst postwar recession has been followed by weak growth. It is readily assumed that this is cause and effect. Such an analysis is both wrong and damaging. If the weak recovery is due to the recent recession, then its causes must be short-term rather than structural. This belief is behind the frequent calls for more fiscal or monetary easing and the resulting failure to discuss, let alone address the deeper structural problems.

Periods of slow growth can be caused by insufficient demand or insufficient supply. If demand is the problem, the resources of the economy are not being fully utilised. But, if supply is the constraint, then those resources have not been growing fast enough. Read more

Japan’s economic policy is a battle between those who want inflation, on one side, and the fiscal hawks on the other. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s decision to hold a snap election suggests that the inflationists, of which he is one, are currently winning. The market rose on the news of the election, so it seems that investors believe that inflation would be good for both share prices and the economy.

Inflation, as measured by annual changes in the consumer price index, is currently well over 2 per cent. But according to the Bank of Japan, prices for producers are actually falling relative to three months ago, after the effects of this year’s consumption tax increase are excluded. The central bank goes on to state that this is a reflection of declining prices for international commodities, and that the annual rate of increase for consumer prices is just 1 per cent after fresh food is removed from the calculations. Read more

Japan’s gross domestic product shrank in the third quarter of 2014 at 1.6 per cent per annum over the quarter and 1 per cent over the previous 12 months. This disappointed the stock market, which fell by more than 2 per cent. It then recovered almost fully the next day on the news that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had called a snap election, designed to give him a mandate to postpone the increase in consumption tax otherwise due in October 2015.

Governments can boost demand by increasing expenditure or by cutting taxes. Disappointing GDP data do not therefore provide much reason for gloom unless the government appears unwilling to boost demand or the data reflect a problem of supply rather than demand. Read more

Japan cannot put its economy on to a sustainable path unless it reforms its corporation tax system. Fortunately, this is now under active discussion. Unfortunately, it is far from clear that the right changes will be made.

One sector of the economy cannot lend unless another borrows. The sum of the net lending and net borrowing in an economy must therefore equal zero. Japan’s government is a huge borrower and, if this is to be brought down to a sustainable level, the net lending of other sectors must come down by an equal amount. As chart one shows, it is the corporate sector which has moved into massive cash surplus since 1988, when Japan’s fiscal balance moved into a structural deficit. It is therefore the corporate sector which must take the brunt of any fall in government borrowing through a similar decline in the sector’s net lending. Current tax arrangements and regulations are the key cause of the massive cash surpluses run by companies which must be brought down if the fiscal deficit is to be reduced to manageable proportions. Read more

Hedge funds’ portfolios are often leveraged and they can be big winners or losers if this pays off. In this sense the US is also a hedge fund. In terms of its international assets, the US is long equities and short debt. This has been hugely to its advantage because equities have given much better returns, but this benefit carries large risks for the future.

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The damage done to the UK and US economies by buybacks in preference to capital investment was a central theme of my book The Road to Recovery, and it has found its way, not too often I hope, into these blogs. I have therefore been heartened by the growing interest shown by the financial press in this threat to our economies. The Economist recently devoted a major section to the issue, as did the Financial Times on October 12.

The change in the way managements are paid drives buybacks but this has yet to be widely appreciated. The US Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing programme was rightly underlined by my colleagues as adding the fuel of cheap debt but, without the preference for buybacks, low bond yields would have encouraged capital investment. This they markedly failed to do. An important paper, shortly to be published in the Review of Financial Studies, “Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?” by John Asker, Joan Farre-Mensa and Alexander Ljungqvist demonstrates that a huge difference has appeared in recent years in the levels of investment by quoted and unquoted companies. Read more

The following comment on my blog post about quantitative easing and the eurozone struck a chord:

“The unaddressed and unanswered question about fiscal stimulus in the eurozone is about why it will be anything other than another short-term sugar rush?” Read more

I showed in my previous blog that the ratio of depreciation to operating profits is much higher in the published figures for Japanese non-financial companies than it is for their US counterparts and that this could not be justified in terms of either the amount of equipment that needed to be depreciated or the rate at which it should be written off. There is therefore a strong implication that Japanese profits are understated relative to US ones, but this is subject to two provisos.

First, even if the ratio of depreciation to output should be the same in both countries, the ratio of operating profits could be very different if US companies had much higher ratios of profits to output than Japanese ones. Read more

In two earlier blogs I explained why the cyclically adjusted price earnings yield (Cape) could not sensibly be applied to valuing Japanese shares. (One of several reasons is that Cape is only valid if profit margins are mean reverting over relatively short periods of time, such as 10 years or so, and this has not been the case in Japan.) This does not mean that they cannot be valued by other means. In this and the next blog I attempt one possible way to do this. Read more