Interest rates

It is an old adage that the market is a weighing machine in the long-term and a voting one in the short-term. The latest data published by the Federal Reserve in its Z1 Financial Accounts of the United States show the weighing and the voting pointing in sharply different directions. Read more

World growth over the past three years has fallen below its five-year rate and below its very long-term one, as chart one shows. It seems therefore reasonable to assume that we are experiencing what is at least a cyclical downturn. But the chart also shows that the trend since 1980 or 1990 seems to be a rising rather than a falling one. It doesn’t therefore seem to me reasonable to assume that the world is about to experience of the sort of longer -term slowdown that can reasonably be described as secular stagnation, though of course this may happen. Read more

One of the most encouraging features of the US economy has been the recent improvement in the level of labour participation, which is the proportion of those aged 15 to 64 who wish to work (i.e. employed plus unemployed).

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Usually the Fed waits too long before raising interest rates. The pressure to delay is particularly strong today. One reason is the sharp decline in the trend growth rate of the US. As I have pointed out in these blogs, this is the result of a sharp fall in the growth of the population of working age and in productivity. In the decade prior to the financial crisis (1997 to 2007), the numbers in the US of those aged 15 to 64 grew at 1.38 per cent per annum and is now forecast to rise over the next decade at only 0.18 per cent per annum (chart one).

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Abenomics, the term given to the reform package Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe launched to revive the country’s economy, is based on two myths. One is that the economy has performed badly and the second is that this non-existent failure has been due to deflation. Despite its lack of intellectual justification, the attempt to stop deflation has been a success as the accompanying rhetoric and monetary policy have produced yen weakness. This was an essential step towards solving Japan’s fiscal problem and, as the rhetoric has been about deflation rather than devaluation, the dramatic weakness of the currency has been achieved without international opprobrium.

Over time the devaluation should result in an improved current account. This will allow the fiscal deficit to fall while the economy moves ahead, but it is not enough on its own. The other essential is to reduce the cash flow surplus of the business sector. Having achieved success in step one, largely by accident, there is a chance that Abenomics will succeed in step two. If it does, it is again likely to be an accident. Read more

Ian McCafferty, an external member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, believes “Britain’s ‘productivity puzzle’ will persist as the economy recovers because much of the decline in output is structurally entrenched.” As a result, Mr McCafferty believes that the Bank of England “should not ‘hold back too long’ on interest rate rises”.

Scarcely a day passes without some reference to the UK’s “productivity puzzle” and a claim that the poor productivity is “inexplicable”. This reflects a failure to understand how and why the economy has changed. Poor productivity is so readily explicable that it should cause no surprise. It is, as I have sought to explain before, the natural result of the change in management incentives. Read more

It is widely, but by no means universally, accepted among economists that the “rate of interest” is closely related to growth. It is, however, also generally accepted that this applies to a closed economy, such as the world as a whole.

The growth rate of G5 countries has been declining steadily for years, and this trend has recently accelerated, as chart one shows. It seems likely that low growth has become endemic and this is being widely interpreted as implying that real interest rates will remain low. This view strikes me as being unjustified on theoretical grounds and is also a very dubious conclusion to draw from the past. Read more

“When will the Bank of England raise interest rates?” is the usual question. “When should it?” is the important one. The bank has a long history of “acting too little and too late”. As I explained in inflation and deflation, inflation is more dangerous than deflation and prudent central bankers would rather act too soon to raise rates than be too late and then be forced to cause a recession to get inflationary expectations back under control.

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Comments are flying around about whether inflation or deflation is the greater risk. This is almost invariably interpreted as asking which is the most likely and therefore misses the central point. Inflation is a much greater risk – not because it is more likely but because its consequences are far worse.

Deflation has been demonised. It has been harmless or even beneficial in Japan. While I think it would hurt the eurozone, its impact would be mild and easily reversed – or it would be if German economic policy was not so obstinately foolish. Inflation poses a much more serious problem, particularly in Japan, the UK and the US. Read more