Next week’s summit of European Union leaders faces an important choice on Turkey.  Should the EU toughen existing measures that are holding up Turkey’s EU accession talks, because of Ankara’s refusal to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic?  Or should the EU recognise that this would send completely the wrong message, just when Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders are trying to reach a comprehensive settlement of the long-standing Cyprus dispute?

Precisely because the EU is divided on the Turkish question - the Greek Cypriot-run government of Cyprus wants a strong line, and other countries are split between supporters and opponents of Turkey’s entry into the EU - it seems unlikely that a consensus can be reached in favour of placing additional obstacles in the path of Turkey’s negotiations.

But the fact that Turkey’s membership prospects are being framed in these terms is a bad sign in itself.  It is draining public support in Turkey for joining the EU.  It is encouraging the ruling Justice and Development party to pursue its policy of broadening Turkey’s foreign policy horizons beyond Europe and beyond the Nato alliance - to the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia and central Asia.

That, of course, is by no means a bad thing.  Turkey’s revived engagement with its non-European neighbours, and its mediation in disputes such as that between Israel and Syria, are positive developments.

But an analysis written by Amanda Akcakoca of the European Policy Centre think-tank sums up the other side of the picture nicely.  “The old notion that Turkey is a country linked exclusively to the West has been set aside.  The common vital interests that tied Ankara and Washington together during the Cold War have significantly weakened, and Turkey will no longer toe the US foreign policy line when this goes against its own strategic interests.  Neither will it feel obliged to align itself to every EU foreign policy action or statement as long as Brussels persists in its ambiguous attitude towards Turkey’s eventual membership,” she writes.

One can agree with all of this - except perhaps the notion that it is “Brussels” that has an ambiguous attitude.  Actually, it is the inability of the EU’s 27 governments to form a common position on Turkey that is the heart of the problem.  The EU’s Lisbon treaty is meant to strengthen the EU’s common foreign policy and help the EU project its influence more convincingly around the world.  No policy issue will be more important than the Turkey dossier in demonstrating whether these fine aspirations are just hot air.

Watch this video by Quentin Peel, the FT’s international affairs editor, on the Tories and Europe

The inimitable Nicolas Sarkozy couldn’t resist the temptation to term last week’s allocation of jobs in the new European Commission as a victory for France and a defeat for Britain.  In particular, the French president crowed, he had outmanoeuvred the Brits by securing the internal market portfolio, which is responsible for financial regulation, for Michel Barnier, the new French commissioner.

It was certainly a little undiplomatic for Sarkozy to uncork the metaphorical Champagne bottles so soon after the announcement of the new jobs.  There are many raw nerves in the British government and in the City of London about how various EU measures in the pipeline may damage the UK’s financial sector.  Sarkozy touched every one of those nerves with a rod of fire.

In fact, he went even further by implying that France had more or less gained control of EU farm policies, too, because Dacian Ciolos, the new agriculture commissioner, was a Romanian who had studied in France.  The message?  Forget serious reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.

The problem with Sarkozy’s enthusiastic outburst was that it reminded everyone, just as the EU’s Lisbon treaty came into effect on December 1, that most if not all of the bloc’s 27 governments still see the EU as an arena for competitive national muscle-flexing as well as co-operation.  British Eurosceptic circles responded to the make-up of the new Commission in exactly the same way as Sarkozy - i.e., it was a defeat for the UK.  Even pro-EU Brits used a similar interpretative framework, by seeking solace in the fact that Barnier’s department chief would be an experienced UK official supposedly sticking up for British interests.

But Brussels, in my view, does not operate in such a simplistic fashion.  The Commission has a deeply ingrained culture of working for the common European interest.  It rubs off on most politicians and officials who spend some of their career there.

Barnier will not be a mere puppet of the Elysée, as is suggested by a careful reading of his speeches over the years.  Here he is, speaking in 2006: “I do not think we need fear competition between ourselves, it exists everywhere in life… I have never criticised the Americans for being strong, I have always reproached the Europeans and others for being weak.”

Also, it is as well to remember that EU legislation - on the financial industry and other matters - may be drawn up by the Commission, but the final word lies with the Council of Ministers, representing national governments, and the European Parliament.  Many of the real political battles are fought in these last two institutions.

I somehow doubt Barnier’s role in shaping EU financial regulation is going to be anything like as decisive as either his supporters hope or his critics fear.

As of today the European Union is going about its business under a new set of rules known as the Lisbon treaty.  In Brussels this is universally seen as a good thing because, to quote Rebecca Harms and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, co-presidents of the European Parliament’s Greens faction, the treaty “sets the framework for increased European democracy, better decision-making, higher levels of transparency and closer participation of European citizens”.

Well, perhaps it does and perhaps it doesn’t.  One thing’s for sure: the new arrangements strengthen the European Parliament - hence the enthusiasm of Harms and Cohn-Bendit.  But the Lisbon treaty’s reforms are like the ingredients of a good dinner.  Use them intelligently, and all will be well.  Forget to put in the garlic and the peppers, and it will taste terrible.  In other words, wise leadership and a sense of responsibility to something higher than one’s domestic political audience are going to be necessary to make Lisbon work effectively.

There are two early signs that some EU leaders aren’t learning the lesson.  One is the effort of politicians in several former Soviet bloc countries to discredit Baroness Catherine Ashton, the EU’s new foreign policy high representative, because she used to be treasurer for Britain’s Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament more than 25 years ago.  The allegation is that CND may have received covert support from the Soviet Union and that this makes Ashton an inappropriate person to run EU foreign policy.

Let me say, first of all, that I never had any sympathy in the 1970s and 1980s for the views of CND, which struck me as remarkably blind to the essential nature of the Soviet regime and its foreign, military and propaganda policies.  However, CND also formed part of a honourable British tradition of radical opposition to government - it was anything but unpatriotic.  No evidence has publicly emerged of Soviet financial support for CND but, even if it did, would that destroy Ashton’s credibility?

Not necessarily.  It would all depend on whether she had consciously accepted Soviet funds.  So far, there is nothing to suggest she did.  Meanwhile, you cannot crucify someone for political opinions, however misguided, held a quarter of a century ago.  Well, maybe you can in the Czech Republic or Latvia, but not in Britain - or in Brussels, where European Commission president José Manuel Barroso used to be a student Maoist in his native Portugal.

The second troubling sign for the EU in the Lisbon era is French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s cock-a-hoop celebration of the new appointments in the European Commission as a victory for France and a defeat for Britain…  But that’s for tomorrow.

The FT’s Brussels blog is taking a break and will return soon.

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