In Cold War times it was a rule of thumb that, whenever the Soviet Union’s behaviour was particularly bullying, the US and western Europe would put aside their differences and close ranks in reaction. Conversely, when Moscow was less threatening, there was less pressure for complete unity in the western alliance. France (Charles de Gaulle), West Germany (Willy Brandt) and the US (Richard Nixon) each sought benefits for their own countries from closer contacts with the Soviet leadership.
For all the European Union’s show of unity on Monday at its emergency summit in Brussels, the crisis over Russia’s destruction of Georgia’s territorial integrity clearly hasn’t reached the point at which all the Europeans are with each other in heart and soul. The explanation isn’t hard to find.
Today’s 27-nation EU is a very different creature from the European Community of the 1970s and 1980s, which started with six members and still had only 12, all in western Europe, by the end of the Cold War. It is the inclusion of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the 1990s and, above all, of 10 former communist bloc countries since 2004 that has made the difference.
Take the remarks made at Monday’s summit by the leaders of Poland and Austria. In what was a clear reference to the Germans, Italians and others, Donald Tusk, Poland’s prime minister, complained: “There are politicians, even in Europe, who would prefer empty conclusions because of their intensive bilateral relations with Russia.”
By contrast, Alfred Gusenbauer, Austria’s chancellor, was adamant: “I’m against any kind of escalation.” Russia and the EU, he said, have “strategic reasons for reasonable co-operation”.
The summit saw a gap between countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – all former Soviet satellites – and France, Germany and Italy. The former group sympathises strongly with Georgia, whereas the latter trio is highly critical of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian leader, and enjoy flourishing trade and investment relationships with Russia that they have no wish no jeopardise.
However, it would be wrong to assume that the eastern Europeans are hotheads pressing for some kind of showdown with Moscow. Not at all. Geographically, they are on the frontline. They are, for the most part, small states. Two are extremely small and have restive Russian minorities. Open confrontation is even less in their interests than it is in those of France or Germany.
Rather, the eastern Europeans are drawing on their experience of Soviet behaviour to alert their western European partners to the need to respond firmly when Russia crosses the line, as all EU countries say it has done in Georgia. Their alarm is understandable because Georgia is part of the same former sphere of Russian control to which they once belonged. “Who will be next?” they are thinking.
However, economic or even tough diplomatic sanctions against Russia were never going to be announced at the summit. The EU is not a military alliance or even a regional policeman for Europe. Its common foreign and security policy is a work in progress, not a solid fact. Negotiation, partnership and a knack for fashioning ingenious compromises out of nothing are the EU’s very spirit and life force.
The only problem is that Russia, in its present mood, may not be especially susceptible to this type of approach.
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