A couple of months ago, some European Union policymakers talked despairingly of how 2009 risked turning out to be “a wasted year”. Now the EU is on a roll. The impasse over José Manuel Barroso’s reappointment as European Commission president was removed last month when the European parliament stopped playing games and renewed his term of office.
And all of a sudden, it looks as if “a decade of deadening debate over the European Union’s institutional shape” – as British foreign secretary David Miliband puts it in today’s FT – will soon come to an end, after Ireland’s referendum on the Lisbon treaty produced a massive majority in favour. It may not be long before the EU has its first full-time president, a new head of foreign policy and a new Commission with a five-year mandate serving under Barroso.
So is all rosy in the European garden? Not quite. The principal problem, as it has been for the past two years, is the financial crisis. Time and time again, as I peek into the future, I find myself disturbed by the terrible condition of Europe’s public finances and the strains that this will put on the eurozone’s unity.
In a newly published report, economists at Barclays Capital look at the evolution of the eurozone’s public debt-to-gross domestic product ratio up to the middle of the next decade. In one scenario, which assumes an annual fiscal adjustment of 2 per cent of GDP, 4 per cent inflation and 3 per cent economic growth, the eurozone’s average debt would be 65 per cent in 2016. That is not bad (though it’s above the 60 per cent threshold set for new entrants into the eurozone).
But just look at the differences between the area’s member-states. The German debt would be 40 per cent of GDP, the Dutch debt 37 per cent, the Finnish debt 12 per cent. But the Greek debt would be 150 per cent, the Irish debt 126 per cent and the Portuguese debt 89 per cent. In footballing terms, this would be like Barcelona and Chelsea playing in the same league as Atromitos Athens and the Tralee Dynamos.
This scenario, by the way, is not Barclays Capital’s “base case”, which is more pessimistic, estimating average eurozone debt at 90 per cent of GDP in 2016. But the same enormous divergence between, say, Germany and Greece is evident: German debt would be 64 per cent, Greek debt 171 per cent.
With such bleak forecasts, it is entirely understandable that German policymakers dislike proposals for issuing common eurozone bonds. But the financial crisis is testing to the limit the eurozone’s ability to conduct a properly co-ordinated fiscal policy. When interest rates start going up again, as they will, this will present a far bigger challenge for the EU than getting Barroso reappointed or passing the Lisbon treaty.






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