It was buried amid the excitement of the European Union’s summit in Brussels, but I’d like to draw your attention to a revealing report published on Thursday on the subject of European access to strategic raw materials.  Prepared under the supervision of the European Commission, the report names 14 critical materials that Europe risks not having enough of in the future – with potentially far-reaching implications for Europe’s economic development, not to mention its defence and security.

The European Union is nothing if not addicted to targets.  Promises to achieve particular goals by specific dates are part and parcel of the EU’s daily business.  Sometimes the objectives are met, sometimes they are not met, and sometimes it’s hard to tell either way.  European monetary union, for example, was launched in 1999, but only after a two-year delay because a majority of member-states didn’t meet the criteria earlier in the decade (did Greece ever meet them?).

Rumours are flying thick and fast that the troubles of Spain’s banking sector will require emergency attention at Thursday’s summit of European Union leaders in Brussels.  But it appears highly improbable that Spain will ask for help from the emergency financial stabilisation fund that EU finance ministers agreed to set up last month.  For one thing, the fund is not yet fully up and running.  For another, the Spanish government is emphatically not shut out of credit markets – a point underlined this morning by the successful issuance of €5bn worth of short-term government bills.

Spain’s economic vulnerabilities are obvious, and the implications of a Spanish crisis for the rest of the eurozone are no less clear.  French and German banks alone are exposed to some $450bn of Spanish debt, according to a report just published by the Bank for International Settlements.

But it is worth repeating that Spain is not Greece.  The Greek crisis originated in decades of mismanagement of the public finances, plus an unhealthy culture of corruption and use of the state for political patronage.  Although such practices are not unknown in Spain – and not unknown in the US, China and numerous other countries, for that matter – they have never attained Greek levels.

One little-noticed side effect of the Greek debt crisis is that it is playing into the hands of those who oppose faster progress on enlarging the European Union.  Western Balkan countries such as Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are queuing up at the EU’s door, but only Croatia has any chance of membership in the next three years.

Among the reasons is that Greece, the first Balkan state to enter the EU (in 1981), has been exposed as a country that not only ran ruinous and reckless fiscal policies for many years, but deceived its partners with false data in order to join the eurozone at the start of this decade.  Rightly or wrongly, some policymakers in EU national capitals argue that this unhappy experience demonstrates that, when it comes to public probity, Balkan states are just not to be trusted.

They point to the fact that corruption, organised crime and judicial inefficiency remain serious problems in Bulgaria and Romania, two other Balkan countries, which entered the EU in 2007.  Croatia, too, has difficulties in these areas - one reason why Zagreb’s membership negotiations are taking longer than once expected.  (I would caution, however, against underestimating the strength of feeling in some western European countries about the need for Croatia to co-operate fully with United Nations war crimes investigators.)

One small step in the direction of EU enlargement may be taken next week.  The Dutch government is signalling that it may lift its objections to ratification of a EU pre-accession agreement for Serbia.  As with Croatia’s entry talks, the problem with Serbia has been its co-operation with the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague and, in particular, its inability or reluctance to arrest Ratko Mladic, the fugitive Bosnian Serb military commander.

But even the Dutch move, welcome as it would be, would not really accelerate Serbia’s entry into the EU.  It is not yet even an official membership candidate.  Macedonia, by contrast, is an official candidate but cannot start its negotiations because Greece is blocking them over the infamous name dispute (“Should Macedonia be allowed to call itself Macedonia?”).

I recall that last August Valentin Inzko, the Austrian diplomat who serves as the international community’s high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, said it would be a nice idea if the Balkan states could join the EU in 2014, on the 100th anniversary of the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian archduke Ferdinand – the event that sparked World War One.

Less than a year later, Inzko seems to think 2018 – the 100th anniversary of the war’s end - might be a more realistic date.  True … but how will the EU rid itself of its “Balkan enlargement fatigue” in the meantime?

A Polish priest who was murdered in 1984 by secret policemen working for the then ruling communist authorities was beatified last weekend by the Vatican, a step that puts him on course for eventual sainthood.  The news meant a lot to me because, although I’m not Catholic, I came to know the priest well when I lived and worked in Warsaw as a young reporter in the 1980s.

His name was Jerzy Popieluszko, and he was famous throughout Poland for the anti-communist ”masses for the homeland” that he used to hold at his church, St Stanislaw Kostka, in the Warsaw suburb of Zoliborz.  No Sunday evening was complete without a visit to the church to hear the singing of patriotic hymns and the voice of Popieluszko denouncing the latest injustices of the communist regime.  Thousands upon thousands of Poles used to attend these masses, filling the streets all around the church.  I and other Western reporters used to slip into the vestry to make sure we could hear every word of his sermons.

When I wrote stories about Popieluszko for my employers, the Reuters news agency, the editors would sometimes ask me to file a note for English-speaking readers giving guidance on how to pronounce his name.  I came up with something like ” YEAH-zhy Pop-yeah-WHOOSH-koh”.

The European Union’s fiscal rulebook, known as the stability and growth pact, has fallen into such discredit since the euro’s launch in 1999 that almost any change is likely to be an improvement.  But are the reforms that EU finance ministers agreed in Luxembourg on Monday good enough?  I have my doubts.

There are many flaws in the stability pact, but the essential problem is enforcement.  How can outsiders compel a government, with sovereign control of its budget, to observe fiscal discipline?  The pact contains a provision for imposing fines on countries that run up high budget deficits and ignore recommendations from other member-states and the European Commission to take corrective measures.  Predictably, however, no country has ever paid a fine or has even been asked to pay a fine throughout the euro’s 11-year history.  Governments have shrunk from punishing other governments because they know that the tables may one day be turned on themselves.

In any case, it has always seemed potty to slap fines on a country with a large deficit.  The penalties would simply exacerbate the country’s budgetary difficulties.  No wonder Romano Prodi, the former Commission president, once called the stability pact “stupid”.

Slowly, too slowly perhaps, the eurozone is delivering its response to the collapse of market confidence triggered by the European sovereign debt crisis.  An important step appears likely to be taken at a finance ministers’ meeting in Luxembourg on Monday.  They are set to agree the terms on which a Special Purpose Vehicle will be able to borrow up to €440bn on the markets to help a eurozone member-state that is experiencing borrowing difficulties.

On the face of things, this initiative goes considerably further than the €110bn rescue package arranged last month for Greece. The Greek aid is based on bilateral loans from other governments in the 16-nation eurozone. But the SPV will be a self-contained entity, operating under Luxembourg law, that will issue bonds backed by member-state guarantees.

You could almost call them “common eurozone bonds” – except that, for political reasons, this is an all but unmentionable term.  Opposition to common eurozone bonds is exceptionally strong in Germany, where the prevailing view is that such a measure would simply benefit wastrels like Greece and impose higher borrowing costs on countries that practise fiscal discipline – i.e., Germany itself.  Nonetheless, the German government has taken an energetic role in designing the structure of the SPV.  It is a big moment for Germany and one which shows that the German commitment to making a success of European monetary union is not to be underestimated.

The European Union’s rotating presidency will pass on July 1 from Spain to Belgium, and then six months later from Belgium to Hungary.  The direction of EU affairs will therefore soon be in the hands of a centre-right Hungarian government that has wasted little time, since its massive election victory in April, in asserting its patriotic – some would say ‘nationalist’ – credentials.

Policymakers in Brussels are anxiously watching this development.  They recall the unhappy experience of the Czech Republic’s EU presidency in the first half of 2009.  The last thing they want is another turbulent presidency run by one of the 10 central and eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004-2007.  It would give critics of EU enlargement even more ammunition to fight with.

How time flies when you’re having fun.  I spent the best part of Wednesday trailing Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran’s foreign minister, around Brussels.  After about four hours it dawned on me that, no matter how strange and disturbing some of his statements, his style is in certain respects remarkably similar to that of a European politician.  That is to say, he repeats his best lines wherever he goes, presumably in the belief that if you say something often enough, in as many different places as possible, at least some people will swallow your message and regurgitate it to others.

Two weeks ago European leaders decided to postpone an upcoming summit of something called the Union for the Mediterranean.  It is safe to say that very few people in the Mediterranean noticed or cared.

The story of the UfM is a classic tale of what passes for foreign policy in today’s European Union.  The organisation was the brainchild of President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, who wanted to strengthen relations between the EU’s southern member-states – such as France, Italy and Spain – and their North African and Arab neighbours across the sea.  It was not a bad idea in principle.  But it aroused the suspicions of Germany and other northern EU countries, which insisted in the name of European unity that all EU member-states should belong to the UfM.

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Peter Spiegel is the FT's Brussels bureau chief. He returned to the FT in August 2010 after spending five years covering foreign policy and national security issues from Washington for the Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times, focusing on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He first joined the FT in 1999 covering business regulation and corporate crime in its Washington bureau, before spending four years covering military affairs and the defence industry in London and Washington.

Joshua Chaffin is one of the FT's EU correspondents, covering areas including policies on trade, the environment and energy. He has worked in the FT's Brussels bureau since late 2008 and before that was an FT correspondent in New York and Washington DC.

Alex Barker is EU correspondent, covering the single market, financial regulation and competition. He was formerly an FT political correspondent in the UK and joined the FT in 2005.

Stanley Pignal is Brussels correspondent for the Financial Times, covering EU justice, home affairs, social developments, telecoms and the Benelux region. He joined the bureau in January 2009, having previously worked for the FT as a corporate reporter in London.

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