Category: Enlargement

In today’s paper, fellow Brussels Blogger Stanley Pignal has a nice scoop about a letter France and Germany sent to European Union officials announcing their formal objections to including Bulgaria and Romania in the Schengen area, the visa-free travel zone that most EU members are part of.

Traian Basescu, the Romanian president, has already responded this morning by calling the letter a “discriminatory act against Romania,” and vowing to fight the move.

Because the issue could get even hotter, especially since the incoming Hungarian presidency had made Bulgarian and Romanian Schengen membership such a priority, we thought we should post the letter here, with some annotations of our own.

Turkey’s bid to join the European Union is expected to make a little progress today.  I stress “a little”.  In most respects, the cause of Turkish membership of the EU is in worse shape than at any time since EU governments recognised Turkey as an official candidate in 2004.

The progress, minimal though it is, takes the form of an agreement by the EU and Turkey to open formal talks on food security. This is one of the 35 chapters, or policy areas, that a country must complete before it can join the EU.  It means that Turkey will have opened 13 chapters in total.  Of these, however, only one chapter has been closed.  If this is progress, the snail is king of the race track.

After spending three days in Reykjavik and the northern town of Akureyri, just below the Arctic Circle, I am starting to get the feeling that Iceland’s entry into the European Union is anything but guaranteed.  I have met government ministers and officials who are eager to steer their country into the EU.  But I have met a fairly wide range of private sector businessmen, teachers, students and other Icelanders who are either flatly opposed or at best non-committed.

The most passionate opposition I’ve encountered has come from representatives of the powerful fisheries industry and the less powerful but politically influential agricultural lobby.  Here’s what the manager of the national dairy farmers’ association said: “If we entered the EU, our tariffs would have to go.  Our home market share would drop by 25 to 50 per cent.  The number of farmers would drop by 60 to 70 per cent.  EU membership would deal us a tremendous blow, there’s no doubt about it.”

Will Iceland really join the European Union?  I have come to Reykjavik in search of answers.  In one sense, it’s the right time to be here: the skies are white for almost 24 hours a day at this time of year, appearing to throw light on everything.  But in another sense this promises to be a frustrating trip - Iceland itself doesn’t seem to know if it wants to be in the EU or not.

The opinion polls are not good.  After a long period in which a solid majority of about 60 per cent of Icelanders supported EU membership, things have turned upside down in recent months.  Support for EU entry was estimated to be as low as 28 per cent in one recent survey, whilst opposition now runs at about 60 per cent.  If Iceland is serious about joining the EU, it will have to hold a referendum, so these numbers matter.  Right now, however, we are a long way from a referendum – at least two years, and perhaps longer.  Much can change.

Enthusiasm for the EU was high when Iceland’s banking system and currency collapsed in 2008, prompting the introduction of a drastic austerity programme conducted under the beady eye of the International Monetary Fund.  But Iceland’s dispute with the UK and the Netherlands over how to repay British and Dutch savers who lost their money in Icesave, the failed online Icelandic bank, has changed public opinion.

One little-noticed side effect of the Greek debt crisis is that it is playing into the hands of those who oppose faster progress on enlarging the European Union.  Western Balkan countries such as Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are queuing up at the EU’s door, but only Croatia has any chance of membership in the next three years.

Among the reasons is that Greece, the first Balkan state to enter the EU (in 1981), has been exposed as a country that not only ran ruinous and reckless fiscal policies for many years, but deceived its partners with false data in order to join the eurozone at the start of this decade.  Rightly or wrongly, some policymakers in EU national capitals argue that this unhappy experience demonstrates that, when it comes to public probity, Balkan states are just not to be trusted.

They point to the fact that corruption, organised crime and judicial inefficiency remain serious problems in Bulgaria and Romania, two other Balkan countries, which entered the EU in 2007.  Croatia, too, has difficulties in these areas - one reason why Zagreb’s membership negotiations are taking longer than once expected.  (I would caution, however, against underestimating the strength of feeling in some western European countries about the need for Croatia to co-operate fully with United Nations war crimes investigators.)

One small step in the direction of EU enlargement may be taken next week.  The Dutch government is signalling that it may lift its objections to ratification of a EU pre-accession agreement for Serbia.  As with Croatia’s entry talks, the problem with Serbia has been its co-operation with the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague and, in particular, its inability or reluctance to arrest Ratko Mladic, the fugitive Bosnian Serb military commander.

But even the Dutch move, welcome as it would be, would not really accelerate Serbia’s entry into the EU.  It is not yet even an official membership candidate.  Macedonia, by contrast, is an official candidate but cannot start its negotiations because Greece is blocking them over the infamous name dispute (“Should Macedonia be allowed to call itself Macedonia?”).

I recall that last August Valentin Inzko, the Austrian diplomat who serves as the international community’s high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, said it would be a nice idea if the Balkan states could join the EU in 2014, on the 100th anniversary of the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian archduke Ferdinand – the event that sparked World War One.

Less than a year later, Inzko seems to think 2018 – the 100th anniversary of the war’s end - might be a more realistic date.  True … but how will the EU rid itself of its “Balkan enlargement fatigue” in the meantime?

The European Union’s rotating presidency will pass on July 1 from Spain to Belgium, and then six months later from Belgium to Hungary.  The direction of EU affairs will therefore soon be in the hands of a centre-right Hungarian government that has wasted little time, since its massive election victory in April, in asserting its patriotic – some would say ‘nationalist’ – credentials.

Policymakers in Brussels are anxiously watching this development.  They recall the unhappy experience of the Czech Republic’s EU presidency in the first half of 2009.  The last thing they want is another turbulent presidency run by one of the 10 central and eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004-2007.  It would give critics of EU enlargement even more ammunition to fight with.

Two weeks ago European leaders decided to postpone an upcoming summit of something called the Union for the Mediterranean.  It is safe to say that very few people in the Mediterranean noticed or cared.

The story of the UfM is a classic tale of what passes for foreign policy in today’s European Union.  The organisation was the brainchild of President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, who wanted to strengthen relations between the EU’s southern member-states – such as France, Italy and Spain – and their North African and Arab neighbours across the sea.  It was not a bad idea in principle.  But it aroused the suspicions of Germany and other northern EU countries, which insisted in the name of European unity that all EU member-states should belong to the UfM.

Yulia Tymoshenko’s refusal to acknowledge Viktor Yanukovich as the legitimate winner of Ukraine’s presidential election is starting to embarrass her friends in the European Union.  The White House, Nato and the EU have all congratulated Yanukovich on his victory.  The longer Tymoshenko maintains her defiant stance, the more it will cost her in terms of prestige and contacts in Europe.

Only last December I saw the red carpet rolled out for Tymoshenko at a congress in Bonn of the centre-right European People’s Party, the biggest party in the European Parliament.  Everyone was there – German chancellor Angela Merkel, EU president Herman Van Rompuy, French premier François Fillon, Italian premier Silvio Berlusconi, etc.  Tymoshenko was one of the star attractions from the “new” eastern Europe.

A potentially decisive moment is approaching in the Cyprus settlement talks that started in September 2008.  Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations secretary-general, is to visit the divided island on Sunday and stay there until Tuesday.  He does not, of course, have the authority to impose a settlement or even seriously to bang heads together.  But what he can do is impress on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders that the world is watching them and that a great deal hangs on the outcome of their negotiations.

A sense of urgency hangs over the talks because presidential elections will be held in Turkish Cypriot-controlled northern Cyprus on April 18.  Mehmet Ali Talat, the leftist president who helped revive the effort at reaching a comprehensive settlement more than 16 months ago, looks vulnerable to the challenge of Dervis Eroglu, the nationalist prime minister.

Eroglu says that, if he wins, he will not break off the talks with Demetris Christofias, the Greek Cypriot leader.  But the prospects for a deal would surely diminish, because Eroglu advocates a “two-state solution” to the Cyprus problem – i.e., one based on recognition of the north’s separate statehood.  This is not only unpalatable to the Greek Cypriots but runs contrary to the whole thrust of the UN-sponsored negotiations.  

The temptation to be cynical about the Cyprus talks is strong, but should be resisted.  I have met both Talat and Christofias, and I do not doubt their sincerity when they say they want a deal.  However, both men are operating under severe political pressures in their respective communities, and the time constraints are starting to tell.

True, it can sometimes feel as if time has stood still since Turkish forces invaded and partitioned the island in 1974.  The Greek Cypriots, who control the internationally recognised government of Cyprus, appear to feel little incentive to negotiate a settlement.  After all, they have spent almost six years as full members of the European Union, and have even been allowed into the eurozone, without having to pay any political price at all.

As for Turkey, it is surely an anachronism for a country that has modernised itself and opened itself up to the world so much over the past 30 years to continue to station at least 21,000 troops on Cyprus (the Greek Cypriots say the real figure is 43,000).

But as an excellent commentary by Didem Akyel of the International Crisis Group points out, “if this round of talks fails, that will be the surest route to partition, resulting in great losses for Cypriots and all others affected by the dispute”.  It would certainly strike a blow at Turkey’s already waning hopes of EU membership and at the possibility of closer EU-Nato co-operation.

Ah, but perhaps there are some EU countries that would secretly welcome both prospects?

The European Union should be pleased with the outcome of the first round of Ukraine’s presidential election.  Not because the politician who received the most votes was former premier Viktor Yanukovich, the most pro-Russian of the main candidates.  Rather, because the election for the most part met the very high standards of democracy, legality and fairness that the EU had demanded of Ukraine to sustain the process of bringing the country closer to the 27-nation bloc.

It was a genuine contest among a variety of distinctive candidates, and the second, knock-out round on February 7 between Yanukovich and Yulia Tymoshenko, the incumbent prime minister, will be a genuine contest, too.  Compare this with the tainted presidential election of November 2004, which precipitated the Orange Revolution that propelled Viktor Yushchenko to power.  In terms of democracy and the political maturity of society, Ukraine has progressed a long way over the past five years.

In contrast to 2004, Russia has so far kept a low profile during this election.  No doubt one reason is that Moscow was perfectly aware that Yushchenko, the outgoing president, whom the Kremlin loathed for his pro-western attitudes, had suffered a near-total collapse in popularity and didn’t stand a chance of making it to the second round.  Another reason is related to Ukraine’s desperate economic troubles.  Russia senses that, after the election is over, the new president and his or her policy advisers will have little choice but to adopt a more accommodating stance towards Russia than Yushchenko was inclined to take.

Nevertheless, the very fact that Ukraine is able to hold a free and fair election with multiple candidates is in some ways a rebuke to Russia – and other former Soviet states with authoritarian inclinations.  It will remind those Russians with an interest in political freedom – and there are still quite a few – that they have been denied the same possibility for at least a decade.  For all Ukraine’s economic difficulties, the “little Slavic brother” on Russia’s western frontier is persevering with his promising experiment in democracy.

What is important now, from an EU point of view, is that the election’s second round proceeds calmly and that the winner is able to arrange a smooth transfer of power with Yushchenko.  This will ease the EU’s worries about political instability or deadlock in Ukraine and, one hopes, will speed up the negotiations on a EU-Ukrainian association agreement.  This accord would be a much more realistic and positive step forward for Ukraine than entry into Nato – something a relative majority of Ukrainian voters seem to grasp.

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Peter Spiegel is the FT's Brussels bureau chief. He returned to the FT in August 2010 after spending five years covering foreign policy and national security issues from Washington for the Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times, focusing on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He first joined the FT in 1999 covering business regulation and corporate crime in its Washington bureau, before spending four years covering military affairs and the defence industry in London and Washington.

Joshua Chaffin is one of the FT's EU correspondents, covering areas including policies on trade, the environment and energy. He has worked in the FT's Brussels bureau since late 2008 and before that was an FT correspondent in New York and Washington DC.

Alex Barker is EU correspondent, covering the single market, financial regulation and competition. He was formerly an FT political correspondent in the UK and joined the FT in 2005.

Stanley Pignal is Brussels correspondent for the Financial Times, covering EU justice, home affairs, social developments, telecoms and the Benelux region. He joined the bureau in January 2009, having previously worked for the FT as a corporate reporter in London.

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