Category: Enlargement

Tuesday’s murder of Bobi Tsankov, a young Bulgarian journalist who wrote about his country’s over-mighty gangsters, took place in broad daylight in a crowded street in the centre of Sofia.  As a statement about the power of organised crime in Bulgaria, it could hardly have been more explicit.

Moreover, it could hardly have come at a worse time for Prime Minister Boyko Borissov’s government.  Borissov came to power in July facing the arduous task of regaining the trust of Bulgaria’s European Union partners.  Some of them bitterly regretted their decision to let Bulgaria join the EU in 2007 before it had properly confronted the scourge of organised crime.  A 2008 European Commission report on Bulgaria’s progress in tackling corruption and organised crime was, in my view, the most negative ever produced about a EU member-state.

Broadly speaking, however, Borissov has done a good job in reassuring the rest of Europe that he means business.  His government has tried to crack down on public sector corruption, such as in the customs service, and it claims some success in its anti-kidnapping campaign.  Herman Van Rompuy, the new EU president, visited Sofia in December and stated: “Bulgaria is again on the right track.”

From a EU perspective, though, Bulgaria rarely seems to be in the news for the right reasons.  Over the past week, some curious reports have emerged from Sofia suggesting that the Bulgarian government may seek to derail Turkey’s EU membership bid.  Why would Bulgaria threaten such a rash step against its neighbour?  One official in Sofia linked the threat to long-standing Bulgarian financial claims against Turkey.

Bulgaria demands up to €14bn in compensation from Turkey for property that belonged to several hundred thousand ethnic Bulgarians who were driven out of the western Ottoman Empire just before the First World War.  However, these claims are more than 80 years old, and there seems no particular reason to publicise them now – unless for domestic Bulgarian political purposes.

Turkey is urging restraint.  After the Tsankov murder, Bulgaria should concentrate first on putting its own house in order.

What does 2010 hold in store for the European Union?  With people in Brussels only just drifting back to work after a couple of weeks of snow, sub-zero temperatures and seasonally adjusted flu, it seems too brutal to plunge straight into topics such as the “2020 Strategy“, the “Reflection Group“ and other elusively named EU initiatives of which we are certain to hear more as the year moves on.

What one can say is that the EU ended 2009 feeling rather more pleased with itself than perhaps it had expected 12 months previously.  Despite suffering the most severe economic contraction in its history, the EU avoided a meltdown of its financial sector, stuck fairly well to its rules on fair competition and free trade, and even witnessed a return to growth in certain countries.

Of course, survival came at a heavy price.  The sharp increase in budget deficits and public debts incurred as a result of the crisis has not only wiped out all progress achieved on Europe’s fiscal front since the euro’s launch in 1999.  It has also prompted concern about the ability and willingness of the hardest-hit countries, such as Greece, Ireland and Spain, to make the sacrifices in living standards and adjustments to public policy that will be necessary to stay in the same monetary union as Germany.  And the fiscal condition of the UK is truly terrible.

The EU can take pride in having modestly advanced its enlargement process in 2009.  This was never going to be easy in a year of such harsh economic conditions.  But in the end there was progress to report for a clutch of aspirant countries, notably Albania, Croatia, Iceland, Montenegro and Serbia.  Against that, one has to state bluntly that it was a bad year for EU attempts to stabilise Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This could return to haunt the EU in 2010.

Then there was final approval of the Lisbon treaty – a matter of almost total indifference to the non-European world, but a cause dear to the hearts of EU policymakers, who had battled valiantly for almost a decade to change some of the rules governing the way the EU goes about its business.  Nothing spoke more eloquently of the importance of this formidably obscure document than the relief on everyone’s faces after Irish voters said Yes to the treaty in October, and after Czech President Vaclav Klaus dropped his objections to it a few weeks later.  The Lisbon rules won’t transform the EU, but there is – for the moment – a collective will to make them work for the general interest.

What about the bad omens of 2009?  If one was Bosnia, another was the EU’s inability to achieve much in the grey zone of former Soviet states that divides the bloc from Russia and is increasingly turning into an area of political and economic rivalry.  The EU’s optimistically named Eastern Partnership took off in May, but its credibility was undermined by a lack of funding and by the absence of most of Europe’s top leaders at the Prague launch event.  In 2010 Ukraine, which holds a landmark presidential election on January 17, willl be the key country to watch.

Probably the most worrisome omen was the dénouement of the Copenhagen world conference on climate change, when the EU found itself abruptly frozen out as a handful of other states, led by the US and China, tried to frame the final compromises.  As Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister, told me a few days later: “We’ve been taught some lessons about the realities of the so-called multipolar world.”

Quite so.  If I were to hazard one prediction about 2010, it is that Europe will receive one or two more lessons on the same subject.

Seen from continental Europe, one of the biggest questions of 2010 concerns David Cameron, leader of the UK’s opposition Conservative party.  The Tories are widely expected to win the forthcoming British election, but few European Union politicians can claim with confidence to know where he truly stands on the all-important matter of Britain’s relationship with the EU.

The lack of clarity isn’t helped by the Tories’ distant relationship with their fellow EU centre-right parties.  I am in Bonn at a congress of the European People’s Party, the leading centre-right party group.  Everyone who matters is here: Germany’s Angela Merkel, Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi, Herman Van Rompuy (the newly appointed full-time EU president)…  Countries from Malta to Latvia and Georgia to Croatia are represented.  But there are no Conservative party politicians at all here – not Cameron, not William Hague, his shadow foreign secretary, not Kenneth Clarke, the only authentically pro-EU voice in the shadow cabinet.

What a magnificent example of “splendid isolation” – what childishness.  And what makes the Tories’ absence all the more extraordinary is that a majority of the speakers at the EPP congress are speaking in English.

In the absence of direct contacts with the Tories, the EPP’s leaders and strategists could do worse than look at a new report on Cameron and the EU published today by the Centre for European Reform, the London-based think-tank.  It paints Cameron as a force for moderation on European issues within his party, observing: “Though a eurosceptic of sorts, he is a pragmatist rather than an ideologue and he sees that the British national interest requires constructive engagement with EU partners.  Cameron needs to be supported against those who wish to provoke a crisis in Britain’s relationship with the EU.”

I am sure this is true, but if I were a political leader in mainland Europe I would feel sorely tempted to ask myself: “But what is Cameron going to offer me?  Where is he proposing to meet me halfway?”  Accepting that the EU’s Lisbon treaty is here to stay, as he did last month, is nothing like enough.

Once in power, there is much that Cameron could contribute in a positive sense to shaping the EU’s future.  He could put forward ideas for improving the EU’s long-term economic competitiveness, combining a strategy for economic growth with a dedication to fighting climate change.  He could press forward on the important issue of European security and defence policy, recognising that this will do much to determine Europe’s relative weight in the world.  He could hold aloft the banner of EU enlargement.

If other EU leaders are to support Cameron against the anti-EU elements in his party and country, it will be up to him to offer something in return.

Next week’s summit of European Union leaders faces an important choice on Turkey.  Should the EU toughen existing measures that are holding up Turkey’s EU accession talks, because of Ankara’s refusal to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic?  Or should the EU recognise that this would send completely the wrong message, just when Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders are trying to reach a comprehensive settlement of the long-standing Cyprus dispute?

Precisely because the EU is divided on the Turkish question – the Greek Cypriot-run government of Cyprus wants a strong line, and other countries are split between supporters and opponents of Turkey’s entry into the EU – it seems unlikely that a consensus can be reached in favour of placing additional obstacles in the path of Turkey’s negotiations.

But the fact that Turkey’s membership prospects are being framed in these terms is a bad sign in itself.  It is draining public support in Turkey for joining the EU.  It is encouraging the ruling Justice and Development party to pursue its policy of broadening Turkey’s foreign policy horizons beyond Europe and beyond the Nato alliance - to the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia and central Asia.

That, of course, is by no means a bad thing.  Turkey’s revived engagement with its non-European neighbours, and its mediation in disputes such as that between Israel and Syria, are positive developments.

But an analysis written by Amanda Akcakoca of the European Policy Centre think-tank sums up the other side of the picture nicely.  “The old notion that Turkey is a country linked exclusively to the West has been set aside.  The common vital interests that tied Ankara and Washington together during the Cold War have significantly weakened, and Turkey will no longer toe the US foreign policy line when this goes against its own strategic interests.  Neither will it feel obliged to align itself to every EU foreign policy action or statement as long as Brussels persists in its ambiguous attitude towards Turkey’s eventual membership,” she writes.

One can agree with all of this – except perhaps the notion that it is “Brussels” that has an ambiguous attitude.  Actually, it is the inability of the EU’s 27 governments to form a common position on Turkey that is the heart of the problem.  The EU’s Lisbon treaty is meant to strengthen the EU’s common foreign policy and help the EU project its influence more convincingly around the world.  No policy issue will be more important than the Turkey dossier in demonstrating whether these fine aspirations are just hot air.

Enlargement of the European Union is, almost imperceptibly, moving forward once more.  EU foreign ministers are expected next week to forward Albania’s membership application to the European Commission for an opinion.  This is a necessary technical step on the path to entry – small, but important.

The Commission is already preparing opinions on the applications of Iceland and Montenegro.  The opinions will take quite some time to deliver – longer for Albania and Montenegro than for Iceland – but the machinery is now in motion.

There are signs of progress elsewhere, too.  For a long time Serbia’s efforts to draw closer to the EU have been held back by the refusal of the Netherlands to permit implementation of Serbia’s EU stabilisation and association agreement.  The Dutch insist that Serge Brammertz, the chief United Nations war crimes prosecutor, must first of all declare that Serbia is fully complying with its efforts to capture war crimes suspects – principally, Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb military commander.

Brammertz is due to hand his latest report to the UN Security Council in early December, and the Serbian government appears confident that it will be positive.  That would remove the Dutch veto and allow Serbia to make a formal application for EU membership.

Meanwhile, Croatia’s bid to join the EU is back on track after a compromise over a maritime border dispute with Slovenia.  One possible complication here is that Slovenia may hold a referendum to approve the deal.

Nor will it be plain sailing for Albania.  As Olli Rehn, the EU enlargement commissioner, pointed out this week, the Albanian socialist opposition has been boycotting parliament since the national election of June 28.  The boycott “does not respect European democratic standards”, Rehn said, and could damage Albania’s chances of being granted the formal status of an EU membership candidate.

Of all the countries with EU aspirations, there remain serious problems over Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey and a frustrating deadlock over Macedonia.  But the recent movement on enlargement is encouraging, nonetheless.  Enlargement has been one of the EU’s great foreign policy success stories.  With the Lisbon treaty finally in place, it’s time to step up the pace.

Even before he was elected as president of France in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy made it crystal-clear that he didn’t want Turkey to join the European Union - ever.  Now concerns are growing in Brussels that Sarkozy is contemplating a formal Franco-German initiative next year to offer Turkey a “privileged partnership” instead of, as now, the long-term prospect of full EU membership.

The idea of a “privileged partnership” has been around for a good few years.  Sarkozy likes it, and so does Germany’s ruling Christian Democratic party.  It also appeals to Angela Merkel, the CDU chancellor.  However, Merkel has up to now taken a nuanced approach, recognising that Germany, along with other EU countries, recognised Turkey as an official candidate for membership in 1999.  A responsible country cannot just wriggle out of agreements made in good faith, Merkel believes.

The difference now is that, after last month’s German election, the Social Democrats – more sympathetic to Turkey’s aspirations – are out of government and have been replaced by the Free Democrats, whose position on Turkey is more ambiguous.  The balance of opinion in Berlin is changing.  Sarkozy may try to seize the opportunity to line up the new German government behind the concept of the ”privileged partnership”, according to EU policymakers.

Needless to say, Turkey would dismiss an offer along these lines as an insult.  There is no legal foundation for a “privileged partnership”, says Egemen Bagis, Turkey’s chief negotiator on EU matters.   You are either in the EU or not in the EU.  You cannot be half-pregnant, Bagis once told me.

The US would undoubtedly dislike such an initiative, too.  Ignoring criticism that it’s none of their business, both Democratic and Republican administrations have always encouraged the EU to accept Turkey as a full member.

Alas, Turkey’s EU membership bid is in serious trouble, anyway.  The European Commission tried to put a brave face on matters this week in its annual report on Turkey.  But the inescapable truth is that out of the 35 negotiation chapters, or policy areas, that a country needs to complete in order to join the EU, Turkey has opened 11, of which only one has been provisionally closed.  Another 12 chapters have been either formally frozen by the EU, or informally blocked by France with support from others opposed to Turkey’s bid.  The entire process risks grinding to a halt.

In December EU leaders will discuss Turkey’s failure to heed their calls to open its ports and airports to ships and aircraft from the Greek Cypriot-controlled government of Cyprus.  In theory they could take a harsh line and more or less abandon Turkey’s EU entry talks.

I doubt this will happen – Sweden, which holds the EU’s rotating presidency until December 31, is friendly towards Turkey, and many other countries think it would be crazy to adopt such a position just when negotiations on a Cyprus settlement are reaching a critical moment.

But towards the end of the first half of 2010, the picture may well look different.  April is the key month.  If the Cyprus talks are deadlocked by the time of next April’s Turkish Cypriot presidential election, and if he can get Germany on board, Sarkozy may be tempted to unveil his “privileged partnership” proposal.

According to Brian Cowen, Ireland’s premier, a No result in Friday’s referendum on the European Union’s Lisbon treaty would raise the prospect of a “two-speed Europe”, with some countries forging ahead with closer political and economic integration and others staying outside.  But isn’t a two-speed Europe the dog that is hauled out of its kennel every time there’s a EU institutional crisis but which, in the end, never barks?

After Irish voters rejected the Lisbon treaty in June 2008, a number of politicians were quick to assert that a two-speed Europe was the only way to keep the European “project” on the road.  Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s prime minister, who has lived through more EU crises than most of us have had quetsch plum tarts, mused in public that perhaps it was time for a “Club of the Few” to go ahead on their own.

Slovenia’s announcement last Friday that it is ready to lift its veto on Croatia’s European Union entry talks gave a welcome boost to the EU enlargement process.  Other than Iceland’s decision in July to apply for membership, enlargement has been running into one brick wall after another in the past couple of years.

This is partly because of petty arguments such as the Slovenian-Croatian maritime border dispute (still unresolved, in spite of last Friday’s breakthrough) which held up Croatia’s talks.  But it is also because of a certain fatigue and disillusion in many of the EU’s 27 member-states, especially in western Europe, about admitting new entrants.

The lesson some countries drew from the entry of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 was that the EU had made a mistake in letting them join before they had met EU standards on tackling corruption and organised crime and on strengthening their judicial systems.  These problems are so entrenched that EU foreign ministers drew attention to them yet again on Monday at a meeting in Brussels.

While praising evidence of modest progress in both countries, the ministers said: “The positive changes remain fragmented and have not yet produced practical results for Romanian citizens…  The Council stresses the need for more substantial results in investigating, prosecuting and judging cases of high-level corruption and organised crime in order to secure lasting change in Bulgaria.”

This statement has serious implications for Croatia’s membership talks.  For the Slovenian veto, enforced since last December, distracted attention from the fact that one of the biggest obstacles on Croatia’s path to the EU is domestic corruption and organised crime.  (There is also the question of Croatia’s co-operation with the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague.)

Ivan Simonovic, Croatia’s justice minister, contends that his country has stronger anti-corruption mechanisms in place than some countries that are already EU members.  Perhaps he is correct as far as concerns Romania and Bulgaria.  In Transparency International’s 2008 global corruption index, Romania was ranked 70th and Bulgaria 72nd, with Croatia slightly above them in 66th place.

But with the prevailing political climate in western Europe cool towards enlargement, it would be rash for Croats to think that the EU will welcome them with open arms just because corruption and organised crime are a little less rampant than in Bulgaria and Romania.

There is a tendency in Croatia to assume that the country is self-evidently at the cultural and geographical heart of Europe – it was, after all, part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire – and that entry into the EU is therefore automatic.  But as a result of its experiences with Bulgaria and Romania, the EU sets the bar higher than it used to.

This message will come into ever sharper focus now that Slovenia has lifted its veto.

After the fall of communism in central and eastern Europe, one compelling argument for bringing the region into the European Union was that the experience of prosperity, democracy and everyday multinational co-operation would ease national and ethnic tensions there.  Who knew, perhaps eventually it would get rid of them altogether, just as France and Germany were gradually reconciled after the second world war?

A flare-up of tensions last month between Slovakia and Hungary will serve as proof, to those western Europeans who were always hostile to enlargement, that such hopes were premature.  Worse still, it will confirm them in their opinion that, by admitting the two countries in 2004, all the EU succeeded in doing was to trap a nasty virus inside its own borders.

They are wrong, in my view, but that doesn’t mean that the Slovak-Hungarian tensions should be glossed over.  The spark for the trouble was the Slovak government’s decision to deter Hungary’s head of state from attending a statue-unveiling ceremony in the ethnic Hungarian-populated part of southern Slovakia.  The statue was of Saint Stephen, Hungary’s first king, who ruled 1,000 years ago.

To many Slovaks, Hungary’s attempt to send its president to the ceremony marked yet another example of interference in a region that Hungary had ruled since the Middle Ages, until forced to cede the area after the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s collapse in 1918.  To Hungarians, however, the origins of the episode lie in the anti-Hungarian outlook of Slovakia’s coalition government, manifested in a new language law which stipulates that only Slovak can be used in most public institutions.  Thousands of ethnic Hungarians went on the streets last week to demonstrate against the law.

All this is reminiscent of the Slovak-Hungarian tensions that persisted throughout the 1990s, especially after Slovakia became an independent state in 1993 in the wake of Czechoslovakia’s break-up.  Sixteen years ago, I spent some time in the part of Slovakia where the latest troubles broke out and, re-reading what I wrote back then, it is tempting to conclude that not a great deal has changed in the meantime.

And yet that is not really so.  There are ultra-nationalist elements in Slovakia, and they are even represented in the country’s coalition government.  But overall Slovakia is more confident in its statehood.  It joined the eurozone this year and has no interest in fomenting instability in its region.  Meanwhile, Hungary has every right to take an interest in the status of ethnic Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries.  Perhaps sometimes Hungary oversteps the mark in a rather disconcerting way, but there is never any suggestion of violence or attempted subversion.

Tensions of this kind have such deep roots that it would be silly to expect them to disappear as a result of five years of EU membership.  But in the end, the chances that they really will disappear will be much higher if Slovakia and Hungary are in the EU than outside.

Next Tuesday, Turkey’s bid to join the European Union will creep forward one more inch.  The EU and Turkey will open formal talks on taxation, one of the 35 “chapters”, or policy areas, that a candidate for EU membership must complete before joining the bloc.

Egemen Bagis, Turkey’s chief EU negotiator, is pleased but, unsurprisingly, not overwhelmed.  After the taxation talks start, only 11 of Turkey’s 35 chapters will be open.  The EU froze another eight chapters in December 2006 in retaliation for Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to vessels and aircraft from the Greek Cypriot-controlled government of Cyprus.

Visiting Brussels on Thursday, Bagis made it plain that he strongly favoured EU membership.  “I believe that the European Union is the grandest peace project in human history, and the crown of this peace project will be Turkey’s accession,” he told me and some other Brussels-based reporters over lunch.

But entry into the EU is indisputably a long way off.  Bagis recognised that Turkey would not complete all 35 chapters by 2014.  Even then, there would be huge question marks over the readiness of countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands to approve Turkish membership.  Western European political parties opposed to Turkey’s accession performed strongly in the recent European Parliament elections.

Bagis made one particularly interesting point.  He said he foresaw three possible scenarios in the event that Turkey were to close all 35 chapters: a) Turkey immediately joins the EU; b) Turkey, like Spain and the UK in the 1960s, is vetoed but perseveres with its application and eventually succeeds in joining; or c) Turks, like Norwegians in 1972 and 1994, turn down the chance of EU membership in a referendum, even though their country meets all the entry criteria.

Bagis says that EU membership is a goal that can unite all Turks – civilian leaders and the military, northern Turks and southern Turks, Turks and ethnic Kurds, and so on.  But what if, thanks to western European opposition, Turkish society’s faith in the possibility of EU membership diminishes to the point where the goal itself no longer seems to matter?

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Peter Spiegel is the FT's Brussels bureau chief. He returned to the FT in August 2010 after spending five years covering foreign policy and national security issues from Washington for the Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times, focusing on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He first joined the FT in 1999 covering business regulation and corporate crime in its Washington bureau, before spending four years covering military affairs and the defence industry in London and Washington.

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