Last week I met Ivan Simonovic, justice minister of Croatia, whose bid to join the European Union in 2011 or 2012 depends to a great extent on how well the EU authorities judge the nation’s struggle against organised crime and corruption is going.  Simonovic, an energetic reformer of Croatia’s judicial system, told me that Croatia now had “a stronger system of prevention and suppression of organised crime than in many European Union countries”.

He didn’t mention any countries by name, but it may have been no coincidence that on the same day the European Commission published its latest reports on Bulgaria and Romania, easily the two most corruption-ridden EU member-states. The report on Bulgaria struck me as surprisingly mild, permitting Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev to describe it as “a clear, encouraging signal that we are on the right track”. Still, the report’s final sentence pulled no punches: “No major court decisions on high-profile cases of organised crime have been taken in recent months.”

The assessment of Romania was noticeably harsher. “The pace of progress noted in the Commission’s report of July 2008 has not been maintained… Some investigations of high-level cases remain blocked by the Romanian parliament… The capacity of the judicial system in Romania is still weak… It is important that the Romanian authorities regain momentum on judicial reform and the fight against corruption, so as to reverse certain backward movements of recent months.”

The corridors of power in Brussels still echo to the mutterings of policymakers who think Bulgaria and Romania, which became EU members in January 2007, were admitted too soon into the bloc. Once a country joins, so the argument goes, its fellow member-states and the EU institutions lose much of their leverage to make that new entrant behave better. True, but one could perhaps make the case that Bulgaria’s recent improvement - if that’s what it really is - owes something to the European Commission’s decision last year to withdraw or suspend EU funds worth several hundred million euros.

Overall, though, it is difficult to disagree with the latest verdict from Transparency International, the anti-corruption watchdog: “Since 2007, some anti-corruption measures have been launched by both countries, but results are far from satisfactory since these initiatives are limited to the EU’s minimal mandatory requirements and do not address the core corruption problems faced by Bulgaria and Romania.”

In his recent inaugural address in Washington, President Barack Obama said “the time has come to set aside childish things”. Evidently the leaders of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia weren’t listening.

They have just done an unbelievably childish thing and named their section of a major north-south trans-European highway - known in Eurospeak as “Corridor 10″ - after Alexander the Great. In 2007, they renamed Skopje airport after him.

Now, as we know, Alexander certainly had a taste for travel. He extended his empire as far as India. But these persistent efforts to attach his name to modern European transport systems are, I’d say, beginning to stretch the point.

The Macedonians in Skopje think their state has a rightful claim on Alexander’s memory because of his connections to their territory in ancient times. But the authorities in Athens regard Alexander as an exclusively Greek warrior-hero.

The result: Greece has made clear it won’t pay one euro towards the cost of the Macedonian part of Corridor 10. And relations between Athens and Skopje are in yet another mess.

In Brussels, European Union officials are beside themselves with frustration as they watch this dispute jeopardise their carefully laid plans for the EU’s slow but steady enlargement into the Balkans. The argument over what former Yugoslav Macedonia should call itself has dragged on for almost 20 years, and a solution seems no closer now than when it first broke out.

Of course, the dispute arouses great passions on both sides - as shown in the posts to this story on BalkanInsight.com. But the way it’s being handled would be enough to make the great Alexander turn in his grave.

Greece argues that Skopje’s claim to the name Macedonia is an assault on Greece’s ancient Hellenic heritage, its identity and even its territory, since there is a northern Greek province also called Macedonia. For the former Yugoslav republic, however, it is vital to have a name that strengthens the identity of its people. Skopje perceives subtle threats not only from Greece but from Bulgaria, which questions whether there really is such a thing as a Macedonian nation and language, and Serbia, which denies the autonomy of the Macedonian church.

Last year, a widespread view in Brussels was that Greece had overplayed its hand when it blocked ex-Yugoslav Macedonia’s progress towards EU and Nato membership because of the name dispute. Now, however, it’s Skopje that’s in the EU’s black book, because of its dumb decision on renaming its bit of Corridor 10.

In an excellent new report, the International Crisis Group think-tank recommends that Skopje should state its readiness to accept a UN mediator’s proposal and use the name “Republic of Northern Macedonia” for international purposes. In return, Greece should drop its veto threats at Nato and the EU.

Common sense, really. But this is a commodity in short supply in some parts of the Balkans.

Turkey should almost be pleased. On Friday the European Union agreed to open two new “chapters”, or policy areas, in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations - on the free movement of capital and on information society and the media. The Czech Republic, which takes over the EU’s rotating presidency from France on January 1, hopes to open two more chapters during its six-month spell in charge.

So out of the 35 chapters that need to be completed before a country can join the EU, Turkey now has 10 open and could have 12 open by June 30. Whoopee! At this rate, all 35 will be open by some time in 2015. Except, of course, that certain western European governments have no intention of letting Turkey into the EU at all. Moreover, eight of Turkey’s negotiating chapters were frozen two years ago because the EU disapproves of Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to trade with Cyprus. All in all, far from moving steadily forwards, Turkey’s accession talks are going nowhere fast.

Still, at least Turkey is under fewer and fewer illusions about where things really stand. With Croatia, there is less certainty. Quarrels with Slovenia, its former fellow-Yugoslav republic, meant that the EU on Friday concluded only three chapters with Croatia and opened one more. Slovenia blocked further progress.

This was a bitter blow for Croatia, which had wanted to conclude five chapters, open 10, and race ahead to completing its EU entry talks by next December, with a view to becoming a full member-state in 2011. Instead, Croatia now has concluded only 7 of the 35 chapters, with another 15 open and 13 more still to be launched. Finishing these talks inside the next 12 months is starting to look like a very tall task.

Then there is Serbia. A report by the United Nations war crimes prosecutor this month made it clear that, even if Serbian co-operation with the war crimes tribunal in The Hague had improved, it ought to be even better. The arrest of Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb general accused of genocide, would do the trick. But as long as he remains at large, the Dutch government won’t lift its block on closer Serbian association with the EU.

Macedonia is stuck, too - over that wearisome dispute with Greece about what its name should be. As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, it will be something of an achievement if it hangs together as a state, never mind about joining the EU. And when Montenegro officially presented its membership application on Monday, there were mutterings on the EU side that this was much too premature.

Some people put these problems down to “enlargement fatigue” in the EU’s older member-states. I don’t know if they’re right. But it certainly looks as if, as far as concerns enlargement, everyone can settle down to a good long sleep in 2009.

The European Commission’s latest annual report on Turkey is striking for its kind words on Turkish foreign policy and its harsher language on internal Turkish political developments. It describes progress in some areas towards meeting the criteria for joining the European Union, and little or no progress in others.

In short, there is something for those who want Turkey one day to be in the EU, something for those who do not, and a lot for those who prefer to let the whole thing just drift along.

On foreign policy, the Commission welcomes Turkey’s mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. It praises President Abdullah Gül for breaking the ice in relations with Armenia by making the first visit to Yerevan by a Turkish head of state. It also recognises Turkey’s constructive role in proposing a Caucasus stability accord to ease regional tensions after Russia’s invasion of Georgia.

On domestic affairs, though, the tone is different. “Despite its strong political mandate, the government did not put forward a consistent and comprehensive programme of political reforms… Overall, there has been limited progress on public administration reform… No progress has been made on strengthening parliamentary oversight of the military budget… The government has failed to prepare a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy…” And so on.

The truth is that Turkey’s accession negotiations are stuck in a rut. They started in October 2005, but out of the 35 chapters, or policy areas, that must be completed before a candidate country can join, Turkey and the EU have opened only eight. Another eight were frozen in December 2006 because of Turkey’s refusal to open its trade to vessels from Cyprus. Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and other leaders scarcely disguise their opposition to full Turkish EU membership.

All this is taking its toll on Turkey’s traditionally pro-western political and business elites and on Turkish public opinion in general. Turkey has been diversifying its diplomatic and commercial relations and engaging more actively with its closest neighbours, with the Turkic world of Central Asia and, increasingly, with Russia.

Too many EU leaders give the impression of using a 30-year-old mental map of the world in which Turkey is just some turbulent, backward appendage to the south-eastern corner of Europe. In Ankara or Istanbul, such condescension does not go down well.

Among the lessons to be drawn from the Russian-Georgian war is that the next flashpoint between the European Union and Russia may turn out to be Ukraine. There is a particular risk of trouble over Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula where ethnic Russians are in the majority and where Russia’s Black Sea fleet has a 20-year lease on bases that is due to expire in 2017.

To help avert a crisis in Ukraine, the EU badly needs to come up with a convincing strategy for rescuing the country from the geopolitical no man’s land in which it has languished since the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia underscores the Kremlin’s determination to rebuild its influence in former Soviet republics on its western and southern borders. Ukraine - with 46m people and a culture and history intimately connected to that of Russia - is the biggest prize of them all.

Unfortunately, the EU’s plans for Ukraine are at present anything but convincing. At an EU foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels last month, the 27-nation bloc even found itself debating whether to state the obvious and call Ukraine a European country. The snag is that to do so would imply that Ukraine has the right to eventual EU membership, a prospect that some EU member-states can’t stomach.

EU and Ukrainian leaders are due to meet in the French town of Evian on September 9 and sign an association agreement on closer relations. But this accord will be deliberately ambiguous about whether or not it puts Ukraine on a track leading one day to EU accession.

A new report by the European Council on Foreign Relations think-tank argues that the EU cannot afford any more delays in defining and deepening its ties with Ukraine. It proposes giving Ukraine access to the EU’s four freedoms (freedom of movement of goods, people, services and capital) and a roadmap for visa-free travel. It advises the EU to commit itself to consulting and assisting Ukraine in the event of a challenge to the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It recommends support for Ukraine’s efforts to secure the peaceful withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea fleet from Crimea.

Above all, the report advocates that the Ukraine should be offered a “clearer perspective” towards a Nato membership action plan, and states that the EU should recognise Ukraine’s right to join the EU. None of these steps would be intended as a provocation to Russia, whose sheer size and regional weight leave the EU with no choice but to pursue a policy of long-term diplomatic and commercial engagement with Moscow.

The report’s recommendations make a lot of sense. However, they may overstate the EU’s ability to apply its famed “soft power” in a country that is right on Russia’s doorstep and permeated with Russian influence. Equally, they may underestimate Russia’s probable response to any hint that Ukraine is drawing close to Nato.

All in all, one has to fear that a crisis in Ukraine, like this month’s fighting in Georgia, will flare up long before the EU’s member-states have forged a consensus on what they want to do.

Those who say Turkey must never be allowed to join the European Union should meet Mehmet Simsek, the Turkish economy minister. His family and career background may surprise some people. But it is a story that serves as a reminder not to lock modern Turkey in a box of tired old stereotypes.

Simsek was in Brussels this week for a meeting of the European Policy Centre think-tank. After bombarding his lunchtime audience with fiscal and trade data, he turned to the attacks being launched on Turkish targets by the PKK, the Kurdish separatist movement.

"The PKK is not representative of Kurds," he said. "I am a Turkish citizen but my ethnic origin is Kurdish."

Quite so. Simsek was born in 1967 in Batman, a poor province of southeastern Turkey. Kurdish, not Turkish, was his first language - and this in a country where Kurdish identity and the Kurdish language have often struggled to win official recognition from the authorities.

Yet here is Simsek, at the age of 40, running Turkey’s economy. On the way he has picked up an economics degree from Ankara University, collected another degree from the UK’s University of Exeter, worked for the US embassy in Ankara, spent time at the equity analysis department of UBS bank in New York, and then moved up at the ranks at Merrill Lynch in London.

In Turkey’s general election last July, Simsek was elected to parliament for the Justice and Development party, the one that scares so many Europeans because of its Islamic roots.

It’s worth pausing a moment to think about this. An ethnic Kurd, born into poverty, rises first to become an international investment banker and then to take office as a government minister for a party which, though wedded to Turkey’s secular system, clearly has conservative Islamic religious tendencies.

It is an extraordinary tale that tests the limits of the European imagination by confounding its sense of what constitutes progress and backwardness, east and west, tolerance and intolerance. Turkey truly is unique. And that is one good reason not to rush to judgement on where its long process of self-transformation may finish up.

The last time Serbian and European leaders really got together, they seethed at each other. So why is the EU dusting off its plans to cuddle up to Belgrade? And why do I think it is a good idea?

I remember that last meeting in October, when, bunkered down in a conference centre in Luxembourg, Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia’s prime minister, proclaimed his country’s heartfelt desire to hang on to the province of Kosovo – whatever the wishes of the EU or US.

Olli Rehn, the EU’s enlargement Commissioner, said Serbia had done nowhere near enough to track down Gen Ratko Mladic, the man blamed for Europe’s worst massacre since the second world war – the killing of up to 8,000 Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995.

The air was thick with recrimination. Rehn made clear that unless Serbia did much more on handing over Mladic, there was no chance that talks would resume on deepening Belgrade’s ties with Brussels,  negotiations supposed to open the way for Serbia to join the EU.

Now, however, Rehn is giving off much more positive signals, making clear that, if Serbia’s parliamentary elections on Sunday go well, the talks could pick up where they left off and make up for lost time.

Continue reading "Dealing with Belgrade"

Britain has been traumatised in recent months by stories about a tidal wave of Polish and Lithuanian workers coming to the UK. Given the tone of much of the media reporting of the issue, it is hardly surprising that British support for the EU enlargement process has fallen by eight points to 36 per cent in just six months.
Such a response would seem bizarre in the United States, where it is far more common for workers to cross state lines in search of jobs. In fact, such labour mobility is a vital part of the US economy’s success.

Continue reading "Europe needs more mobility, not less"