Germany's Schäuble, left, and France's Moscovici sent the Tobin letters out this morning.
First, it was going to be a global financial transactions tax – known among the cognoscenti as the Tobin tax – agreed by the Group of 20 major economies, but the US wouldn’t go along. Then it was going to be an EU-wide levy among all 27 members of the bloc, but the UK and several Nordics disagreed.
That got whittled down to the 17 eurozone members, but the Dutch and Irish didn’t want it. So, starting today, a final push to find nine EU members who will sign up to the Tobin tax was launched by France and Germany, who sent letters around this morning to all EU finance ministries looking for takers.
Under the EU’s arcane rules, if nine sign up, Paris and Berlin can move ahead with “enhanced cooperation” – essentially a tool that allows a small subset of countries to agree on common policies and still stay within the EU’s legal system. But it’s not certain they’ll find even nine, EU diplomats said.
According to copies of two letters obtained by Brussels Blog – one to the European Commission, the other to national capitals – co-signatories Pierre Moscovici, the French finance minister, and Wofgäng Schauble, his German counterpart, are trying to gain support by arguing the tax is the financial sector’s contribution to eurozone crisis response. Read more
Is it possible to have one supervisor for eurozone banks, while keeping 17 different paymasters for when things go wrong?
It is the big potential problem of phasing in a banking union – while prudential responsibility is centralized under one supervisor, the means to pay for bank failure isn’t. One cynical diplomat likened it to “telling all cars to suddenly change sides and drive on the left of the road – but leaving the lorries to drive on the right.”
Just think through what would happen in the case of a failed financial institution once the European Central Bank takes over supervision.
Under the Brussels banking union plan, the ECB will have the power to shut down the lender by removing its license to operate. But in practice it would require the authorisation of the bank national authority. As we know, some banks perform vital functions for the economy and are too big to fail. For the ECB to pull the plug, someone would have to be available to pay for winding it up or bailing it out. Read more
Planning for a European banking union is racing ahead, in spite of the considerable political obstacles. The vision is for two, five or even ten years in the future. But be in no doubt: the institutional turf war is already afoot.
It was on display today in the pages of the international press. Speaking to the FT Jose Manuel Barroso, the European commission president, laid out his vision of a banking union built on the foundations of existing EU institutions.
At the same time Christian Noyer, the governor of the Bank of France, made his pitch in the Wall Street Journal for eurozone central banks to provide “the backbone of the financial union”.
The clashing views highlight the great unanswered question of the banking union: if power over banks is centralised, who will be given control? Cui bono? These three scenarios lay down the broad templates for a union, and the institutions that would stand to win and lose depending on the outcome.
1. An EU banking union
Broadly as outlined by Barroso. A single supervisor, resolution regime and deposit guarantee fund serving all 27 member states. Should the UK refuse to take part — which it will — arrangements would be found to enable the other members to go forward. This union would cover countries outside and inside the single currency club, but remain within an EU framework.
Treaty change would not be necessary, at least according to the commission. Read more
Madrid police stand guard outside Bankia, the troubled Spanish bank, during a protest Saturday.
In talking to senior officials about plans for a Spanish bailout for our story in today’s dead tree edition of the FT, several steered us to the seemingly overlooked bank recaptialisation guidelines for the eurozone’s €440bn rescue fund that were adopted last year.
Those six pages, available for all to see on the website of the rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, make clear European leaders were contemplating exactly the situation Spain now finds itself in: having done the hard work on fiscal reform, but suffering from a teetering banking sector that needs to be recapitalised.
The important thing to note in the current context is that the EFSF guidelines, adopted after more than a year of fighting over whether the fund should be used for bank rescues at all, allow for a very thin layer of conditionality for bailout assistance if the aid goes to financial institutions – notably, it foresees no need for a full-scale “troika” mission of monitors poking around in national budget plans. That’s something the government of Mariano Rajoy has been demanding for weeks. Read more
Some issues to bear in mind when considering whether a European banking union is a realistic possibility. The difficulties highlighted are not impossible to overcome. But it would be a wrench.
1. Germans don’t like strong EU supervision of their banks. Berlin is fond of federal EU solutions. But it is even more keen on running its own banks. The political links — especially between the state and regional savings banks — are particularly strong in Germany. To date Berlin has proved one of the biggest opponents of giving serious clout to existing pan-EU regulators.
2. Germans really don’t like strong EU supervision of their banks. There is again some wishful thinking about Berlin shifting position. Angela Merkel did say she supported EU supervision. But there were important caveats. She referred to supervision of “systemically important banks” — which is likely to exclude the smaller Sparkassen banks and the 8 Landesbanks. To some analysts, this represents a giant loophole. She also did not explain what kind of supervision. Berlin may only support tweaks to the current system.
3. Germans don’t like underwriting foreign bank deposits. Another pillar of a banking union is common deposit insurance. To Berlin this proposal represents another ingenious scheme to pick the pocket of German taxpayers. A weaker proposal to force national deposit guarantee schemes to lend to each other in emergencies has been stuck for two years in the Brussels legislative pipeline. Most countries opposed it. German ministers say it could be considered, once there is a fiscal union across the eurozone. So don’t wait around.
Francois Hollande rather enjoys issuing blood-curdling warnings to the City of London. During the campaign he declared his “real enemy” to be ”the world of finance” and post-election he is not toning down the rhetoric.
How ironic then that Hollande’s first major piece of EU financial regulation will see him largely siding with European banks (and yes, that includes the British ones) against calls from the UK and ECB for tougher rules.
Diplomacy in Brussels can be a funny business. Hard as it is to believe, in this negotiation the big beasts of City banking have been privately cheering on the French. Next week, when finance ministers meet to negotiate a deal, we’ll all be able to see if Hollande changes Paris’ tune. Read more
Belgium's finance minister Steven Vanackere talks to colleagues at the Copenhagen meeting.
Our front page story in tomorrow’s dead tree version of the FT includes lines from confidential analyses distributed to European Union finance ministers at their gathering in Copenhagen. As usual, we thought we’d offer a bit more from the documents here at the Brussels Blog.
Among the most interesting elements in the documents are discussions about Europe’s banks, which have seen a surge in confidence thanks to the European Central Bank’s €1tn in cheap loans, known as LTRO for long-term refinancing operations.
One of the analyses in particular – the three-page “Assessment of key risks and policy issues” prepared by the EU’s economic and policy committee – warns that there are new signs of instability in the European banking sector. Details after the jump… Read more
European regulators embarked on a financial rulemaking binge after the 2008 crisis. Yet the biggest question of all — how do you let a big bank like Lehman Brothers collapse without endangering the entire financial system — remains unanswered. If you think the system was inadequate 2008, it is basically no better today.
A Brussels proposal on “Crisis Management and Bank Resolution” has been promised “in a few weeks” since the summer of 2011. Month after month, the Commission ducked the issue. Today Michel Barnier, the commissioner overseeing financial services, admitted he needed more time for a informal mini-consultation on “timing and calibration”. The odds are surely lengthening on a proposal emerging before the summer. Read more