Tag: European Union

The European Union is nothing if not addicted to targets.  Promises to achieve particular goals by specific dates are part and parcel of the EU’s daily business.  Sometimes the objectives are met, sometimes they are not met, and sometimes it’s hard to tell either way.  European monetary union, for example, was launched in 1999, but only after a two-year delay because a majority of member-states didn’t meet the criteria earlier in the decade (did Greece ever meet them?).

Apart from wars and economic slumps, nothing divides Europeans as much as the Eurovision Song Contest.

This annual televised orgy of glitzy musical mediocrity is now in its 55th year.  Good God, it is even older than the European Union’s 1957 founding Treaty of Rome!  The years have truly taken their toll.  Some would say the last memorable winning song was “Waterloo” by Sweden’s Abba in 1974.  Still, this year’s final, to be staged in Oslo on Saturday, is as certain as previous spectacles to hold millions of viewers spellbound.  It would have been no different 2,000 years ago if a multinational gladiatorial contest had been broadcast from Rome’s Colosseum to the rest of Europe.

As you’d expect, European Union leaders were quick to congratulate David Cameron on his appointment as British prime minister.  But for all the warm words, they will be watching his first moves on the European stage like hawks.

An important test will come next week at a meeting of EU finance ministers in Brussels.  There the UK will find itself under pressure from a majority of countries to agree to new arrangements tightening the regulation of hedge funds and private equity.  Spain, which holds the EU’s rotating presidency, is desperate to get the deal done next week, having helped out Gordon Brown’s Labour government by delaying it until the British election was out of the way.  But will the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition be inclined to sign up to such an important measure so soon into its period of office?

Yulia Tymoshenko’s refusal to acknowledge Viktor Yanukovich as the legitimate winner of Ukraine’s presidential election is starting to embarrass her friends in the European Union.  The White House, Nato and the EU have all congratulated Yanukovich on his victory.  The longer Tymoshenko maintains her defiant stance, the more it will cost her in terms of prestige and contacts in Europe.

Only last December I saw the red carpet rolled out for Tymoshenko at a congress in Bonn of the centre-right European People’s Party, the biggest party in the European Parliament.  Everyone was there – German chancellor Angela Merkel, EU president Herman Van Rompuy, French premier François Fillon, Italian premier Silvio Berlusconi, etc.  Tymoshenko was one of the star attractions from the “new” eastern Europe.

There is a need to clear up some misconceptions about how Greece, or some other fiscal miscreant in the 16-nation eurozone, would be rescued by its partners in the event that it was unable to refinance its debts.

Quite a few commentators seem to think eurozone governments would find it hard to sidestep the ban on bail-outs specified in European Union treaty law.  The European Central Bank, the European Commission and certain EU governments, not least that of Greece itself, have contributed to the confusion by insisting in public that a rescue is undesirable and unnecessary (while quietly planning for precisely this contingency).

Actually, EU legal experts have known for some time that, although a rescue of a eurozone member-state would not be straightforward in legal terms, it would be far from impossible.

The relevant section of the EU’s Lisbon treaty, which came into effect in December, appears to be Article 122.  This contains two clauses.  The first states that EU governments may decide to help each other out in the event of severe difficulties in the supply of certain products, above all energy.  The second clause states that when a member-state “is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council [of national governments], on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to the member-state concerned.”

There it is, in black and white.  EU governments can grant financial assistance to a fellow member-state that is in serious trouble.

Of course, Greece’s woes have not been caused by a natural disaster.  You could also make a pretty strong case that it is the mistakes of Greek policymakers, not events beyond Greece’s control, that lie behind the appalling mess in the Greek public finances.  Still, if you don’t define the 2007-09 world financial crisis as an “exceptional occurrence”, then it hard to see what type of event could ever fall into this category.

Note that Article 122 stresses it would be EU national governments, acting on advice from the Commission, that would take the decision to rescue Greece – or Ireland, Portugal and so on.  There is nothing in the treaty requiring the ECB to state its opinion one way or the other.  So, on this question, it is important to listen to eurozone political leaders, above all Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, as well as Commission president José Manuel Barroso.

None of them is any doubt whatsoever that, if the worst happens, they will have to rescue Greece.  As they see matters, the stability of one eurozone country is essential to the stability of all the others.  As one high-level EU policymaker put it this week: “The EU has all the instruments to deal with the situation in Greece.  We can do it, if the political will is there to do it.”

Tuesday’s murder of Bobi Tsankov, a young Bulgarian journalist who wrote about his country’s over-mighty gangsters, took place in broad daylight in a crowded street in the centre of Sofia.  As a statement about the power of organised crime in Bulgaria, it could hardly have been more explicit.

Moreover, it could hardly have come at a worse time for Prime Minister Boyko Borissov’s government.  Borissov came to power in July facing the arduous task of regaining the trust of Bulgaria’s European Union partners.  Some of them bitterly regretted their decision to let Bulgaria join the EU in 2007 before it had properly confronted the scourge of organised crime.  A 2008 European Commission report on Bulgaria’s progress in tackling corruption and organised crime was, in my view, the most negative ever produced about a EU member-state.

Broadly speaking, however, Borissov has done a good job in reassuring the rest of Europe that he means business.  His government has tried to crack down on public sector corruption, such as in the customs service, and it claims some success in its anti-kidnapping campaign.  Herman Van Rompuy, the new EU president, visited Sofia in December and stated: “Bulgaria is again on the right track.”

From a EU perspective, though, Bulgaria rarely seems to be in the news for the right reasons.  Over the past week, some curious reports have emerged from Sofia suggesting that the Bulgarian government may seek to derail Turkey’s EU membership bid.  Why would Bulgaria threaten such a rash step against its neighbour?  One official in Sofia linked the threat to long-standing Bulgarian financial claims against Turkey.

Bulgaria demands up to €14bn in compensation from Turkey for property that belonged to several hundred thousand ethnic Bulgarians who were driven out of the western Ottoman Empire just before the First World War.  However, these claims are more than 80 years old, and there seems no particular reason to publicise them now – unless for domestic Bulgarian political purposes.

Turkey is urging restraint.  After the Tsankov murder, Bulgaria should concentrate first on putting its own house in order.

Herman Van Rompuy, the European Union’s first full-time president, is getting down to business.  Hitting the ground running?  Not exactly.  But in various subtle ways the mild-mannered, philosophically inclined former Belgian premier is already making an impact on the way the EU goes about its work.

On Monday, his first official working day, he announced that he was summoning all 27 EU heads of government to Brussels on February 11 for an unscheduled summit on economic policy.  This statement didn’t attract much attention, because plans for such a summit were being laid even before Christmas.  But the announcement was significant nonetheless.  Chairing summits is one of the few duties that the EU’s Lisbon treaty specifically reserves to the full-time president.  By calling an unscheduled summit, Van Rompuy was signalling to the world that he intends to use his presidential authority to the full.

Meanwhile, it became clear last month that EU summits will take on a substantially different format under Van Rompuy.  Foreign ministers of member-states will, for example, no longer be automatically invited to the regular summits held in Brussels four times a year.  It is even possible that Van Rompuy will abolish, or at least radically change, the practice of issuing summit communiqués that run to dozens and dozens of pages and rarely say anything new or interesting.

Van Rompuy is also making a point of travelling around Europe as much as possible to consult with EU heads of government over a range of policy issues.  On Wednesday he will be in The Hague for talks with Jan Peter Balkenende, the Dutch premier.  On Friday he will fly down to Madrid to see José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, prime minister of Spain, with whom it is crucial that he has a good working relationship, since Spain holds the EU’s rotating presidency for the next six months.

Van Rompuy was active in December, too.  At the start of the month he was in Milan, where Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi gave him a red-carpet welcome, complete with military honours.  Two weeks later, after an assailant fractured Berlusconi’s nose and broke his teeth by throwing a miniature replica of Milan cathedral in his face, Van Rompuy rushed out a statement: “This brutal and pointless attack has shocked us all.  I wish him a swift recovery …”

This response indicates that Van Rompuy knows the value of keeping himself in the public eye, however anodyne the statements that he is obliged to let his press office issue in his name.  If you go to the homepage of the European Council, the institution that represents EU governments and of which Van Rompuy is now the head, you will find all sorts of goodies such as his personal video blog and a schedule of his weekly appointments.

For his famous haiku, alas, you will have to look elsewhere.

Van Rompuy is 62 years old and has the look of an amiable, slightly dotty professor – the sort who might absent-mindedly pour tea all over the table while he tells you an anecdote about Socrates (the Greek philosopher, not the Brazilian footballer).  It would be unfair to pass any judgements at such an early stage.  But it is already clear that Van Rompuy has every intention of making his mark.

Seen from continental Europe, one of the biggest questions of 2010 concerns David Cameron, leader of the UK’s opposition Conservative party.  The Tories are widely expected to win the forthcoming British election, but few European Union politicians can claim with confidence to know where he truly stands on the all-important matter of Britain’s relationship with the EU.

The lack of clarity isn’t helped by the Tories’ distant relationship with their fellow EU centre-right parties.  I am in Bonn at a congress of the European People’s Party, the leading centre-right party group.  Everyone who matters is here: Germany’s Angela Merkel, Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi, Herman Van Rompuy (the newly appointed full-time EU president)…  Countries from Malta to Latvia and Georgia to Croatia are represented.  But there are no Conservative party politicians at all here – not Cameron, not William Hague, his shadow foreign secretary, not Kenneth Clarke, the only authentically pro-EU voice in the shadow cabinet.

What a magnificent example of “splendid isolation” – what childishness.  And what makes the Tories’ absence all the more extraordinary is that a majority of the speakers at the EPP congress are speaking in English.

In the absence of direct contacts with the Tories, the EPP’s leaders and strategists could do worse than look at a new report on Cameron and the EU published today by the Centre for European Reform, the London-based think-tank.  It paints Cameron as a force for moderation on European issues within his party, observing: “Though a eurosceptic of sorts, he is a pragmatist rather than an ideologue and he sees that the British national interest requires constructive engagement with EU partners.  Cameron needs to be supported against those who wish to provoke a crisis in Britain’s relationship with the EU.”

I am sure this is true, but if I were a political leader in mainland Europe I would feel sorely tempted to ask myself: “But what is Cameron going to offer me?  Where is he proposing to meet me halfway?”  Accepting that the EU’s Lisbon treaty is here to stay, as he did last month, is nothing like enough.

Once in power, there is much that Cameron could contribute in a positive sense to shaping the EU’s future.  He could put forward ideas for improving the EU’s long-term economic competitiveness, combining a strategy for economic growth with a dedication to fighting climate change.  He could press forward on the important issue of European security and defence policy, recognising that this will do much to determine Europe’s relative weight in the world.  He could hold aloft the banner of EU enlargement.

If other EU leaders are to support Cameron against the anti-EU elements in his party and country, it will be up to him to offer something in return.

Next week’s summit of European Union leaders faces an important choice on Turkey.  Should the EU toughen existing measures that are holding up Turkey’s EU accession talks, because of Ankara’s refusal to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic?  Or should the EU recognise that this would send completely the wrong message, just when Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders are trying to reach a comprehensive settlement of the long-standing Cyprus dispute?

Precisely because the EU is divided on the Turkish question – the Greek Cypriot-run government of Cyprus wants a strong line, and other countries are split between supporters and opponents of Turkey’s entry into the EU – it seems unlikely that a consensus can be reached in favour of placing additional obstacles in the path of Turkey’s negotiations.

But the fact that Turkey’s membership prospects are being framed in these terms is a bad sign in itself.  It is draining public support in Turkey for joining the EU.  It is encouraging the ruling Justice and Development party to pursue its policy of broadening Turkey’s foreign policy horizons beyond Europe and beyond the Nato alliance - to the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia and central Asia.

That, of course, is by no means a bad thing.  Turkey’s revived engagement with its non-European neighbours, and its mediation in disputes such as that between Israel and Syria, are positive developments.

But an analysis written by Amanda Akcakoca of the European Policy Centre think-tank sums up the other side of the picture nicely.  “The old notion that Turkey is a country linked exclusively to the West has been set aside.  The common vital interests that tied Ankara and Washington together during the Cold War have significantly weakened, and Turkey will no longer toe the US foreign policy line when this goes against its own strategic interests.  Neither will it feel obliged to align itself to every EU foreign policy action or statement as long as Brussels persists in its ambiguous attitude towards Turkey’s eventual membership,” she writes.

One can agree with all of this – except perhaps the notion that it is “Brussels” that has an ambiguous attitude.  Actually, it is the inability of the EU’s 27 governments to form a common position on Turkey that is the heart of the problem.  The EU’s Lisbon treaty is meant to strengthen the EU’s common foreign policy and help the EU project its influence more convincingly around the world.  No policy issue will be more important than the Turkey dossier in demonstrating whether these fine aspirations are just hot air.

There are all sorts of threats to the European Union’s unity, but something tells me that the biggest threat isn’t the Visegrad group.  This appears to be a view not shared by President Nicolas Sarkozy of France.

Speaking after the October 29-30 EU summit in Brussels, Sarkozy criticised the fact that the leaders of the four Visegrad countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – had held a pre-summit meeting to co-ordinate their positions.  “If they were to meet regularly before each Council, that would raise some questions,” Sarkozy said.

Would it, really?  When I put this question the other day to a high-ranking official from a Visegrad country, he replied with a Sarkozy-like grimace on his face.  The Visegrad group was, he said, as harmless as other EU regional subgroups, such as the Nordic trio (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), the Iberians (Portugal and Spain) and Club Aristotle (Cyprus and Greece).

In truth, the most curious thing about the Visegrad group is that it still exists.  No sooner had it been set up in 1991 after the fall of communism than, like some mysterious mitteleuropäisch cell, it mutated from three members into four with the break-up of Czechoslovakia.  It held together largely because of the belief that strength in solidarity would accelerate the integration of the four into western security and economic structures – the EU and Nato.

But the strains inside the group have never entirely gone away.  Poland, the biggest member, tends to see itself as a kind of big brother, with a wider view on the world than the rest.  The Poles no longer want to be treated in the EU as a mere regional player, a country defined by its proximity to places like Belarus and Ukraine.  They want to be at the top table, next to France, Germany and the UK.

The Czech Republic tends to be regarded as the smarty-pants of the four, a perception reinforced by the Czech EU presidency in the first half of this year.  The Czechs spent an awful lot of time telling everyone how they were superior to their neighbours, because their far-sighted policies had enabled them to escape the worst of the financial crisis.  This know-all attitude didn’t exactly endear them to their EU partners.

Slovakia had a bad reputation in the 1990s because of the misrule of Vladimir Meciar, the former prime minister.  But it then transformed itself so fast that it is now the only Visegrad country in the eurozone.  However, there are continuing tensions over Slovakia’s ethnic Hungarian minority.

Hungary was hit hardest by the financial crisis.  Its neighbours gave Hungary the cold shoulder in February when the government in Budapest proposed a €180bn emergency aid programme to recapitalise the banking systems of central and eastern Europe and reschedule foreign currency debt.

This in itself is proof, if any were needed, that Sarkozy’s suspicions are exaggerated.  But then again, French opinions about the EU’s former communist countries have a rich history.  After all, who was it who told the central and eastern Europeans at the start of the Iraq war that they had “missed a good opportunity to shut up”?

Step forward, ex-president Jacques Chirac.

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Peter Spiegel is the FT's Brussels bureau chief. He returned to the FT in August 2010 after spending five years covering foreign policy and national security issues from Washington for the Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times, focusing on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He first joined the FT in 1999 covering business regulation and corporate crime in its Washington bureau, before spending four years covering military affairs and the defence industry in London and Washington.

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