sovereign debt crisis

In a June letter, Anastasiades called Bank of Cyprus his country's "mega-systemic bank".

After the upheaval of March’s prolonged fight over Cyprus’s €10bn bailout, much of the ensuing debate has focused on the island’s largest remaining financial institution, the Bank of Cyprus, which was saved from shuttering but faces an uncertain future.

The bank’s fate was highlighted in a letter from Cyprus’s president to EU leaders in June, where he argued that eurogroup finance ministers had not properly dealt with the “urgent need” to address the “severe liquidity strain” the bailout had placed on the country’s last “mega-systemic bank”.

“I stress the systemic importance of BoC, not only in terms of the banking system but also for the entire economy,” Nicos Anastasiades wrote at the time.

Well, the European Commission’s soon-to-be-released first review of the Cyprus programme, a draft of which was obtained by Brussels Blog and posted here, shows that the fate of the bank is still somewhat unresolved – and that the EU has decided to make Nicosia’s promise to live up to the original bailout terms a primary condition for easing onerous capital controls which still hamper economic activity. Read more

Greek finance minister Stournaras, left, with IMF chief Lagarde at Monday's eurogroup meeting

In an interview with five European newspapers published Thursday, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister who heads the committee of eurozone finance ministers, said his eurogroup will need to look at whether Greece needs additional bailout aid in April 2014.

This will surprise some members of the troika, particularly the International Monetary Fund, who were pushing for a reckoning much more quickly amid signs the €172bn second Greek bailout is running out of cash much sooner than anticipated.

Once the €3bn in EU aid contained in a new €4.8bn tranche approved this week is paid out, total EU outlays will reach €133.6bn — out of a total €144.6bn committed (the IMF puts up the rest). So just €11bn left in the EU’s coffers. Further evidence that cash is leaving too quickly is contained in the latest report on Greece’s rescue prepared by the European Commission, which our friends and rivals at Reuters obtained and helpfully posted for everyone to see.

As Brussels Blog noted earlier, there is no more EU cash left in the programme for the second half of next year, even though the bailout was originally supposed to contain enough until the end of 2014. But this chart in the new report makes clear that cash may run out even quicker than that: Not only is the third and fourth quarters of 2014 completely unfunded, now there’s only €1.5bn left for the second quarter, too. Read more

Pedro Passos Coelho, Portugal's prime minister, addresses his nation on Tuesday

Portugal’s political wobble has raised anew questions about whether it will need a second bailout once its current €78bn rescue runs out in the middle of next year. With bond market borrowing costs hovering above 7 per cent – just below levels where Lisbon was forced into the rescue in April 2011 – a full return to market financing appears far less likely than it did just a few days ago.

What are the options if Portugal can’t make it? Back in February, when eurozone finance ministers were weighing whether to give both Ireland and Portugal more time to pay off their bailout loans, EU officials drew up a memo that included a section titled “Options beyond the current programmes and the role of the ESM”.

Although it’s over four months old, it hasn’t been made public before and it offers some newly-relevant insights into what path Portugal may take if it can’t stand on its own by May 2014. Read more

Nicos Anastasiades, the Cypriot president, leaving bailout negotiations in March.

Remember when accusations of money laundering appeared to be Cyprus’ biggest problem? It was only a few weeks ago that Nicosia was pressured into agreeing an outside auditor to poke around its banks to ensure they are not havens for questionable Russian deposits.

Given the fact Cyprus’ two main banks have been either shuttered or drastically restructured as part of its €10bn bailout, it may now seem a moot point, but the 34-page draft “memorandum of understanding” between Cyprus and bailout lenders (a copy of which we’ve gotten our hands on and posted here) is holding Nicosia to the promise.

On page 6 of the MoU, Cyprus agrees to go forward with the audit, as well as an “action plan” to make clearer just who is behind the “brass plate” shell companies that offshore entities use to take advantage of the island’s low corporate tax rates: Read more

At Friday’s gathering of eurozone finance ministers in Dublin, the so-called eurogroup is expected to give a “political endorsement” of the details of Cyprus’ €10bn bailout programme, according to a senior EU official.

Ahead of that meeting, documents related to that sign-off have begun to leak out, including the always-interesting “debt sustainability analysis” (which Brussels Blog got its hands on and posted here) and an equally intriguing document titled “assessment of the actual or potential financing needs of Cyprus”, which we’ve also posted here.

As our friends and rivals at Reuters first reported, the most unexpected thing in the documents is the revelation that Nicosia will help reduce its debt burden by selling off “the excess amount” of gold reserves held by the Cypriot central bank, which is expected to raise €400m.

But the details of the rest of what will be the “contribution by Cyprus” to the bailout may be more significant. It is spelled out in detail on page four of the second document and makes clear just how damaging the mishandling of the first bailout agreement was.

Originally, Cyprus was to contribute €7bn (€5.8bn from the now-infamous bank levy and the rest from a new withholding tax on investment profits) to the €17bn total cost of the bailout. Just over a week later, the amount Nicosia will contribute almost doubled, to €13bn, and the total price tag had increased to €23bn. Read more

The EU's Rehn, left, with Cypriot finance minister Sarris at the outset of Friday night's meeting

With the eurozone’s €10bn Cyprus bailout now laid waste by the country’s parliament, the recriminations are likely to begin almost immediately. In fact, they started even before the vote was held — almost as soon as it was announced early Saturday morning that the programme included a 6.75 per cent levy on bank accounts under €100,000.

Since then, almost all officials involved in the talks have said it wasn’t their decision to seize deposits from small savers.

Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, was the first out of the gate, telling public broadcaster ARD on Sunday that it wasn’t his idea. “We would obviously have respected the deposit guarantee for accounts up to €100,000,” Schäuble said. “But those who did not want a bail-in were the Cypriot government, also the European Commission and the ECB, they decided on this solution and they now must explain this to the Cypriot people.”

That statement sparked anger over at the ECB, which denied any involvement in levying smaller depositors. “I want to emphasise that it wasn’t the ECB that pushed for this special structure of the contribution which has now been chosen. It was the result of negotiations in Brussels,” Jörg Asmussen, the ECB executive board member who handled the central bank’s negotiations Friday night, said Monday. “We provided technical help with the calculations, as always, but we didn’t insist on this special structure.

This morning, Pierre Moscovici, the French finance minister, added his name to the list, saying he had been in favour of exempting smaller depositors “from the beginning”.

So where does the truth lie? We pieced together the events of Friday night and Saturday morning for Monday’s dead tree edition of the FT, but it appears more forensics might be needed to get this all straight. Having talked to multiple participants, here’s an even more detailed account. Read more

International lenders agreed to a €10bn bailout of Cyprus early Saturday morning after 10 hours of fraught negotiations, which included convincing Nicosia to seize €5.8bn from Cypriot bank deposits to help pay for the rescue, a first for any eurozone bailout.

The cash from Cypriot account holders will come in the form of a one-time 9.9 per cent levy on all deposits over €100,000 that will be slashed from their savings before banks reopen Tuesday, a day after a Cypriot holiday. An additional 6.75 levy will be imposed on deposits below that level.

Cypriot finance minister Michalis Sarris said his government had already moved to ensure deposit holders could not make large withdrawals electronically before Tuesday’s open; Jörg Asmussen, a member of the European Central Bank executive board, said a portion of deposits equivalent to the levies would likely be frozen immediately.

“I am not happy with this outcome in the sense that I wish I was not the minister that had to do this,” Mr Sarris said. “But I feel that the responsible course of action of a minister that takes an oath to protect the general welfare of the people and the stability of the system did not leave us with any [other] options.” Read more

Finance ministers MIchael Noonan of Ireland, center, and Vito Gaspar of Portugal, right, with the EU's Olli Rehn at January's meeting.

After Greece last year won a restructuring of its €172bn rescue that included an extension of the time Athens has to pay off its bailout loans, Ireland and Portugal decided they should get a piece of the action, too.

So at the January meeting of EU finance ministers in Brussels, both Dublin and Lisbon made a formal request: they’d also like more time to pay off their bailout loans. According to a seven-page analysis prepared for EU finance ministry officials a few weeks ago, though, the prospect is not as straight forward as it may seem.

The document – obtained by the Brussels Blog under the condition that we not post it on the blog – makes pretty clear that while an extension might help smooth “redemption humps” that now exist for Ireland (lots of loans and bonds come due in 2019 and 2020) and Portugal (2016 and 2021), it’s not a slam dunk case. Read more

Over the course of the eurozone crisis, the relationship between EU leaders and credit-rating agencies has been, at best, a love-hate one, with officials frequently lashing out at the three major sovereign raters for the timing and severity of their downgrades.

So it was probably with some Schadenfreude that those same officials learned of the news that the US Justice Department will soon file a civil suit against Standard & Poor’s – arguably the most prominent of the rating agencies – for misleading investors when it gave gold-plated endorsements to US mortgage-related securities before the 2008 financial crisis.

But what happens when S&P starts pointing out that some of the most criticised eurozone policies – the austerity measures aimed at forcing internal devaluations in struggling peripheral countries – may be working? The silence thus far has been deafening. Read more

Greek prime minister Samaras takes questions after last month's EU summit in Brussels.

When eurozone leaders finally reached agreement on an overhauled €173bn bailout of Greece last month, Antonis Samaras, the Greek prime minister, declared the prospect of his country leaving the euro to be over: “Solidarity in our union is alive; Grexit is dead.”

But late on Friday, someone decided to resurrect it: the International Monetary Fund. In its first report on the Greek bailout since last month’s deal, the IMF was unexpectedly explicit on the risks that Greece still faces, including the potential for full-scale default and euro exit.

In fact, the 260-page report includes a three-page box explicitly dedicated to examining the fallout if Greece were to be forced out of the euro, which we’ve posted here. The box, titled “Greece as a Source of Contagion”, concludes that while the eurozone has improved its defences, it still remains hugely vulnerable to shocks that would come following Grexit. Read more