“Fashionable management school theory appears to have lent undeserved credibility to some chaotic systems.”
This line leapt out from the 571-page UK parliamentary review of banking published on Wednesday. It’s in the conclusion to the passage criticising the way in which banks applied the “three lines of defence” risk control framework – line managers, risk controllers and compliance staff, and internal audit.
If the US Department of Justice does push its accusations of gross negligence against BP to trial, disinterested observers can look forward to a detailed exploration of the oil company’s culture and management.
As I wrote in my first column as FT management editor in 2011, the report issued by Barack Obama’s national commission into the Deepwater Horizon disaster reads like a guide to the challenges of implementing cultural change, fighting complacency, running a collaborative “extended enterprise”, and managing risk. BP’s own 2010 accident investigation report, based on an investigation by Mark Bly, the group’s head of safety and operations, took a far narrower view. There are 69 references to culture in the national commission report, for instance; there are none in BP’s, and the only discussion of management is focused on specific operational issues.