Monthly Archives: October 2008

By Thomas Palley

The Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury continue to fail in their attempts to stabilize the U.S. financial system. That is due to failure to grasp the nature of the problem, which concerns the parallel banking system. Rescue policy remains stuck in the past, focused on the traditional banking system while ignoring the parallel unregulated system that was permitted to develop over the past twenty-five years.

This parallel banking system financed vast amounts of real estate lending and consumer borrowing. The system (which included the likes of Thornburg Mortgage, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers) made loans but had no deposit base. Instead, it relied on roll-over funding obtained through money markets. Additionally, it operated with little capital and extremely high leverage ratios, which was critical to its tremendous profitability. Finally, loans were usually securitized and traded among financial firms.

by Martin Wolf

It is just over three score years and ten since the Great Depression. Judged by its rejection of the plan put forward by Hank Paulson, US Treasury secretary, Congress believes it is time to risk another one. That slump was, arguably, the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century: it was, among other things, responsible for the events that led to the second world war – not least Hitler’s rise. One can only imagine what horrors a depression might bring now?

Such forebodings must seem exaggerated. So, I expect, they will be. But that dire outcome is no longer impossible, not because a slump is inevitable, far from it, but because action is needed to prevent one.

We are watching the disintegration of the financial system. Finance is the web of intermediation binding economic agents to one another, across both space and time. Without it, no modern economy can survive. Yet that is now threatened, with the ongoing collapse in trust and flight to safety. We can indeed run this experiment. But why should we?

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By Lucian Bebchuk

Most immediate reactions to the defeat of the emergency legislation in the House of Representatives seem to assume that, facing a choice between approval and government inaction that could bring about a financial meltdown, the House irresponsibly and irrationally opted for the latter. But the defeat of this particular bill hardly leaves us with inaction as the only alternative.

The bill was defeated at least partly because of its inability to gather sufficient public support due to its evident flaws. Congress can and should adopt quickly a bill that would address these flaws and consequently enjoy strong public support.

There is widespread recognition of the depth of the crisis and the need for governmental intervention. Why was the bill nonetheless defeated? Because there is an equally widespread recognition that spending $700 billion on purchasing (and insuring) toxic paper would be a highly flawed form of intervention.

During the week preceding the vote, it has become evident that the government’s contemplated plans for valuing troubled assets would lead to a quagmire. Opposition to the bill grew due to expectations that purchasing toxic paper could well result in massive complexities, large giveaways, and substantial public losses.

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