By Nicholas Stern
When John Maynard Keynes from Britain and Harry Dexter White from the US were designing a system on international economic institutions, agreed at Bretton Woods in July 1944, their judgments were shaped by the preceding three decades of depression and World Wars.
The colonial structures were still in place and the Cold War was about to begin. But the world has profoundly changed in the past 65 years with decolonisation, globalisation, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China, India and other leading developing countries. Read more
By Kevin O’Rourke
This period last year seems an age ago. The fear then was of resource scarcity: of rising oil prices and increasing food prices, as biofuels crowded out food production and population continued to grow. Environmental worries also reflect resource scarcity, albeit of another type. Once this crisis is over, these concerns will inevitably return to the agenda, and could easily dominate it for the rest of this century. Read more
By Ricardo J. Caballero
We are not out of the woods yet, but the elements of the Legacy Assets programme are encouraging.
They combine the strengths of the public institutions involved – the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – to produce a powerful combination of public equity, loans and guarantees to leverage private capital in the process of thawing frozen financial markets. Read more
I am becoming ever more worried. I never expected much from the Europeans or the Japanese. But I did expect the US, under a popular new president, to be more decisive than it has been. Instead, the Congress is indulging in a populist frenzy; and the administration is hoping for the best. Read more
By Michael Pomerleano
In an article this month, “Promising signs of progress in the ‘Bad Bank’ Plan” I wrote that the approach sketched out by Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, deserved consideration and support from the policymaking and financial communities for the following reasons: Read more
By Christopher D. Carroll
Maybe it was worth the wait.
Judging from preliminary details, the US Treasury’s plan to rescue the financial system is a lot savvier about the relationship between financial markets and the macroeconomy than are the usual-suspects: critics from both left and right who are already pouncing on the Geithner plan.
Unlike the critics, the Treasury has absorbed the main lesson from the past 30 years of academic finance research: asset price movements mainly reflect changes in investors’ collective attitude toward risk. Read more
By Photis Lysandrou
The financial sector is widely blamed for the financial crisis, with banks and their investment vehicles considered responsible for the products at its epicentre.
By contrast, investors who bought these products are seen as having played a largely passive role. In fact, demand-side pressures were the main driving force behind the growth of these products. As a result, governments will be unable to prevent crises if they restrict themselves to changing the global financial architecture. Read more
Lord Turner is the UK’s man for all seasons. A few years ago, he fixed pensions. Today, it is finance. The report by the new chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority is a turning point. The authorities of a country that used to boast of its light financial regulation have changed their minds: the UK has lost confidence in its financial sector.
“Over the last 18 months, and with increasing intensity over the last six, the world’s financial system has gone through its greatest crisis for at least half a century, indeed arguably the greatest crisis in the history of finance capitalism.” This is the report’s starting point. It advances two explanations for this disaster: exceptional macroeconomic conditions – particularly the emergence of excess savings in large parts of the world – and reliance on “the theory of efficient and rational markets”. As the report notes, “the predominant assumption behind financial market regulation – in the US, the UK and increasingly across the world – has been that financial markets are capable of being both efficient and rational”. So regulators were expected to stay out of the way. In the report’s new view, they should be in the way, instead. The financial sector no longer enjoys the benefit of the doubt: it may burn up the world.
The most important analytical points are that individual rationality does not ensure collective rationality, that individual behaviour is frequently less than rational and that, in consequence, markets can overshoot, in both directions. Above all, such failings create systemic risks: if everybody believes in the same (faulty) risk models, the system will become far more dangerous than any individual player appreciates; and if everybody relies on their ability to get out of the door before anybody else, many will die in the inferno. Read more
By Michael Pomerleano
We are witnessing the widespread use of guarantees, which suggests that policymakers consider them a “free lunch” permitting them to bypass budgetary scrutiny. I advocate that guarantees should be transparent, judicious and temporary and applied only in specific circumstances.
Previous financial crises have seen the use of government blanket guarantees, which are blunt instruments. Such measures for depositors and creditors were introduced in East Asia to protect banking system stability. Read more
Can we afford this crisis? Will governments destroy their solvency, as they use their balance sheets to rescue over-indebted private sectors? Read more