Monthly Archives: December 2009

Pinn illustration

I have recently been thinking a great deal about my long-dead father. I have been writing a memoir of his life for an exhibition being organised by Vienna’s Exilbibliothek (“Exile Library”) in honour of what would have been his hundredth birthday. But I have also been thinking about him because he would have fully understood what is at stake today.

Born in what was then Austrian Poland on April 23 1910, my father’s life began just after the end of the “noughties” of the 20th century, of which I wrote last week. Moved by his parents to Vienna in 1914, he lived through the first world war, the hyperinflation of the early 1920s and the Great Depression, before leaving for London, just ahead of Hitler’s arrival, in 1937. There he survived internment as an enemy alien and the second world war. Nearly all his relatives, apart from his immediate family, were killed in the Holocaust. The same was true of my mother’s family. While she and her immediate relatives escaped by trawler from the Netherlands in May 1940, her wider family was destroyed.

As a central European intellectual born in 1910 – he was a playwright, journalist, broadcaster, documentary filmmaker and writer of television dramas, in his native language, German – my father lived in historic times. Of the countless lessons I learnt from him, the most important is the most obvious: civilisation is as fragile as glass. Moreover, when chaos comes, the worst of human nature will almost always emerge, as it did, to such cataclysmic effect, in his lifetime.

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We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the eighth and final question, from Sean Kelleher. Martin’s response is below.

Sean Kelleher: Where do you see sterling vis à vis the dollar and the euro mid 2010 and end 2010 and long-term and why?

Martin Wolf: I never forecast currencies. It is not my job to do so and I am sure I would be bad at it. But sterling does not look an attractive long-term hold, does it? What you have to ask yourself is whether all the bad news is already in the price.

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the seventh question, from Ali Ahmed. Martin’s response is below.

Ali Ahmed: As the dust settles from the crisis, what now for the Decoupling theory that asserts that emerging markets can grow rapidly and sustainably even as the developed economies go through a prolonged slowdown? This theory was in fashion at the beginning of the crisis, out of fashion as we went through 2009 and saw massive drops in production in emerging markets bearing the brunt of the collapse in world trade. What is your assessment as we enter 2010?

Martin Wolf: At present, we can say that decoupling has some credibility, but it is not unlimited. We know that when the developed world suffers a huge financial crisis and recession, the whole world is indeed affected, via reductions in access to credit, rising prices of credit, falling volumes and prices of exports and collapsing remittances. But we also know that emerging markets with strong domestic and external fiscal and financial positions have been able to offset these forces. China and, to a lesser extent, Brazil and India, are noteworthy examples. So a degree of decoupling has indeed occurred, despite the crisis. But it has also greatly helped that, in the end, a depression was averted.

The only truly global power was in rapid relative decline. Not long before, it had won a pyrrhic victory in a costly colonial war. New great powers were on the rise. An arms race was under way, as was competition for markets and resources in undeveloped areas of the world. Yet people still believed in the durability of the free trade and free capital flows that had nurtured prosperity and, many believed, had also underpinned peace.

That was how the world looked to many at the end of the “noughties” of the 20th century. Yet catastrophe lay ahead: a world war; a communist revolution; a Great Depression; fascism; and then another world war. The world order – built on competing great powers, imperialism and liberal markets – proved incapable of providing the public goods of peace and prosperity. It took calamity, the cold war and the replacement of the UK by the US as hegemonic power to re-establish stability. That then facilitated decolonisation, unprecedented economic expansion, the collapse of communism and yet another epoch of market-led global integration.

“History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes,” as Mark Twain is supposed to have said. The noughties of the 21st century now have the same fin de regime feeling as those of a century ago. Then the US, Germany, Russia and Japan were on the rise; now it is China and India. Then it was the Boer war; now it is the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Then it was an arms race between Germany and the UK; now it is the military build-up in China. Then the protectionism of the US undermined liberal trade; now conflicts between the US and China undermine our ability to tackle climate change. Then the US was isolationist; now China and other rising powers demand untrammelled sovereignty.

The remainder of this article can be read here. Please post comments below.

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the sixth question, from Simon Israel. Martin’s response is below.

Simon Israel: Deflation is entrenched in Japan. Could the ageing population be a causal factor (quite apart from the proximate monetary and fiscal aspects)? If so, does this presage deflation in the ageing economies of western Europe and America?

Martin Wolf: I have never understood why ageing per se should be deflationary. Ageing shrinks aggregate supply (because the labour force shrinks) and lowers household savings (because pensioners save less than people at work, particularly those in their 40s and 50s). So I tend to expect ageing to be inflationary: more demand and less supply. This will be reinforced by the fiscal effects of ageing, which are going to be far bigger than those of the current crisis. With bigger fiscal deficits, monetisation of those deficits seems relatively likely, in the long term.

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the fifth question, from a reader who wishes to remain anonymous. Martin’s response is below.

Anonymous: With the government indirectly supporting asset prices, to what extent is the current economic situation like Japan’s at the start of their lost decade, and is it likely that a multi-year gentle deflation in assets prices may occur?

Martin Wolf: There are strong similarities between the situations today in the US and UK, in particular, and in Japan in the 1990s. Like Japan, the US and UK suffered large asset price bubbles, above all, in property. Like Japan, the US and UK had huge expansions in credit and a massive overleveraging of the financial sector. And, like Japan, the US and UK had to adopt unprecedented fiscal and monetary expansion to stave off a post-bubble collapse into a true depression. While the bubbles and excess leverage were smaller in the US and UK than in Japan, more of the world economy has been affected this time. That will make it far more difficult for the affected economies to export their way out of their difficulties. I expect the recovery to be weak and the need to sustain large fiscal deficits, to support demand, to be much greater than many now assume. At the same time, monetary policy has been much more aggressive, much sooner, in the US and UK than it was in Japan. So I do not expect a long-term deflation in consumer prices, as has happened in Japan. In the US, property prices have gone a long way towards completing their adjustment. This seems less true in the UK. Equity prices look a little overvalued again, but not extraordinarily so. So, on balance, I do not expect a multi-year deflation in asset prices. In the longer term, inflation seems a greater danger, if the US and UK cease to be able to sell public debt on favourable terms and the central banks are forced to buy most of it.

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the fourth question, from Andrew Flowers of Atlanta, Georgia. Martin’s response is below.

Andrew Flowers: Why is the Federal Reserve refusing to do more to stimulate aggregate demand? That is, why hasn’t quantitative easing (QE) been expanded? Ben Bernanke would probably answer that current limits on QE are to insure inflation expectations are well-anchored. But do you believe inflation expectations would become unanchored if the Fed expanded QE?

Martin Wolf: You have answered your own question, I think. The Fed is walking a tightrope between doing too little and watching the economy go back into recession and doing too much and so igniting a serious upsurge in inflationary expectations. I think they (and the fiscal authorities) are doing too little rather than too much. But I recognise that this is a matter of fine judgement.

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the third question, from Richard Brown. Martin’s response is below.

Richard Brown: What is the reason banks are not lending? Specifically, why are US banks not lending to small business, even to those in good financial standing and with whom they have had long term relationships?

Martin Wolf: I do not know the data on this or whether data on borrowing by the kind of small businesses you mention even exists. But I imagine that we are dealing with a “multiple equilibrium” problem. In the bad equilibrium, banks think the economy is weak and so downgrade the perceived creditworthiness of many of their borrowers. Thus, they refuse to lend. That makes their judgement a self-fulfilling prophecy: if nobody can borrow, everybody indeed faces a weaker economy. What is needed is policy aimed at shifting the whole economy into a better equilibrium. That can only be done by raising aggregate demand, by forcing banks to lend or, more plausibly, by doing both these things together. In practice, the government has not done enough to achieve this shift. We seem to be stuck in the bad equilibrium.

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the second question, from Kevin P.Gallagher. Martin’s response is below.

Kevin P. Gallagher: In the US, and to some extent the EU, credit ratings agencies will remain largely unscathed in financial regulatory reform packages. How can we prevent another crisis, or mitigate one, without fundamental reforms of the CRAs?

Martin Wolf: It is scandal that the model of payment for the credit rating agencies has not been changed. They should be paid by agents for the buyers not by the sellers. More important, the regulatory role of ratings should be removed altogether. They have no credibility, in this regard. My own view is that, at best, ratings are a lagging indicator of what is happening in the market. At worst, they are actively misleading. Nobody should be required to hold assets of a particular grade. Will this failure cause another crisis? I don’t know. But it won’t help us avoid one, that is for sure.

Read Martin’s response to the first question – on income distribution and the crisis.

In depth coverage on rating agencies (FT)

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the first question, from Dirk Brouwer of the Netherlands. Martin’s response is below.

Dirk Brouwer, Amstelveen, The Netherlands: How could a more equitable distribution of income be instrumental in solving the impact of this crisis? Especially in the UK and the USA the top 20% has close to 50% of the net incomes which is one of the reasons for the bubbles on Wall Street and on the housing market.

Martin Wolf: I am not at all sure about the link between inequality and the bubble. I think that the growth of the financial sector played an important role in increasing inequality in the US and UK. It helped a very small proportion of the population to extract a large amount of rent. But I am not sure about the reverse causal relationship from higher inequality to the bubble. The argument would, I suppose, be that, lacking higher incomes, a large proportion of the population borrowed in order to sustain consumption. This is possible. But I do not know of any convincing arguments for the proposition.

In any case, whatever the causal relationship, I cannot see how a more equitable distribution of income would now help solve the crisis. I suppose one might argue that it would increase sustainable consumption, though consumption already looks excessive in the US. I think one would have to argue, instead, that greater equality is a good in itself. The big question is how one could achieve it. There are limits, I think, to how much redistribution one can achieve through the redistribution of pre-tax incomes. So the aim should be to alter the distribution of pre-tax incomes themselves. I know of no easy way to do this, certainly not in the short run.

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