The proposal to issue E-bonds, made in the FT by Jean-Claude Juncker and Giulio Tremonti, has sparked widespread controversy. Some observers (for example, Wolfgang Münchau) have said that it contains the kernel of a solution to the European debt crisis – which, under some circumstances, it might. But the initial response from Angela Merkel has been negative, exactly as it has been in many earlier rounds of this particular debate. The E-bond idea will obviously go nowhere without the support of Germany. But they have never before faced the real possibility that there could be a break-up of the euro if the sovereign debt crisis is not overcome. Maybe it is time for them to think again.

By Michael Pomerleano

In response to the financial crisis, the most immediate fundamental reform adopted by several developed countries is to have a “systemic regulator” overseeing the stability of the financial system as a whole. Through data gathering, analysis and ultimately regulation, the systemic regulator is expected is expected to mitigate the risks associated with highly inter-dependent relationships between financial institutions. Many central banks are receiving significant new responsibilities for macroprudential supervision. Changes to the UK regulatory framework in 2010 gave the Bank of England responsibility for microprudential and macroprudential regulation. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act established the Financial Stability Oversight Council, to be led by Treasury Secretary including the heads of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.

Several arguments have been put forward for justifying why central banks are receiving a prominent role in macroprudential supervision: financial supervision offer insights into the condition of financial institutions that is essential in the conduct of monetary policy; and central banks are inextricably involved in the financial stability function through their lender-of-last-resort function.

By Thomas I. Palley

The great American novelist Mark Twain observed “history does not repeat itself but it rhymes.” Today the rhyme is with the 1930s, and if you don’t hear it, read FDR’s great Madison Square Garden speech of October 1936:

“For 12 years this nation was afflicted with hear-nothing, see-nothing, do-nothing government. The nation looked to government but the government looked away. Nine mocking years with the golden calf and three long years with the scourge! Nine crazy years at the ticker and three long years in the breadlines! Nine mad years of mirage and three long years of despair! Powerful influences strive today to restore that kind of government with its doctrine that that government is best which is most indifferent.”

Despite this clarity, the Obama administration insists on hearing a rhyme with the 1990s. That tone deafness has its roots in political choices made at the administration’s outset and explains why the administration has stumbled badly in its first years. If continued, the economic and social consequences will be grave.

The events of the last few weeks have shone a very harsh searchlight on the nature of sovereign debt within the European Monetary Union. Although critics of EMU have always argued that monetary union without fiscal union is “impossible”, it was only when Angela Merkel started to call for a procedure to handle a possible default on the sovereign debt of a member state that the markets began to focus on the fact that such a default really is possible. In substance, nothing much has changed with Mrs Merkel’s remarks: it always was possible for a sovereign state within the EMU to default. But now that the markets have realised that some key elements of “sovereignty” are missing from the EMU member states, market psychology has changed. It will be very hard to put this genie back into the bottle.

The twists and turns in the European sovereign debt crisis have been more than usually bewildering in recent days, so I thought it would be useful to take a step back and look at the longer term budgetary fundamentals which will ultimately decide whether the troubled sovereigns in the eurozone can avoid default. The eurozone as a whole is in better fiscal shape than other developed economies (notably the US and Japan), and even the most indebted economies could yet dig themselves out of the hole they are in. But the eurozone is still plagued by the contradictions of trying to operate a monetary union without supporting this with a fiscal union.

It is becoming clear that these contradictions can only be solved if there is genuine burden sharing inside the eurozone, along with some much tougher budgetary and regulatory rules which prevent this situation ever happening again. Otherwise, there will be more discussion about default, on the lines of Nouriel Roubini’s piece in today’s FT. Or, in extremis, the currency union will be in real trouble.

By Roger Farmer

Ben Bernanke, US Federal Reserve chairman, has announced that the Fed is about to go on a $600bn spending spree by buying $75bn of treasury bonds every month for eight months. Not all of the members of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee agree that a second round of quantitative easing is a good idea. Thomas Hoenig of Kansas City, Jeffrey Lacker of Richmond and Charles Plosser of Philadelphia have expressed concerns that QE2 could lead to inflation through excessive monetary expansion and that it might inflate a new stock market bubble. They may be right.

I have argued in this Forum that more QE can create jobs and prevent a second Great Depression. But it matters how the policy is implemented. The Fed should buy stocks not bonds. And rather than commit to a fixed programme of stock purchases, the Fed should use its market power to stabilize swings in the stock market and smooth out bubbles and crashes.

If he were still alive today, what would Milton Friedman think of his disciple, Ben Bernanke? This is a matter of some concern to the Fed chairman, who is reported as saying to colleagues on Saturday: “I grasp the mantle of Milton Friedman…I think we are doing everything (he) would have us do.” With libertarian economists tending to be among those most critical of QE2, Mr Bernanke is relying on Friedman’s halo effect to enhance the legitimacy of the Fed’s recent actions. Friedman’s friends say that his opinions were unpredictable, which is what made them interesting. But some some free market economists, like Allan Meltzer, claim that Friedman would have strongly disapproved of QE2. Are they right?

After a week which has been replete with important economic and political news from the US, the bulk of the incoming information has confirmed what we knew already. The Fed has embarked on QE2, more or less exactly as expected. The Republicans took the House but not the Senate, and the President’s initial reaction suggests that the Bush tax cuts will probably be extended, which was the central case before the election. And the economy continues to grow at a pace which is neither fast enough to bring unemployment down, nor slow enough to threaten a double dip. While all of this was broadly as expected, there have been some interesting (and mostly encouraging) developments which are worth noting.

So what do we know today that we did not know a week ago? Three things:

The Fed statement just released indicates that the central bank intends to purchase a net total of $600bn of longer term Treasury securities between now and the end of 2011 Q2, at a pace of around $75bn per month. This was almost exactly in line with what the market had been led to expect, so there was no surprise in the extent and timing of QE2. However, there was no further softening in the Fed’s statement that interest rates are likely to remain exceptionally low for an “extended period”, which may have disappointed some observers who were looking for this language to shift in a dovish direction. Overall, the markets initial reaction was a shrug of acceptance that the Fed has done just about what it told us it would do, but certainly no more.

This is the text of a speech by Lord Skidelsky on the UK’s comprehensive spending review. He delivered the speech to the House of Lords on November 1.

My Lords, it is a sign of the jittery state we are in that a slower-than-expected slowdown in the rate of growth is hailed as strong evidence of recovery. Of course it is nothing of the sort. It marks the end of a period in which the economy has been supported by fiscal policy, with some help from the depreciation of sterling. The direction of fiscal policy has now been reversed. In their recent comprehensive spending review, the coalition government confirmed that they will embark on cuts that will withdraw between 1.5 per cent and 2.5 per cent of nominal demand from the economy every year for the next four years.

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