Category: Banks

By Peter Bofinger

The “too big to fail” problem, one of the most negative consequences of the financial crisis, has become more severe than ever. Governments all over the world, with their comprehensive rescue packages for aiding banks, have strengthened their implicit commitment to save financial institutions and their lenders at any price. Therefore, for investors it is becoming less necessary to distinguish between banks of different quality. One simply invests money at the bank which offers the highest interest rate.

Ferguson illustration

Today, the people see in the financial sector not the skilful hands of erstwhile masters of the universe, but the grabbing hands of greedy ingrates. It is little wonder, then, that a desperate President Obama, battered by the voters in Massachusetts, has turned upon a group even less popular than his party. He has duly added the axe of Paul Volcker, 82-year-old former chairman of the Federal Reserve, to the regulatory scalpel offered by his Treasury secretary, Tim Geithner.

Mr Volcker is proposing a version of the distinction between commercial and investment banking brought into the US by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. In announcing his new proposals last week, Mr Obama referred to a “Volcker Rule” that “banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, or sponsor hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading operations for their own profit, unrelated to serving their customers”. Furthermore, added the president: “I’m also proposing that we prevent the further consolidation of our financial system.”

The remainder of this article can be read here. Please post comments below.

As part of the FT’s week-long series on the Brics emerging markets, experts on each of the four economies will contribute to the debate about the role of Brics consumers in the global economy. The last entry focuses on China, read the entries from the other countries below.

By Michael Pettis

Given the speed of its economic transformation, its sky-high bank-stock valuations, the unprecedented size of its accumulated reserves, and its much-advertised desire to change the global monetary system; it is tempting to assume that China will radically transform the world’s capital markets and financial systems with the same ruthless speed with which it has transformed export markets.

But this won’t happen.  Beijing is skeptical of arguments supporting rapid financial and monetary deregulation, and policymakers continue to measure the usefulness of the financial system mainly to the extent that it serves the needs of rapid growth in manufacturing and infrastructure. This means continued heavy-handed control of the capital allocation process and the level of interest rates, the relinquishing of which are the two key measures of real financial sector liberalisation.

China’s main impact on the global financial system will continue, for the foreseeable future, to be limited to its massive accumulation of reserves. And because the US is still the only economy large and flexible enough to accommodate the high trade surpluses that the Chinese economy relies on, it will continue to accumulate dollars.

Iceland is famous for its sagas. But the latest one is truly dramatic: the balance sheets of its privatised financial sector grew from twice to 10 times gross domestic product, in five years. In the absence of a lender of last resort, this story had to end badly. In the panic of 2008, it did.

Because Iceland was a member of the European Economic Area, its banks were allowed to set up branches freely. To raise money, Landsbanki, one of Iceland’s now collapsed banks, set up an internet bank, Icesave, which gulled depositors by offering attractive interest rates. Under the European Union directive, Iceland also had an obligation to establish a deposit insurance scheme, which it did, through a levy on those banks.

Then came the collapse. Some Icelanders blame Gordon Brown, Britain’s prime minister, for pulling the plug on their banks. That is unreasonable. Competent observers had long concluded that the financial system was a house of cards. It was sure to collapse in a panic. Less unreasonable is the complaint over the UK’s use of a section of its anti-terrorism laws to freeze assets. But some such action was justified.

The remainder of this article can be read here. Please post comments below.

There is a difference of opinion within the FT over the Icelandic president’s decision to block a deal to repay the UK and the Netherlands more than €3.9bn lost by savers in a failed Icelandic bank.

Lex write that if Iceland refuses to repay the debt, it risks becoming an international pariah. However, the FT’s editorial argues that Iceland should not be put in a debtors’ prison.

Martin Wolf’s view: “This is not about cutting a running deficit, which is, indeed, unavoidable. It is about forcing innocent people to assume gigantic liabilities for which they have no legal or moral responsibility. How would UK citizens feel if they were forced to assume a debt of £400bn because of HSBC’s failure to meet deposit insurance liabilities in Asia? Let the UK take the bank’s assets and leave it at that.”

There is a further debate in the Financial Times on January 11, on whether Icelanders should accept the debt deal as it stands:
YES: Iceland would benefit from paying up, by Risto Penttilä
NO: The Icesave deal is unfair and unreasonable, by Magnús Árni Skúlason

What do you think? This debate is open to our readers. Please leave your comments below.

Comments are moderated and there will be a delay before they are published.

Related reading:

Iceland: On the will of the people Money Supply blog, FT

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the third question, from Richard Brown. Martin’s response is below.

Richard Brown: What is the reason banks are not lending? Specifically, why are US banks not lending to small business, even to those in good financial standing and with whom they have had long term relationships?

Martin Wolf: I do not know the data on this or whether data on borrowing by the kind of small businesses you mention even exists. But I imagine that we are dealing with a “multiple equilibrium” problem. In the bad equilibrium, banks think the economy is weak and so downgrade the perceived creditworthiness of many of their borrowers. Thus, they refuse to lend. That makes their judgement a self-fulfilling prophecy: if nobody can borrow, everybody indeed faces a weaker economy. What is needed is policy aimed at shifting the whole economy into a better equilibrium. That can only be done by raising aggregate demand, by forcing banks to lend or, more plausibly, by doing both these things together. In practice, the government has not done enough to achieve this shift. We seem to be stuck in the bad equilibrium.

 UK banks

The UK is poorer than it thought it was. This is the most important fact about the crisis. The struggle over the distribution of the losses is going to be brutal. It will be made more so by the second most important fact about the crisis: it has had a huge effect on the public finances. The deficits are unmatched in peacetime.

Happily, the general election would appear to offer a golden opportunity for a debate. Is that not the discussion the country ought to have? Yes. Is it the discussion it is going to have? No. What the government would do if re-elected remains, even after the pre-Budget report, “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”, as Churchill said of Stalin’s Russia.

The remainder of the article can be read here. Please post comments below.

By Theo Vermaelen and Christian Wolff

In the recent financial crisis, taxpayers in many countries had to pick up the bills that resulted from governments bailing out banks. The idea that the government will save you if you make mistakes encourages excessive risk-taking. Bailouts have created popular resentment against bankers’ compensation, which makes it difficult to pay competitive salaries after a bank is rescued. So bailouts, which also add to the government deficits and crowd out other government spending plans, have many undesirable characteristics.

By Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor

Are credit bubbles dangerous? Long-run historical data reveal that important changes have taken place in the financial system over the past decades, setting in train an unprecedented expansion in the role of credit in the macroeconomy. It is mishap of history that just at the time when credit mattered more than ever before, the reigning doctrine had sentenced it to playing no constructive role in central bank policies. Over the past 140 years, episodes of financial instability were often the result of “credit booms gone wrong”.

Windfall taxes are a ghastly idea. They are a sop to prejudice, a burden on risk-taking and a form of arbitrary confiscation. No sensible person should support them. So why do I now find the idea of a windfall tax on banks so appealing? Well, this time, it really does look different.

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