Category: Crisis

By Vernon L. Smith and Steven Gjerstad

Financial and economic collapses in 2007-2008 and 1929-1930 followed unprecedented residential mortgage credit expansions. Both generated household balance sheet crises that were transmitted to banks as asset prices collapsed against fixed debts. Industry suffered from declining expenditures on housing and durable goods, and income fell when production and employment declined.  Irving Fisher (1933) described this spiral in “The debt-deflation theory of great depressions.”

These developments impacted major categories of US expenditures. The chart shows percentage changes in expenditures on consumer non-durables and services (C), GDP, consumer durables (D), non-residential fixed investment (I), and housing (H). The change for each category is computed relative to its level at the start of the recession in Q4 2007. 

The Greek government has promised to slash its fiscal deficit from an estimated 12.7 per cent of gross domestic product last year to 3 per cent in 2012. Is it plausible that this will happen? Not very. But Greece is merely the canary in the fiscal coal mine. Other eurozone members are also under pressure to slash fiscal deficits. What might such pressure do to vulnerable members, to the eurozone and to the world economy?

Having falsified its figures for years, violating the trust of its partners, Greece is in the doghouse. Yet, even if it bears much of the blame, the task it is undertaking is huge. In particular, unlike most countries with massive fiscal deficits – the UK, for example – Greece cannot offset the impact of fiscal tightening by loosening monetary policy or depreciating its currency.

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Ingram Pinn illustration

What would have happened during the financial crisis if the euro had not existed? The short answer is that there would have been currency crises among its members. The currencies of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain would surely have fallen sharply against the old D-Mark. That is the outcome the creators of the eurozone wished to avoid. They have been successful. But, if the exchange rate cannot adjust, something else must instead. That “something else” is the economies of peripheral eurozone member countries. They are locked into competitive disinflation against Germany, the world’s foremost exporter of very high-quality manufactures. I wish them luck.

The eurozone matters. Its economy is almost as big as that of the US. It is three times bigger than those of Japan or China. So far, it has passed its initial test. Nevertheless, the peak to trough decline of the US economy was only 3.8 per cent (second quarter 2008 to second quarter 2009), while the eurozone’s was 5.1 per cent (first quarter 2008 to second quarter 2009).

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We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the fifth question, from a reader who wishes to remain anonymous. Martin’s response is below.

Anonymous: With the government indirectly supporting asset prices, to what extent is the current economic situation like Japan’s at the start of their lost decade, and is it likely that a multi-year gentle deflation in assets prices may occur?

Martin Wolf: There are strong similarities between the situations today in the US and UK, in particular, and in Japan in the 1990s. Like Japan, the US and UK suffered large asset price bubbles, above all, in property. Like Japan, the US and UK had huge expansions in credit and a massive overleveraging of the financial sector. And, like Japan, the US and UK had to adopt unprecedented fiscal and monetary expansion to stave off a post-bubble collapse into a true depression. While the bubbles and excess leverage were smaller in the US and UK than in Japan, more of the world economy has been affected this time. That will make it far more difficult for the affected economies to export their way out of their difficulties. I expect the recovery to be weak and the need to sustain large fiscal deficits, to support demand, to be much greater than many now assume. At the same time, monetary policy has been much more aggressive, much sooner, in the US and UK than it was in Japan. So I do not expect a long-term deflation in consumer prices, as has happened in Japan. In the US, property prices have gone a long way towards completing their adjustment. This seems less true in the UK. Equity prices look a little overvalued again, but not extraordinarily so. So, on balance, I do not expect a multi-year deflation in asset prices. In the longer term, inflation seems a greater danger, if the US and UK cease to be able to sell public debt on favourable terms and the central banks are forced to buy most of it.

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the third question, from Richard Brown. Martin’s response is below.

Richard Brown: What is the reason banks are not lending? Specifically, why are US banks not lending to small business, even to those in good financial standing and with whom they have had long term relationships?

Martin Wolf: I do not know the data on this or whether data on borrowing by the kind of small businesses you mention even exists. But I imagine that we are dealing with a “multiple equilibrium” problem. In the bad equilibrium, banks think the economy is weak and so downgrade the perceived creditworthiness of many of their borrowers. Thus, they refuse to lend. That makes their judgement a self-fulfilling prophecy: if nobody can borrow, everybody indeed faces a weaker economy. What is needed is policy aimed at shifting the whole economy into a better equilibrium. That can only be done by raising aggregate demand, by forcing banks to lend or, more plausibly, by doing both these things together. In practice, the government has not done enough to achieve this shift. We seem to be stuck in the bad equilibrium.

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the second question, from Kevin P.Gallagher. Martin’s response is below.

Kevin P. Gallagher: In the US, and to some extent the EU, credit ratings agencies will remain largely unscathed in financial regulatory reform packages. How can we prevent another crisis, or mitigate one, without fundamental reforms of the CRAs?

Martin Wolf: It is scandal that the model of payment for the credit rating agencies has not been changed. They should be paid by agents for the buyers not by the sellers. More important, the regulatory role of ratings should be removed altogether. They have no credibility, in this regard. My own view is that, at best, ratings are a lagging indicator of what is happening in the market. At worst, they are actively misleading. Nobody should be required to hold assets of a particular grade. Will this failure cause another crisis? I don’t know. But it won’t help us avoid one, that is for sure.

Read Martin’s response to the first question – on income distribution and the crisis.

In depth coverage on rating agencies (FT)

We invited readers to send questions this week to Martin Wolf, the FT’s chief economics commentator. Here is the first question, from Dirk Brouwer of the Netherlands. Martin’s response is below.

Dirk Brouwer, Amstelveen, The Netherlands: How could a more equitable distribution of income be instrumental in solving the impact of this crisis? Especially in the UK and the USA the top 20% has close to 50% of the net incomes which is one of the reasons for the bubbles on Wall Street and on the housing market.

Martin Wolf: I am not at all sure about the link between inequality and the bubble. I think that the growth of the financial sector played an important role in increasing inequality in the US and UK. It helped a very small proportion of the population to extract a large amount of rent. But I am not sure about the reverse causal relationship from higher inequality to the bubble. The argument would, I suppose, be that, lacking higher incomes, a large proportion of the population borrowed in order to sustain consumption. This is possible. But I do not know of any convincing arguments for the proposition.

In any case, whatever the causal relationship, I cannot see how a more equitable distribution of income would now help solve the crisis. I suppose one might argue that it would increase sustainable consumption, though consumption already looks excessive in the US. I think one would have to argue, instead, that greater equality is a good in itself. The big question is how one could achieve it. There are limits, I think, to how much redistribution one can achieve through the redistribution of pre-tax incomes. So the aim should be to alter the distribution of pre-tax incomes themselves. I know of no easy way to do this, certainly not in the short run.

By Michael Pomerleano

The global financial crisis has revealed the “fallacy of composition” in the supervision of the financial system. While financial supervisors deemed each individual institution to be sound, risks were building in the system. Individual countries and the Financial Stability Board seek to develop a regulatory approach to stability at national and global level respectively. Here, I offer criteria for effective regulation of financial stability and review the proposed reforms in the European Union and the US.

“As the last of the official Q3 data came in, the UK found itself in the unenviable position of being the only economy in the [Group of 20 leading economies] to remain in recession”. Thus did Consensus Forecasts summarise the UK’s plight. With the third-largest economic decline, after Japan and Italy, the most indebted households, the biggest fiscal deterioration and the greatest dependency on the financial sector among the Group of Seven leading high-income countries, the UK has suffered a huge economic shock.

Fortunately, the UK also possesses assets. Among these are: a government with the capacity to act; the ability to borrow in its own currency; a flexible exchange rate; a credible monetary regime; a modest initial level of public indebtedness; privileged access to the European market, the world’s biggest; a greater number of top-class universities than any country, apart from the US; and an economy that has shed its most vulnerable manufacturing activities.

What the country requires is a strategy for what I have called the “post post-Thatcher era”. What should be its elements? Growth with stabilisation is the answer.

What then should be the elements of the strategy for growth?

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 UK banks

The UK is poorer than it thought it was. This is the most important fact about the crisis. The struggle over the distribution of the losses is going to be brutal. It will be made more so by the second most important fact about the crisis: it has had a huge effect on the public finances. The deficits are unmatched in peacetime.

Happily, the general election would appear to offer a golden opportunity for a debate. Is that not the discussion the country ought to have? Yes. Is it the discussion it is going to have? No. What the government would do if re-elected remains, even after the pre-Budget report, “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”, as Churchill said of Stalin’s Russia.

The remainder of the article can be read here. Please post comments below.

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