By Jeffrey Sachs

Before our political leaders get too fancy remaking capitalism next month at the Bretton Woods II summit in Washington, they should attend to urgent business. Since the closure of Lehman Brothers triggered a global banking panic, political leaders in the US and Europe have successfully thrown a cordon round their banks to prevent financial meltdown. What they have not done yet is to co-ordinate macroeconomic policies to stop a steep global downturn. This is the urgent agenda. Continue reading "The best recipe for avoiding a global recession"

By Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh and Alan M. Taylor

Since the early 1990s, central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have accumulated foreign reserves at an unprecedented rate. The macroeconomic impact of these official flows has been profound and they have contributed significantly to global imbalances. Providing an explanation for these trends remains a major puzzle in international macroeconomics, and prevailing theories based on trade or debt deliver poor empirical performance. We argue that part of this great reserve accumulation is a response to the threat of financial instability in the context of rapidly expanding financial systems, increasingly mobile capital, and exchange rate objectives. The recent turbulence in global financial markets supports this view. Continue reading "Reserve accumulation and financial stability"

By John Muellbauer

Fed minutes released on October 7 disclosed that as recently as Sept 16, Fed officials thought risks to growth and inflation were roughly equally balanced. And Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke acknowledged on the same day that though the inflation outlook had improved somewhat, it remained uncertain. The market may have taken these views as representative of central banks round the world, particularly given the ECB decision of October 2 not to reduce rates. Following these releases, the Dow Jones index fell by about 6.5 percent as the market thought the internationally co-ordinated interest rate cut it had been expecting had become less likely. This and the knock-on effects on world markets then helped to force central banks to make the cut the market had expected, but on October 8.

Central banks’ caution about inflation risks is understandable given the experiences of 2008. Forecasting inflation is notoriously difficult. There have been big structural shifts in the world economy such as trade and financial globalisation and in individual economies, such as the decline in trade union power. Monetary policy itself has shifted to a far greater focus on inflation. Energy and food price shocks can be large and very hard to predict. Indeed, the speed of price changes tends to increase with big shocks. Most forecasting models used by central banks therefore put a large weight on recent inflation. This tracks inflation quite well except at turning points because the models miss key underlying influences.

Continue reading "US price deflation on the way"

by Pranab Bardhan

As the petro-authoritarianism of Russia flexes its muscles and the economic prowess of China struts in Olympic glory, developing countries in the world might start rethinking about the lectures on democracy and development they have heard all these years from the West. This is at a time when advanced capitalist democracies are reeling under the shock of unregulated financial overreach and years of living beyond their means, a far cry from the end-of-history triumphalism of capitalist democracy of less than two decades back.

The Chinese case in particular is reviving a hoary myth of how particularly in the initial stages of economic development authoritarianism delivers much more than democracy. This is also backed by the memory of impressive economic performance of other East Asian authoritarian regimes (like those in South Korea and Taiwan in the recent past). The lingering hope of democrats had been that as the middle classes prosper in these regimes, they then demand, and in the latter two cases got, the movement toward political democracy.

But the relationship between authoritarianism or democracy and development is not so simple. Authoritarianism is neither necessary nor sufficient for economic development. That it is not necessary is illustrated not only by today’s industrial democracies, but by scattered cases of recent development success: Costa Rica, Botswana, and now India. That it is not sufficient is amply evident from disastrous authoritarian regimes in Africa and elsewhere.

Continue reading "What does this authoritarian moment mean for developing countries?"

by Raghuram Rajan

Many commentators are looking for an increase in domestic demand in emerging markets to compensate for the slowdown in the US. Indeed, domestic consumption is picking up in several countries including China, while governments in Asia and the Middle East are turning to neglected public investment. Yet years of strong growth and cutbacks in public investment, which have restored economic health to emerging markets, have also eaten up excess capacity. Any increase in domestic demand, if it is not to result in bottlenecks and even higher inflation, will have to be accompanied by a shift in production from an external focus to an internal focus. This means that emerging market currencies will have to appreciate, and the weight of output will shift from traded goods such as T-shirts and electronics to non-traded goods such as real estate and health services over the next few years.

A shift from an outward focus to an inward focus will have to be accompanied by much more institutional discipline. With fewer constraints on underlying inflation, emerging market central banks will have to be more careful in targeting low inflation, especially as exchange pegs become less viable. Labour markets will have to be more flexible, while product markets will have to be deregulated far more if profitable productive growth is sought in the non-traded goods sector. With more expenditure flowing to assets such as housing, the financial sector will have to be careful not to precipitate booms and busts, and this will mean more reform as well as better supervision. Finally, governments will have to meet the greater demand for public investment without eroding fiscal discipline, maintaining greater caution as the cushion of large foreign exchange reserves diminishes and increases their vulnerability.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our panel of economists appears below.

By Jean Pisani-Ferry

As the collapse of the trade talks in Geneva in July made clear, there is no longer any meaningful trade negotiation without the main nations from the emerging world. The year 2008 may go down in history as the one in which rich countries discovered that this applies to macroeconomic policies, too.

In January it looked as if the opposite lessons could be drawn from events. For a while, Ben Bernanke at the US Federal Reserve and Jean-Claude Trichet at the European Central Bank seemed to be the only relevant policymakers in the world – and they were, as far as liquidity strains were concerned, if only because the US and Europe account for about two-thirds of the global supply of financial assets.

But as months went by, it became clear that countries affected by the shock represented merely a half of world gross domestic product, two-fifths of global energy demand and not even a third of world cereal consumption. Furthermore, rich countries have significantly less weight at the margin: their contribution to world growth is about half their share of world GDP, so one-quarter of the total, and the same rule of thumb applies even more to the demand for oil and foodstuffs. So in the market for scarce commodities, the effects of the slowdown in the US and Europe were offset by domestic booms in the emerging world.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our expert panel appears below.

by Willem Buiter

From a cyclical perspective, things look bad for Europe, the US and most of the global economy. My contribution to summer cheer is to note that longer-term local and global economic prospects are likely to be worse than expected. So welcome to boom and bust. Welcome to subdued long-term growth prospects.

The ancient Greeks knew hubris to be one sin the gods will punish. When Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, announced “the end of boom and bust”, Jove must have checked his thunderbolts. Capitalist market econ­omies are inherently cyclical. The private credit system is intrinsically prone to alternating bouts of irrational euphoria and unwarranted depression. Busts play an essential role. They clean up the mess created during the boom by inflated expectations, overoptimistic plans and unrealistic ventures. These become embodied in unsustainable household debt, productive capacity with no foreseeable use, excessive corporate and financial sector leverage and enterprises whose only asset is hope. The correction is painful, even brutal: unemployment rises, as do defaults, repossessions and bank­ruptcies. We entered such a cathartic phase around the turn of the year in both the US and the UK. Continental Europe is not far behind.

The remainder of this column can be read here . Debate from our panel of economists appears below.

Today, almost two-thirds of humanity lives in high-income or high-growth countries. That proportion is up from less than a fifth 30 years ago. Unfortunately, the remaining 2bn live in countries with stagnant, or even declining, incomes. What makes this even more important is the worrying fact that some two-thirds of the 3bn increase in global population expected by 2050 will live in countries today enjoying little or no growth.

The overriding challenge is to shift more poor countries into the high-growth category. This is addressed by the recently published Growth Report, product of a commission consisting mainly of policymakers from developing countries, under the chairmanship of Michael Spence, a Nobel-laureate economist at Stanford University.

So what does the report contribute? Nothing useful, argued William Easterly of New York University (this forum, May 28). He suggested, instead, that its pragmatism represented “the final collapse of the ‘development expert’ paradigm that has governed the west’s approach to poor countries since the second world war”.

Thereupon, Professor Easterly promptly offered his own expert opinion, namely, that “more economic and political freedoms are associated with much less poverty”. This is true. But it is harsh, to put it mildly, for Prof Easterly to condemn the report when he offers what appears to be even emptier advice.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our expert panel appears below.

Read the debate - contributors so far include William Easterly, Michael Spence, Martin Wolf and Clive Crook.