Category: Eurozone

By Kevin P. Gallagher

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. AFP/Getty Images

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. AFP/Getty Images

Emerging markets have fallen victim to unstable capital flows in the wake of the financial crisis. In an attempt to mitigate the accompanying asset bubbles and exchange rate pressures that come with such volatility, a number of emerging markets resorted to capital controls. Although these actions have largely been supported by the International Monetary Fund, some policy-makers and economists have decried capital controls as protectionist measures that can cause spillovers that unduly harm other nations.

Recently-published research shows that these claims are unfounded. According to the new welfare economics of capital controls, unstable capital flows to emerging markets can be viewed as negative externalities on recipient countries. Therefore regulations on cross-border capital flows are tools to correct for market failures that can make markets work better and enhance growth, not worsen it.

By Domenico Lombardi and Sarah Puritz Milsom

Following the unprecedented downgrade of the European Financial Stability Facility and nine eurozone sovereigns by Standard & Poor’s, there is a renewed impetus for the International Monetary Fund to step up its involvement in the deepening euro area crisis. In an executive board meeting earlier this week, managing director Christine Lagarde requested that the membership step up the fund’s own war chest in an effort to better equip the institution to adequately confront the growing global threat. The move follows an earlier reshuffle at the helm of the European department of the IMF, signalling that the fund has been quietly preparing itself for the gloomiest scenario in which the situation in Europe develops into a full-blown systemic crisis.

Credit: Hannelore Foerster/Bloomberg

Currently, the IMF is unable to ring-fence the euro area and contain any spillovers to the global financial system unless its global membership agrees to provide a significant boost to its resources. As it stands, the organisation has some $385bn in its forward commitment capacity, including the activation of the contingent facility — the new arrangements to borrow — that can be used “to cope with an impairment of the international monetary system or to deal with an exceptional situation that poses a threat to the stability of that system.”

By Thomas I. Palley

In his novel, The Jungle, the American muckraking author Upton Sinclair wrote about the horrendous work and sanitary conditions in the Chicago meat packing industry of the early 20th century. It is sometimes said Sinclair aimed for the heart but hit the stomach. That is because he aimed for progressive social and economic change, but instead his work prompted the founding of the Food and Drug Administration.

The same problem of missing the target confounds current discussions of the eurozone’s problems. What the euro lacks is a government banker, not a lender of last resort as is widely claimed.

By Carlo Jaeger

“The facts, ma’am, just the facts”: these words, attributed to the detective Joe Friday in the American 1950s crime series Dragnet, resonate in today’s eurozone crisis. Will anybody help Angela Merkel, German chancellor and a trained physicist with a sharp analytical mind, to get hold of the facts blurred by this misguided eurozone debate? Or must we wait for François Hollande, Socialist challenger for the French presidency, a European with hyper-sober realism, to grasp the facts his country’s president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has so far ignored?

By Thomas I. Palley

The eurozone‘s public finance crisis continues to fester, reflecting both political and intellectual failure. The intellectual failure is that the crisis has been interpreted exclusively as a debt crisis when it is also a central bank design crisis resulting from the euro’s flawed architecture. The flaw is the inability of eurozone governments to harness the central bank’s power to assist government finances. This systemic weakness explains why US and UK government bonds are weathering the storm, whereas Spain confronts default rumours despite having roughly similar debt and deficit profiles.

By Eswar Prasad and Mengjie Ding

Our analysis paints a sobering picture of worsening public debt dynamics and a sharply rising debt burden in advanced economies. These rising debt levels combined with heightened concerns about fiscal solvency now constitute a major threat to global financial stability.

Recent events in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and other economies on the periphery of the eurozone show the risks of debt buildups that are not tackled. Bond investors can quickly turn against a vulnerable country with high debt levels, leaving the country little breathing room to balance its fiscal books and precipitating a crisis.

Overall, the worldwide picture of government debt is not pretty.

By Domenico Lombardi

The agreement that eurozone leaders reached last week has succeeded in engaging the private sector in the Greek rescue. The package represents a sensible compromise: eurozone countries will provide some sort of guarantee for the collateral provided by Greek banks, which has been downgraded to default status. In turn, this will allow the European Central Bank to continue to refinance the Greek banking system, in keeping with its de facto role as lender of last resort which has led it to fill an institutional and political vacuum since the onset of the crisis.

By Domenico Lombardi

The IMF has just elected the first woman to its managing directorship, and already Christine Lagarde’s new desk in Washington is piling up with folders eagerly awaiting her arrival.

Although the European Summit reached agreement on how to develop the bail-out mechanism for sovereign countries after 2013, it was an agreement about process rather than content. Germany remained adamant that there would be no fiscal transfers to troubled economies, and that the best way forward is further fiscal consolidation, along with plans for the private sector to share in any losses after a sovereign default. EU finance ministers have been charged with filling in the blanks by 31 March, 2011 – if the markets are ready to wait that long. I am not confident that they will be. Nor do I believe that the present path is necessarily in the best interests of Germany itself, let alone other EU member states.

By Michael Pomerleano

A chorus of respected analysts is voicing pessimism about the future of the euro and the European Union.

Dani Rodrik writes about Thinking the Unthinkable in Europe. Barry Eichengreen comments on Europe’s Inevitable Haircut. Daniel Gros, in Big bang or endless crisis? argues for a big-bang solution to the eurozone’s problems. Ken Rogoff in The Euro at Mid-Crisis outlines an equally pessimistic scenario. Surprisingly, eternal optimists such as Desmond Lachman and Nouriel Roubini are joining the skeptics.

I view the lengthy and difficult process of muddling through as unfortunate but necessary. This post owes intellectual debt to Ben Friedman’s NBER paper- Debt Restructuring. Ben’s central point is that if default was easy, the fundamental moral hazard inherent in all uncollateralised borrower-lender relationships would lead to more frequent defaults, and some credit to emerging market countries would not be extended in the first place. He concludes that debt restructuring should not be easy.

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