The Greek government has promised to slash its fiscal deficit from an estimated 12.7 per cent of gross domestic product last year to 3 per cent in 2012. Is it plausible that this will happen? Not very. But Greece is merely the canary in the fiscal coal mine. Other eurozone members are also under pressure to slash fiscal deficits. What might such pressure do to vulnerable members, to the eurozone and to the world economy?

Having falsified its figures for years, violating the trust of its partners, Greece is in the doghouse. Yet, even if it bears much of the blame, the task it is undertaking is huge. In particular, unlike most countries with massive fiscal deficits – the UK, for example – Greece cannot offset the impact of fiscal tightening by loosening monetary policy or depreciating its currency.

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What would have happened during the financial crisis if the euro had not existed? The short answer is that there would have been currency crises among its members. The currencies of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain would surely have fallen sharply against the old D-Mark. That is the outcome the creators of the eurozone wished to avoid. They have been successful. But, if the exchange rate cannot adjust, something else must instead. That “something else” is the economies of peripheral eurozone member countries. They are locked into competitive disinflation against Germany, the world’s foremost exporter of very high-quality manufactures. I wish them luck.

The eurozone matters. Its economy is almost as big as that of the US. It is three times bigger than those of Japan or China. So far, it has passed its initial test. Nevertheless, the peak to trough decline of the US economy was only 3.8 per cent (second quarter 2008 to second quarter 2009), while the eurozone’s was 5.1 per cent (first quarter 2008 to second quarter 2009).

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By Paul De Grauwe

The recent decline of the dollar against major currencies such as the euro and the Japanese yen has been spectacular. Even more spectacular, but often forgotten, is the long run decline of the dollar against the major currencies in the world. Since 1960 the dollar lost two thirds of its value against the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc and the German mark (since 1999 the euro).

The long-term decline of the dollar appears to be quite surprising especially considering that at least since the early 1990s the US has been seen to produce superior economic results, ie a higher productivity growth than most of Europe and Japan with more or less the same rates of inflation. Yet despite the appearance of superior economic performance the dollar has gone on losing value against currencies of countries deemed to have an inferior economic system. Where does this paradox come from? Continue reading "The dilemma for the dollar"

From the FT:

Michael Milken: Prosperity rests on human and social capital

Wolfgang Münchau: Diverging deficits could fracture the eurozone

John Authers: Crisis creates new sophistication in risk

Deven Sharma: Insight: Consistency in credit ratings

Elsewhere:

Dimitri Vayanos and Paul Woolley, VOX EU: Capital market theory after the efficient market hypothesis

Simon Johnson, Peterson Institute: The G-20, the IMF, and Legitimacy

Paul Krugman, NYT: Obama’s Anzio

James Kwak, The Baseline Scenario: Fed Chest-Thumping for Beginners

By Michael Pomerleano

I was in Chicago last week to participate in the 12th Annual International Banking Conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the World Bank. The answer to the question posed — have the rules of the global financial game really changed? — is a resounding no.

This was my first week back in the US after being away for three years, and the conference gave me an opportunity to gauge the state of the debate there. Compared to my two years at the Bank of International Settlements in Basel and my year at the Bank of Israel, the openness of the debate and the quality of the discussions in Chicago were refreshing. However, in the US — the epicentre of the crisis and the country that is supposed to lead the world toward reform and out of the crisis — I expected a far more forceful articulation of remedial measures. Continue reading "Another crash is all too possible"

From the FT:

Jean-Claude Trichet: Europe has mapped its monetary exit

Timothy Geithner: Financial stability depends on more capital

Gillian Tett: A matter of retribution

Elsewhere:

Mark Kleinman: Reforming regulatory benefit cost analysis

Viral Acharya:   Systemic risk and deposit insurance premiums

Paul Krugman:  How did economists get it so wrong?

By Andre Sapir

Imagine the US was facing the current crisis with the following situation: only 30 of its 50 states belong to the dollar area; most of the southern states are outside the dollar area and so is New York, home of the US financial centre; the seat of the US government is in Washington, but dollar area chairman Ben Bernanke operates from Pittsburgh and secretary Tim Geithner is mainly governor of Vermont, one of the smallest US states, with a population of roughly half a million.

Absurd? Yet this is exactly what the European Union looks like, with only 16 of its 27 member states belonging to the euro area; most of the eastern states and the UK, home of the EU financial centre, outside the euro area; the seat of the EU institutions in Brussels, but ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet operating from Frankfurt and Eurogroup chairman Jean-Claude Juncker mainly the prime minister of Luxembourg. Continue reading "How the EU could stop the global crisis becoming a European problem"

From the FT:

Data raise hopes for eurozone recovery France and Germany return to growth

How to release the next boom New growth drivers will emerge, says George Magnus

Elsewhere:

Debtor’s revolt A widespread debt revulsion? Naked Capitalism

When insolvent banks are worth billions We’re nowhere near the point at which you can judge the health of a bank by looking at its share price Felix Salmon

China rising, Rent-seeking version The reason to worry about China  has  little to do with external balances.  It’s about productivity and rent-seeking The Baseline Scenario