Raise interest rates to increase lending

October 29th, 2009 6:00am

By Ronald McKinnon

This is an updated version of Liquidity traps and the credit crunch, published in this forum on August 13, 2009

Since the onset of the credit crunch and global downturn, governments everywhere have responded to the shortfall in aggregate demand in a textbook Keynesian fashion. They have adopted fiscal stimuli: ramping up government expenditures and cutting taxes. Central banks followed the lead of the Federal Reserve by driving down short-term interest rates toward zero: almost exactly zero for overnight interbank rates in the US, Japan, and Canada, and generally less than 1 per cent in Europe into the autumn of this year. Continue reading "Raise interest rates to increase lending"

Zero interest rate policy: Treatment may be as expensive as the crisis

October 15th, 2009 11:22am

By Andrew Sheng and Michael Pomerleano

The national authorities and the international community should be commended for the speed of action taken to stop the spread of the financial crisis. To protect the financial system from the deflation in asset bubbles, the public sector has essentially guaranteed all deposits, rescued systemically important institutions, made large liquidity injections and brought interest rates to zero or near zero under a zero interest rate policy. Almost all systemically important central banks entered into ZIRP under emergency conditions at the same time.

But the polices adopted to combat the crisis are creating their own problems. In the medium term, the treatment may be as expensive as the crisis.

Continue reading "Zero interest rate policy: Treatment may be as expensive as the crisis"

Liquidity traps and the credit crunch

August 13th, 2009 11:25am

By Ronald McKinnon

The global credit crunch which began in 2007 but became acute in 2008, originated from the collapse in the bubble in US house prices and, to a lesser extent, in European ones.

Unsurprisingly, the declining home values made people feel poorer, so consumption spending fell. This fall in aggregate demand in the US and Europe reduced demand for imports and caused a parallel slump in the rest of the world, including in emerging markets. Continue reading "Liquidity traps and the credit crunch"

The Great Recession and the coming jobless recovery

August 6th, 2009 1:05pm

By Roger E. A. Farmer

Confidence is slowly returning to the stock market and the S&P is back to the level it reached when President Obama took office in January. This is enough to prevent a further collapse in spending; the Obama stimulus package may even move us into positive territory for US gross domestic product growth. But these ‘green shoots of recovery’ are not enough to create the jobs needed to restore full employment in the US. Continue reading "The Great Recession and the coming jobless recovery"

Economic woes: this is not a tale of two depressions

June 18th, 2009 6:02pm

By Brendan Brown

Global equity markets are understandably not taking seriously the ominous pessimism from commentators dissatisfied with the notion of an economic recovery emerging from below.

Yes the S&P 500 may be down a few per cent in recent days but that is mainly a reflection of the US dollar’s mini-rebound (which means foreign earnings become worth less in US dollar terms) and some long overdue downward correction (very small so far) in commodity markets. Continue reading "Economic woes: this is not a tale of two depressions"

Why Keynes was right and wrong, and why it matters

May 27th, 2009 6:12pm

Keynes

Keynes

By Roger E. A Farmer

In the FT’s Economists’ Forum, Benn Steil wrote a stimulating piece in which he argued that Keynes was wrong. His argument is that interpretations of Keynesian economics are all based on the assumption that wages and prices are sticky. But wages and prices are not sticky. Ergo - Keynes was wrong. Continue reading "Why Keynes was right and wrong, and why it matters"

Why Keynes was wrong, and why it matters

May 19th, 2009 11:40am

By Benn Steil

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the US budget deficit will reach $1.85 trillion this year and $1.38 trillion in 2010, 13.1 per cent and 9.6 per cent of gross domestic product respectively. Much more worryingly, it projects deficits averaging more than $1 trillion a year for the next 10 years, which will raise the US public debt-to-GDP ratio to more than 80 per cent by 2019. Continue reading "Why Keynes was wrong, and why it matters"

Bah Humbug: Stagflation is around the corner

April 6th, 2009 1:07pm

By Roger E. A Farmer

“Before I draw nearer to that stone to which you point,” said Scrooge, “answer me one question. Are these the shadows of the things that Will be, or are they shadows of things that May be, only?”

Economic policy is in a muddle. Academic voices are flooding the blogosphere and the intelligent policymaker can be forgiven for being unclear as to which side to listen to. On one end of the spectrum are classical revisionists who blame government for distorting market outcomes. On the other are Keynesians who think that fiscal deficits will rescue capitalism from its excesses. Both are partly wrong. Both are partly right. Continue reading "Bah Humbug: Stagflation is around the corner"

Seeds of its own destruction

March 9th, 2009 3:28am

Another ideological god has failed. The assumptions that ruled policy and politics over three decades suddenly look as outdated as revolutionary socialism.

“The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to help.’” Thus quipped Ronald Reagan, hero of US conservatism. The remark seems ancient history now that governments are pouring trillions of dollars, euros and pounds into financial systems. Continue reading "Seeds of its own destruction"

Japan’s lessons for a world of balance-sheet deflation

February 17th, 2009 11:21pm

Pinn illustration

What has Japan’s “lost decade” to teach us? Even a year ago, this seemed an absurd question. The general consensus of informed opinion was that the US, the UK and other heavily indebted western economies could not suffer as Japan had done. Now the question is changing to whether these countries will manage as well as Japan did. Welcome to the world of balance-sheet deflation.

As I have noted before, the best analysis of what happened to Japan is by Richard Koo of the Nomura Research Institute. His big point, though simple, is ignored by conventional economics: balance sheets matter. Threatened with bankruptcy, the overborrowed will struggle to pay down their debts. A collapse in asset prices purchased through debt will have a far more devastating impact than the same collapse accompanied by little debt.

Most of the decline in Japanese private spending and borrowing in the 1990s was, argues Mr Koo, due not to the state of the banks, but to that of their borrowers. This was a situation in which, in the words of John Maynard Keynes, low interest rates – and Japan’s were, for years, as low as could be – were “pushing on a string”. Debtors kept paying down their loans.

The remainder of the article can be read here. Debate from our panel of economists appears below.