Category: Recession

Pinn illustration

The financial crisis of 2009 is morphing into the fiscal anxieties of 2010. This is particularly true inside the eurozone. Spreads between rates of interest on Greek bonds and German bunds touched 3.86 percentage points in late January (see chart). The risk has emerged of a self-fulfilling confidence crisis that would have dire consequences for other vulnerable members. Much attention has focused on what might happen if the crisis were not resolved, with talk of bail-outs, defaults or even exits from the euro. But what would need to be done to resolve the crisis, without such a calamity? It is the demand, stupid.

Conventional wisdom in the eurozone is that the crises are the result of poor policy-making in peripheral countries. In particular, fiscal policy has been too loose and economies too inflexible. The wages of such sins are austerity. Then, after a lengthy penance, the lost sheep returns to the fold of stability.

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By Roger E.A. Farmer

For the past nine months I have been presenting some new ideas at academic conferences where economists have been grappling with the current financial crisis. Boston, Montreal, Amsterdam, London, Cleveland, Sydney, Atlanta … Only the venues change.  The participants and the papers are always the same.

By Vernon L. Smith and Steven Gjerstad

Financial and economic collapses in 2007-2008 and 1929-1930 followed unprecedented residential mortgage credit expansions. Both generated household balance sheet crises that were transmitted to banks as asset prices collapsed against fixed debts. Industry suffered from declining expenditures on housing and durable goods, and income fell when production and employment declined.  Irving Fisher (1933) described this spiral in “The debt-deflation theory of great depressions.”

These developments impacted major categories of US expenditures. The chart shows percentage changes in expenditures on consumer non-durables and services (C), GDP, consumer durables (D), non-residential fixed investment (I), and housing (H). The change for each category is computed relative to its level at the start of the recession in Q4 2007. 

“As the last of the official Q3 data came in, the UK found itself in the unenviable position of being the only economy in the [Group of 20 leading economies] to remain in recession”. Thus did Consensus Forecasts summarise the UK’s plight. With the third-largest economic decline, after Japan and Italy, the most indebted households, the biggest fiscal deterioration and the greatest dependency on the financial sector among the Group of Seven leading high-income countries, the UK has suffered a huge economic shock.

Fortunately, the UK also possesses assets. Among these are: a government with the capacity to act; the ability to borrow in its own currency; a flexible exchange rate; a credible monetary regime; a modest initial level of public indebtedness; privileged access to the European market, the world’s biggest; a greater number of top-class universities than any country, apart from the US; and an economy that has shed its most vulnerable manufacturing activities.

What the country requires is a strategy for what I have called the “post post-Thatcher era”. What should be its elements? Growth with stabilisation is the answer.

What then should be the elements of the strategy for growth?

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By Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor

Are credit bubbles dangerous? Long-run historical data reveal that important changes have taken place in the financial system over the past decades, setting in train an unprecedented expansion in the role of credit in the macroeconomy. It is mishap of history that just at the time when credit mattered more than ever before, the reigning doctrine had sentenced it to playing no constructive role in central bank policies. Over the past 140 years, episodes of financial instability were often the result of “credit booms gone wrong”.

Ingram Pinn illustration

Financial crises have devastating impacts on the public finances. The impact is also most severe where the pre-crisis excesses were greatest. Among members of the Group of Seven leading high-income countries, this means the bubble-infected US and UK. The question both countries confront is how soon and how far to tighten. Tightening will have to be substantial. But premature action could be a devastating error.

In their work on the history of financial crises, Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University note that “the real stock of debt nearly doubles” in crisis-hit countries.* This will be true for the US and UK. It is only in small part the result of bail-outs of the financial sector or of stimulus programmes. According to the International Monetary Fund, in the UK none of the 10.6 percentage point rise in the ratio of fiscal deficits to gross domestic product between 2007 and 2010 will be due to crisis-related discretionary measures.** In the case of the US, 1.8 percentage points of a 6.5 percentage point deterioration will be due to such measures. Most of the change is structural: the levels of GDP and fiscal revenue will not return to the previous path.

How, though, does one assess this fiscal slippage? One way is historical (see charts). In the case of the UK, the crisis is forecast by the IMF to raise the ratio of net public debt to GDP by close to 50 percentage points between 2007 and 2014. The only comparable previous episodes are wars. The increase this time is smaller than that in the wars with revolutionary and Napoleonic France or the world wars of the 20th century. But it is as large, or larger, than in other 18th-century wars.

The remainder of the article can be read here. Please post comments below.

By Thomas Palley

There is widespread recognition that the financial crisis which triggered the Great Recession was significantly due to financial excess, particularly in real estate lending. Now, policymakers are looking to reform the financial system in hope of avoiding future crises. But like the drunk who looks for his lost keys under the lamppost because that is where the light is, policymakers remain fixated on capital standards because that is what is already in place.

By Ronald McKinnon

This is an updated version of Liquidity traps and the credit crunch, published in this forum on August 13, 2009

Since the onset of the credit crunch and global downturn, governments everywhere have responded to the shortfall in aggregate demand in a textbook Keynesian fashion. They have adopted fiscal stimuli: ramping up government expenditures and cutting taxes. Central banks followed the lead of the Federal Reserve by driving down short-term interest rates toward zero: almost exactly zero for overnight interbank rates in the US, Japan, and Canada, and generally less than 1 per cent in Europe into the autumn of this year.

From FT:

Time for the ECB to get serious about the overvalued euro – Willem Buiter

Why the euro is not the next global currency – Jean Pisani-Ferry and Adam Posen

Safe as houses – FT editorial on new mortgage regulation

From elsewhere:

The global crisis and central banks in Latin America: Breaking with the past – Luis I. Jácome H., VOXEU

The secret Paulson-Goldman meeting – Felix Salmon, Reuters

Why Is The Chamber Of Commerce Defending Big Banks? – Simon Johnson, Baseline Scenario

So Now We Know Why Lehman Went Under – Naked Capitalism

From the FT:

Goodbye, Macroeconomics – Eli Noam

The travesty of the commons – Christopher Caldwell on the field of Nobel winner Elinor Ostrom

The free market is not up to the job of creating work – Mort Zuckerman on US unemployment

Countdown to the next crisis is already under way – Wolfgang Münchau

Down but not out – Krishna Guha on the dollar

Elsewhere:

Cognitive Dissonance and Global Macroeconomics – James Kwak on rhetoric and reality in the global imbalances debate, at Baseline Scenario

Escaping the state should cost Lloyds – Peter Thal Larsen, Reuters

Herbert Hoover and the start of the Great Depression – Lee E. Ohanian on history VOXEU

No L – James Hamilton on having avoided an ‘L-shaped’ recovery, at Econbrowser

Goldman Turns Into a Financial Frankenstein While the Fed Snoozes Away – Huffington Post

A reflection on the G20 (The question never asked to Mr Zoellick) – Biagio Bossone on the legitimacy of the G20 for small nations, at VOXEU

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