Category: Regulation

By Laurence Kotlikoff

The Independent Banking Commission’s final report is a grave disappointment. The ICB (chaired by Sir John Vickers) seeks to reinstate Glass-Steagall by ring-fencing good banks and letting bad banks do their thing and, if they get into trouble, suffer the consequences. This proposition was tested by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, whose failure nearly destroyed the global financial system.

The commission retains the current system apart from some extra requirements primarily imposed on the good banks (the retail banks). The main impact of this is likely to be to foster more financial intermediation to run through the bad banks, i.e. if you impose more regulation on financial companies that call themselves X and less on companies that call themselves Y, companies that call themselves X will start to call themselves Y. In short, the commission has in effect taxed good banking while sanctifying shadow banking. The commission has also chosen to regulate based on what a bank calls itself, rather than on what it does.

By Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig

Bankers on both sides of the Atlantic are lobbying furiously against stronger regulation. Authorities in different countries are reluctant to strengthen banking regulation as if the crisis never happened. The European Commission even hesitates to fully implement Basel III.

In this debate, many argue that global competition requires a “level playing field.” Following this argument, and concerned about the City’s competitiveness, the Interim Report of the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking avoids proposing tougher regulation for investment banks.

These “level playing field” arguments are invalid.

By Michael Pomerleano

The message of this article is straightforward. In response to the crisis, the reforms in financial regulation address threats to the banking system by increasing capital and providing for liquidity in the banking system. This article argues that the measures miss the point of the recent crisis. The liquidity crisis in the shadow banking system was a major source of financial and economic instability.

Liquidity grew within in the shadow banking system, and once liquidity evaporated, fire sales lead to downward revaluations of collateral assets. In a financial system increasingly dominated by market instruments, a collapse due to rapid revaluations or counterparty risk is a very high prospective risk. The liquidity and leverage ratios proposed by the Basel committee do not address the problem.

By Laurence Kotlikoff

Dear John,

I read with great interest your terrific speech about banking reform. I agree with essentially everything you said, but want to take issue with some aspects of your brief remarks about Limited Purpose Banking.

In your remarks, you lump Narrow Banking together with Limited Purpose Banking, but they are very different proposals. Limited Purpose Banking includes Narrow Banking insofar as cash mutual funds would be held strictly in cash. Such cash mutual funds would be used as the payment system under Limited Purpose Banking and would be the only mutual funds that would be backed to the buck. All other mutual funds, whether open end or closed end, would float in the market.

By Michael Pomerleano

In response to the financial crisis, the most immediate fundamental reform adopted by several developed countries is to have a “systemic regulator” overseeing the stability of the financial system as a whole. Through data gathering, analysis and ultimately regulation, the systemic regulator is expected is expected to mitigate the risks associated with highly inter-dependent relationships between financial institutions. Many central banks are receiving significant new responsibilities for macroprudential supervision. Changes to the UK regulatory framework in 2010 gave the Bank of England responsibility for microprudential and macroprudential regulation. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act established the Financial Stability Oversight Council, to be led by Treasury Secretary including the heads of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.

Several arguments have been put forward for justifying why central banks are receiving a prominent role in macroprudential supervision: financial supervision offer insights into the condition of financial institutions that is essential in the conduct of monetary policy; and central banks are inextricably involved in the financial stability function through their lender-of-last-resort function.

By Michael Pomerleano

In response to the global financial crisis that began in mid-2007, governments around the world are introducing reforms designed to address the way financial markets operate. Although it will take many years to implement the multitude of rules and regulations, we know the contours and can focus on the question of whether the changes will instill a safer system. The answer is likely to be a disappointing no.

To date, reform in financial regulation and supervision has focused mainly on large, regulated institutions. Three examples are the just announced Basel III capital rules, much of the US Dodd-Frank Act, and the US Federal Reserve’s revamping of its large holding company supervision.

Some attention has also been paid to the systemic source of risk, notably in Dodd-Frank’s provisions for prudential supervision of payments, clearing, and settlement systems. Yet, shoring up the capital of the banking system is equivalent to fortifying the Maginot Line while the financial system has changed.

By Michael Pomerleano

Developing and developed countries alike are inextricably connected in the international financial system. Yet this system is heading into strong headwinds and a dangerous period in which vulnerabilities will increase in the international financial system.

By Kevin P. Gallagher

Clear and consistent proposals toward crisis recovery and prevention are needed at the International Monetary Fund upcoming annual meetings. Unfortunately, the IMF has been sending mixed messages over the past two months on the subject of capital controls.

Leading academic critic warns of leaving too much discretion to regulators and calls for new economic thinking.

Joseph Stiglitz was interviewed at the Institute for New Economic Thinking conference, sponsored by George Soros, at King’s College, Cambridge.

Ferguson illustration

Today, the people see in the financial sector not the skilful hands of erstwhile masters of the universe, but the grabbing hands of greedy ingrates. It is little wonder, then, that a desperate President Obama, battered by the voters in Massachusetts, has turned upon a group even less popular than his party. He has duly added the axe of Paul Volcker, 82-year-old former chairman of the Federal Reserve, to the regulatory scalpel offered by his Treasury secretary, Tim Geithner.

Mr Volcker is proposing a version of the distinction between commercial and investment banking brought into the US by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. In announcing his new proposals last week, Mr Obama referred to a “Volcker Rule” that “banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, or sponsor hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading operations for their own profit, unrelated to serving their customers”. Furthermore, added the president: “I’m also proposing that we prevent the further consolidation of our financial system.”

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