By Kevin O’Rourke
This period last year seems an age ago. The fear then was of resource scarcity: of rising oil prices and increasing food prices, as biofuels crowded out food production and population continued to grow. Environmental worries also reflect resource scarcity, albeit of another type. Once this crisis is over, these concerns will inevitably return to the agenda, and could easily dominate it for the rest of this century.
The London summit of 1933 marked the moment at which co-operative efforts to manage the Great Depression collapsed. The summit of the Group of 20 countries, in the same city, on April 2, must turn out quite differently. That may seem a simple task. It is not. The usual platitudinous communiqué would be a catastrophe.
By Ronald McKinnon
As always, I am amazed by how much analytical ground Martin Wolf covers in each column; “Why agreeing on a new Bretton Woods is vital” is no exception. Let me first pick up on one point: the number of countries involved in the negotiation.
The original Bretton Woods agreement was essentially bilateral, and negotiated between the British Treasury (Keynes) and the US Treasury (White) in 1943-1944, with Canada sometimes acting as an umpire.
The post-war General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade cum World Trade Organisation negotiations were manageable and quite successful as long as they were also mainly bilateral – the eastern European bloc versus the US – with Most Favoured Nation treatment extended to most other countries.
Developing countries did have a marginal say. The old GATT exempted them from the requirement to reciprocally reduce their own tariffs. This was disastrous for them, and fortunately is being phased out under the new WTO.
By Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh and Alan M. Taylor
Since the early 1990s, central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have accumulated foreign reserves at an unprecedented rate. The macroeconomic impact of these official flows has been profound and they have contributed significantly to global imbalances. Providing an explanation for these trends remains a major puzzle in international macroeconomics, and prevailing theories based on trade or debt deliver poor empirical performance. We argue that part of this great reserve accumulation is a response to the threat of financial instability in the context of rapidly expanding financial systems, increasingly mobile capital, and exchange rate objectives. The recent turbulence in global financial markets supports this view.
By John Muellbauer
Fed minutes released on October 7 disclosed that as recently as Sept 16, Fed officials thought risks to growth and inflation were roughly equally balanced. And Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke acknowledged on the same day that though the inflation outlook had improved somewhat, it remained uncertain. The market may have taken these views as representative of central banks round the world, particularly given the ECB decision of October 2 not to reduce rates. Following these releases, the Dow Jones index fell by about 6.5 percent as the market thought the internationally co-ordinated interest rate cut it had been expecting had become less likely. This and the knock-on effects on world markets then helped to force central banks to make the cut the market had expected, but on October 8.
Central banks’ caution about inflation risks is understandable given the experiences of 2008. Forecasting inflation is notoriously difficult. There have been big structural shifts in the world economy such as trade and financial globalisation and in individual economies, such as the decline in trade union power. Monetary policy itself has shifted to a far greater focus on inflation. Energy and food price shocks can be large and very hard to predict. Indeed, the speed of price changes tends to increase with big shocks. Most forecasting models used by central banks therefore put a large weight on recent inflation. This tracks inflation quite well except at turning points because the models miss key underlying influences.
By Lawrence Summers
With two wars still continuing and violence in Georgia dominating the foreign policy debate; and with the financial crisis and economic insecurity for families dominating the domestic debate, US international economic policy is receiving less attention in this presidential election year than usual. The limited attention it has received has focused on concerns about specific trade agreements, not broader questions of international strategy. That is unfortunate. The next administration faces the prospect of having to make the most consequential international economic policy choices in a generation at a time when the confidence of governments in free markets is being increasingly questioned.
The current distribution of regional economic power is unlike anything that was predicted even a decade ago. The rise of the developing world, its growing share in global output and far greater share of global growth, is perhaps a quantitative but not a qualitative surprise. The qualitative surprise is this: with almost all the industrial world in or near recession, much of the momentum in the global economy is coming from countries with authoritarian governments that are pursuing economic strategies directed towards wealth accumulation and building up geopolitical strength rather than improving living standards for their populations. China, where household consumption has now fallen below 40 per cent of its gross domestic product – which must be some kind of peacetime record – is the most extreme example. Similar tendencies, however, can be seen in other parts of Asia, Russia and other oil exporting countries.
Even before the slowdown in the industrial world, a striking feature of the global economy was the substantial net flow of capital from the emerging periphery to the industrial centre. Rising oil prices have geopolitical as well as economic consequences. The run-up in oil prices over the past year has generated more than $10bn (€6.8bn, £5.4bn) a week in extra revenues for Opec members. Asian export powers and oil exporters have enjoyed a vast accumulation of wealth, adding about $1,000bn a year in assets.
These shifts have affected almost every global economic issue. The pressure created by the investment of these surpluses was one of the big factors driving the excesses that preceded our financial problems. Concern about the flow of imports from countries that have pursued a strategy of export-led growth is a big reason for the protectionist backlash now being seen in the industrialised world. It is now recognised that meaningful efforts to address climate change require a framework that induces China and other emerging markets to co-operate.
It has become a cliché to suggest that the world’s institutional approaches to economic co-operation need overhauling to take into account the rising economic clout of emerging markets and the decline in dominance of the group of seven leading industrialised nations (G7). This is correct. The steps taken so far – the initiation of the G-20 during the 1990s and the adjustments of voting shares in international financial institutions – are valuable if insufficient.
By Jagdish Bhagwati
In the 1980s, Japan was feared in the US to be a lethal combination of Superman and the evil genius Lex Luthor in a classic case of what I have called the Diminished Giant Syndrome.
Members of Congress famously smashed a Toshiba radio cassette recorder on the steps of Capitol Hill in protest in 1987. Great Britain at the turn of the 19th century had been marked by similar diffidence, despair and recrimination when Germany and the US were emerging on the world scene. There, Sir Howard Vincent entered parliament festooned with mops, pails and brushes marked “Made in Germany”.
US hegemony survived the exaggerated threat from Japan. But the US is now once again a fearful giant. Many Americans see trade as a peril rather than an opportunity. This has turned the US from what the economist Charles Kindleberger famously called an “altruistic” hegemon into a “selfish” hegemon.
The remainder of this article can be read here. Debate from our panel of economists appears below.
by Willem Buiter
From a cyclical perspective, things look bad for Europe, the US and most of the global economy. My contribution to summer cheer is to note that longer-term local and global economic prospects are likely to be worse than expected. So welcome to boom and bust. Welcome to subdued long-term growth prospects.
The ancient Greeks knew hubris to be one sin the gods will punish. When Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, announced “the end of boom and bust”, Jove must have checked his thunderbolts. Capitalist market economies are inherently cyclical. The private credit system is intrinsically prone to alternating bouts of irrational euphoria and unwarranted depression. Busts play an essential role. They clean up the mess created during the boom by inflated expectations, overoptimistic plans and unrealistic ventures. These become embodied in unsustainable household debt, productive capacity with no foreseeable use, excessive corporate and financial sector leverage and enterprises whose only asset is hope. The correction is painful, even brutal: unemployment rises, as do defaults, repossessions and bankruptcies. We entered such a cathartic phase around the turn of the year in both the US and the UK. Continental Europe is not far behind.
The remainder of this column can be read here . Debate from our panel of economists appears below.
By Fred Bergsten
The global economy has clearly decoupled from the US and world growth remains close to 4 per cent in spite of the absence of any increases in domestic US demand. Continued expansion abroad, especially in the emerging market economies, has in fact cushioned the slowdown and so far prevented recession in the US. Hence we are also experiencing the first episode in history of reverse coupling, in which the rest of the world pulls the US forward rather than the opposite.
The most striking feature of the current global economic situation is that the US is the only major country that is seriously contemplating recession and that has adopted aggressive expansionary policies to combat that risk. Most other countries are more worried about inflation than slower growth. Many are experiencing reduced growth, to be sure, but part of their slowing is a natural cyclical reaction to four years of near-record global expansion, at more than 4½ per cent from 2004 to 2007, and the need to focus on price stability. The additional losses because of the housing and credit crises in the US amount only to a couple of 10ths of 1 per cent in most areas, including Europe and Japan. It will reach a full percentage point or more only in the fastest growers such as China, where expansion will remain near 10 per cent. Many of these cuts are in fact welcome as their central banks are tightening monetary policy rather than easing it.
Global growth is thus still likely to approach 4 per cent in both 2008 and 2009 in spite of the sharp slowdown in its largest single economy. The emerging market economies, which now account for half of world output calculated at purchasing power parity exchange rates by the International Monetary Fund, are still expanding at 6-7 per cent. Even the nearest neighbours of the US – Canada and Mexico – are nowhere near recession and have altered their policies much less forcefully. In spite of the international transmission of substantial financial as well as real economic shocks from the US, the traditional relationship where “the world catches cold when the US sneezes” no longer holds.
The second striking feature is the reverse coupling of the global economy. Over the past two quarters, the US has recorded positive growth at an annual rate of 0.8 per cent (in spite of the pronouncements of many observers that recession had already set in). Its “net exports of goods and services”, the gross domestic product equivalent of the current account balance, have strengthened at an annual rate of almost 1 per cent of GDP during that period. Hence the totality of recent US expansion has been provided by the strengthening of its trade balance. Domestic demand has been falling but the US has been saved from recession by the rest of the world.
The improved US trade performance of the past two years is due partly to the substantial, if lagged, restoration of the country’s price competitiveness as the dollar declined by a trade-weighted average of 25-30 per cent since early 2002, reversing most of its excessive run-up during the previous seven years that produced unsustainable current account deficits exceeding 6 per cent of GDP. Equally important, however, is the continued robust growth of the world economy. Every percentage point by which the rest of the world expands domestic demand faster than internal growth in the US produces gains of about $50bn (€32bn, £25bn) for the US external balance. Weighted by US exports, foreign growth exceeded US growth by about 2 percentage points in 2007 and will do so by an average of about 1.5 points this year and next as decoupling persists. Taken together, these currency and comparative growth factors have already improved the real US trade balance, and hence GDP, by almost $150bn since 2006, with gains of another $150bn or so likely through 2009. (The nominal US trade and current account deficits will not improve as much because of the sharp rise in the price of oil imports.)
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s new Economic Outlook projects that more than 80 per cent of all US growth in 2008-09 will derive from continued strengthening of its external position. Exports have been climbing at an annual rate of about 8 per cent, at least six times as fast as imports. Unless domestic demand takes an unexpected further fall in the quarters ahead, reverse coupling of the global economy will thus have prevented the US recession that was so widely predicted and feared. Presidential candidates and members of Congress who believe that the US is losing from globalisation should take note of this export-led growth and its creation of excellent new jobs, and recognise the folly of backing away from international trade at a time when it is providing critical gains for their country.
These international macroeconomic developments also provide another telling indication of the shifts in global economic power. As noted, the emerging market economies make up about half the world economy, so their growth of 6-7 per cent assures reasonably strong world output increases even if there were no expansion at all in the rich countries. China alone accounts for 10 per cent of the global total, so its annual expansion of 10 per cent generates a full percentage point of world growth all by itself. The steadily rising diversification of global economic leadership is paying huge dividends to all its participants, most dramatically during this episode to the US as export-led growth saves it from at least the worst ravages of its housing bubble and associated policy errors.
The writer is director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics
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