BP’s investigation team includes a series of recommendations based on their key findings. The report notes that ”others in the industry may benefit from consideration of these recommendations as well”.

The recommendations themselves are too technical to go into in detail, but broadly cover “drilling and well operations practice” and as well as “contractor and service provider oversight and assurance”.

 Here are a few that seemed noteworthy:

- Conduct an immediate review of the quality of the services provided by all cementing service providers

- Propose to the American Petroleum Institute the development of a recommended practice for design and testing of foam cement slurries in high-pressure, high-temperature applications

It seems that not a lot went right on the Macondo welll on April 20. If you need a step-by-step description of events that led to the accident, here is BP’s more detailed account, helpfully attributing blame at each step (the emphasis is ours).

The cement and shoe track barriers – and in particular the cement slurry that was used – at the bottom of the Macondo well failed to contain hydrocarbons within the reservoir, as they were designed to do, and allowed gas and liquids to flow up the production casing;

The results of the negative pressure test were incorrectly accepted by BP and Transocean, although well integrity had not been established;

Over a 40-minute period, the Transocean rig crew failed to recognise and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons were in the riser and rapidly flowing to the surface;

Continue reading: “BP oil spill report: The nitty gritty”