This blog has been updated to incorporate the Japan GDP data published on Monday.

Japan, it seems, is still stuck between a rock and a hard place. The rather shocking gross domestic product figures just published for the third quarter show that the economy has fallen into yet another technical recession since the sales tax was increased in April. On this evidence, it will be hard to achieve fiscal sustainability without abandoning the economic recovery. Abenomics, which was supposed to resolve this longstanding dilemma, is in trouble.

Although Japanese GDP data are notoriously volatile from quarter to quarter, and this batch was depressed by a temporary burst of inventory shedding, underlying consumer and corporate spending is very weak. Aggressive monetary easing and a huge devaluation have not been enough, as yet anyway, to overcome the effects of even a modest fiscal tightening.

In the next few days, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is widely expected to react to the GDP figures by announcing that the second leg of a sales tax increase, scheduled for October 2015, has been postponed until 2017. Since this delay would be supported by two-thirds of the Japanese electorate, it may be the prelude to a snap general election in December.

In itself, the postponement of the sales tax increase will have a negligible effect on fiscal sustainability, and it will help restore the economic recovery next year. But the fact that it needs to be considered at all raises wider questions about the longer term success of Abenomics. Read more

The most significant economic shock in the global economy so far in 2014 has been the drop of more than 25 per cent in spot oil prices since the end of June. Since this shock is attributed by most energy analysts to an increase in oil supply, and not to a decline in global oil demand, this should have led to a significant decline in near-term world inflation forecasts, and to upgrades in global economic growth forecasts.

The disinflationary effects are uncontroversial. Lower oil prices have obvious direct and indirect effects on consumer prices. But the boost to growth is more debatable, since lower oil prices involve a redistribution of income from oil producers to oil consumers. Why should this reallocation of resources lead to a rise in real gross domestic product? Read more

The rebound in global equities since mid October once again leaves markets in nosebleed territory. The likelihood of an imminent sell-off depends on the economic cycle, the central banks, and temporary extremes in valuation. All of these factors are the staple diet of this blog.

But today I would like to reflect on whether we can expect the much longer up-trend in risk assets, which started in the early 1980s, to continue into future cycles. (Warning: some of this is a bit technical; skip to the end for the bottom line for investors.) Read more

Amid all the obituary notices for quantitative easing that were published when the Federal Reserve stopped buying bonds last Wednesday, it was temporarily forgotten that there are other central banks in the world moving in precisely the opposite direction.

The Bank of Japan immediately stepped up to the plate with an announcement of first order global importance on Friday. It shocked the markets with a gigantic increase in its QE activities, ensuring that the total central bank injection of liquidity into the global economy in 2015 will be much larger than it has been in the last year. Read more

The examination is over. For more than a year the European Central Bank has been shining a light on the books of the eurozone’s banks; this weekend it reported its conclusions.

The balance sheets of 25 institutions were found wanting; the ECB concluded that they need an extra €25bn between them to be able to withstand a nasty economic surprise. Two crucial questions remain. Has enough at last been done to fix the European banking system? And will this on its own be enough to ward off the threat of deflation that is hanging over the eurozone? Read more

In the years after the Great Recession of 2008-09, forecasts for global economic growth have persistently proven too high. This tendency has been particularly pronounced in the major emerging economies, where there has been a gradual realisation that long term trend growth potential should be revised downwards (see this blog).

In the developed economies, growth expectations have also proven persistently too high, causing an increasing focus on “secular stagnation”.

Three of my colleagues at Fulcrum have been examining the behaviour of long run GDP growth in the advanced economies, using developments of dynamic factor models to produce real time estimates of long run GDP growth rates. See the summary paper here by Juan Antolin-Diaz, Thomas Drechsel and Ivan Petrella, and the more academic version here [1].

The results (Graph 1) show an extremely persistent slowdown in long run growth rates since the 1970s, not a sudden decline after 2008. This looks more persistent for the G7 as a whole than it does for individual countries, where there is more variation in the pattern through time.

Averaged across the G7, the slowdown can be traced to trend declines in both population growth and (especially) labour productivity growth, which together have resulted in a halving in long run GDP growth from over 4 per cent in 1970 to 2 per cent now.

Some version of secular stagnation does seem to be taking hold. This may partly explain why, for the last five years, forecasts of G7 real GDP growth have been persistently biased upwards. Read more

Shenzhen Business District  © Nikada / Getty Images

It is very striking that western commentators and investors have become extremely sceptical about any good news emanating from the Chinese economy. This week, for example, official economic data showed growth in gross domestic product at a quarterly annualised rate of about 8 per cent, with industrial production bouncing back in September from a weak reading in August. Yet markets were unimpressed.

Although this latest news clearly reduced the danger that China is entering a hard landing as the property sector adjusts sharply, many headlines proclaimed, correctly, that the economy is now growing at the slowest pace since the last recession. So is China bouncing back from a weak patch of growth, or is it headed for a prolonged slowdown lasting many years?

Actually, both are probably true. Cyclical fluctuations are occurring around a clearly slowing long-term trend for growth, and this can defy simple good news/bad news interpretations. At present, it seems that the latest cyclical slowdown is being controlled, despite the property crash. Read more

The extraordinary volatility in all financial asset classes in the past week can only be described as ominous. On Wednesday, the US ten year treasury, perhaps the most liquid financial instrument in the world, traded at yields of 2.21 per cent and 1.86 per cent within a matter of hours. This type of volatility in the ultimate “risk free” asset has previously been seen only in 2008 and other extreme meltdowns, so it clearly cannot be swept under the carpet.

A few weeks ago, investors had widely expected a strengthening US economy to lead to a rising dollar and a tighter Federal Reserve, with an amazing 100 per cent of economists saying they were bearish about bonds in a Bloomberg survey in April. Instead the markets have started to act as if the world is about to topple into recession, and an abrupt reversal of speculative positions has probably led to exaggerated market moves, in both directions.

Now that excessively large positions have been washed out, what is the underlying message from the past month of market action? Read more

Financial markets caught a nasty chill last week, when extremely weak activity data from Germany coincided with fears that the ECB could not overcome Bundesbank opposition to more aggressive quantitative easing. Then the IMF reported that there is a 40 per cent probability of a recession in the euro area within 12 months, along with a 30 per cent chance of outright deflation. Markets fear that policy makers in the euro area are once again losing control over their weakening economy.

Since markets often sniff out impending trouble before economists do, there is, as Martin Wolf warns, no room whatever for complacency. But, so far, the blip in global risk assets hardly registers on the Richter scale. Nor is there much evidence from published data of a major slowdown in global GDP growth up to now.

US domestic demand is strengthening, and the 20 per cent fall in oil prices since June will boost the oil importing economies markedly in coming months. Unless euro area policy is spectacularly dysfunctional, which I do not expect, the slide in the euro area should not be powerful enough to offset these expansionary forces. Read more

Mario Draghi

  © CARLO HERMANN/AFP/Getty Images

Last week’s press conference by ECB President Mario Draghi left the markets disappointed and somewhat perplexed about the shift towards quantitative easing that had just been sanctioned by the governing council (GC). Because this was focused on private sector assets, in the form of asset backed securities and covered bonds, there were doubts about whether the new policy could be implemented in sufficient size to deal with the deflationary threat in the euro area.

Mr Draghi was noticeably hesitant about giving any firm indication about the likely scale of the programme. Although private sector quantitative easing (QE) is likely to suit the needs of the euro area rather well, as I argued here, the absence of any firm guidance on scale certainly undermined the beneficial announcement effects of the policy change.

The ECB president addressed this issue on Thursday in an appearance at Brookings in Washington. This time, freed from the need to speak for the entire GC, he clearly changed his tune on the scale of the programme. But this highlighted the extent of the gap between his view and that of Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, who presented his position in a revealing interview with the Wall Street Journal on Monday. It is far from obvious how this disagreement will be bridged. Read more