Monthly Archives: July 2014

There have been a few false alarms about a possible upsurge in inflation in the US in the past few years, even as core inflation on most measures has remained extremely subdued. There is an entrenched belief among some observers that the huge rise in central bank balance sheets must eventually leak into consumer prices, and they have not been deterred by the lack of evidence in their favour so far.

Another such scare has been brewing recently. Core CPI inflation is running at 1.9% on a year ago, even after today’s reassuring data for June. James Bullard, the President of the St Louis Fed, is warning that an upside inflation surprise is feasible in the near future, if indeed it is not already happening. Although Mr Bullard describes himself as the “north pole of inflation hawks”, he has not previously been a doom monger about immediate prospects for inflation, so his views deserve to be taken seriously. Read more

The Federal Reserve broke new ground last week when its Monetary Policy Report to Congress specifically warned that the valuations of smaller firms, especially in the biotech and social media sectors of the US equity market, seem “substantially stretched”. Although there was no sign that the Fed planned to take any action to bring down valuations in these sectors, this remark naturally led to a sharp sell-off in shares.

The Fed’s overall message on asset prices last week was a little more bearish than previously. They once again said that overall equity market valuations are “generally in line with historical norms“, but they warned that extremely low implied volatility in the options market possibly reflected “reach for yield” behaviour among some investors. Read more

One of the most notable aspects of the response of western democracies to the cataclysmic economic events of the past decade has been the absence of any attempt to restrict the powers of the central banks. Far from it. With little political controversy, they have been allowed to increase their balance sheets by over 20 per cent of GDP, enormously widen their regulatory role, and profoundly alter the distribution of wealth in our societies.

Cynics will say that it is easy for politicians to approve of central banks when they choose voluntarily to pursue unprecedentedly easy monetary policy. It is when this is reversed that political problems would normally be expected to arise. But, in the US, we are now seeing signs that some members of Congress are seeking to shackle the Fed, not because policy has been too tight, but because they think it has been too accommodative. Read more

Paul Krugman has written two interesting comments (here and here) on my recent “Keynesian Yellen versus Wicksellian BIS” blog. Paul says that the Bank for International Settlements should not be labelled “Wicksellian”, and then asks a typically insightful question: what constitutes “artificially” high asset prices? Some of the discussion below on this point may seem a bit arcane, but in fact it could prove highly relevant for investors.

The crux of the matter is Knut Wicksell’s definition of the (unobservable) natural rate of interest, and its difference from the actual interest rate, as set by the central banks [1]. Krugman says that the Wicksellian or natural interest rate is that which would produce equilibrium between savings and capital investment in the real economy (“full employment”), and therefore leads to stable inflation. If the central banks set the actual rate below the natural rate, inflation will rise, and vice versa.

Since US inflation has generally been stable or falling for years, Krugman infers that the Federal Reserve must have been setting the actual interest rate at about the right level, or even too high (because of the zero lower bound). The further implication is that if current low interest rates are justified, so too are the high asset prices that they have triggered. In that sense, they are not “artificial” [2]. Read more

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) caused a splash last weekend with an annual report that spelled out in detail why it disagrees with central elements of the strategy currently being adopted by its members, the major national central banks. On Wednesday, Fed Chair Janet Yellen mounted a strident defence of that strategy in her speech on “Monetary Policy and Financial Stability”. She could have been speaking for any of the major four central banks, all of which are adopting basically the same approach [1].

Rarely will followers of macro-economics have a better opportunity to compare and contrast the two distinct intellectual strands in the subject, as explained in real time by active policy makers. Faced with exactly the same set of evidence, the difference in interpretation is stark, as is the chasm between them on monetary and fiscal policy.

Martin Wolf has already done a superb job in dissecting the BIS report. To a large extent, the dispute can be viewed as old wine in new bottles: the “Wicksellian” BIS versus the “Keynesian” Yellen [2]. But the Great Financial Crash has provided the two schools with plenty of new evidence to deploy. Read more