“You cannot solve a debt crisis by creating more debt.” As Martin Wolf reminds us, this disarmingly simple statement has been of profound importance in shaping public attitudes to the economic crisis. The failure to make a compelling political argument against this proposition has been crucial in limiting the feasible scale of the fiscal response to the crisis.
Whether one looks at the US, the UK or the eurozone, an aversion to “more debt” has become a dominant political theme, as it did in the 1930s. Richard Koo, a leading student of the debt crisis in Japan, has even argued recently that it is impossible to respond adequately to a balance sheet recession in a democracy because the public dislike of “more debt” becomes so profound. Read more
A large and important change is underway in global economic policy. This change will determine whether the developed economies can grow their way out of recession. Although the new strategy has been tried before by individual economies, this is the first time it has been adopted on such a global scale. If it fails, it is far from clear that policy-makers have a ready-made alternative plan waiting in the wings. Read more
Mount Fuji, Japan. AFP/Getty Images
Until recently, Keynes’ notion of a liquidity trap was of great interest to macro-economists, but was viewed by investors as a rare aberration which, outside Japan, could be safely ignored. In the aftermath of the 2008 credit crunch, all that has changed. Many developed economies seem to be falling into a liquidity trap, and may stay there for several years. What does this imply about asset returns? (This blog is a slightly longer version of an article which first appeared in the FT’s Market Insight column on 24 January, 2012.) Read more
In the second half of 2011, the US economy appeared to buck the impact of the eurozone crisis, with American economic data surprising on the strong side in the final quarter of the year. But, as the new year begins, it seems improbable that economic activity in the US and the eurozone can remain so divergent for much longer.
Will the weakness in the eurozone eventually bring the US economy to its knees? Or will the greater resilience of the US win the day? The answer to these questions will determine whether the global economy will experience a double-dip recession in 2012.
The data released over the holiday period seem to be pointing in a more optimistic direction than markets have recognised. A year of above-trend growth certainly looks like a stretch in the present environment of fiscal tightening and global deleveraging. But the risks of a global double-dip recession appear to be receding, at least for now. Read more
Risk assets fell sharply in the month of September, with equities generally down by between 5 and 10 per cent, and commodities falling by even more than that. The best performing asset in the month was the US dollar effective rate, a clear symptom of the widespread flight to safety. The worst performers were equities in the BRICs, and cyclical commodities like copper. (See charts on asset performance here.)
What had appeared to be mainly a problem for European markets in August has therefore broadened considerably in the past few weeks. The financial markets have started to price in a global recession. They will be very sensitive to the next move in the economic data. So far, it is hard to tell whether a renewed recession has been triggered, or whether the developed world has “only” become stuck in a period of prolonged stagnation. Either outcome would be bad enough for labour markets, and risk assets – but there would still be a large difference between them, which is why the question matters a lot. Read more
The Fed decision was fairly close to what was anticipated in this earlier blog – all “twist” and no “shout”. However, on balance, the statement was slightly more dovish than I expected. Concerns about downside risks to economic activity were at least as great as in last month’s FOMC statement, with new downside risks from financial strains being specifically mentioned, and this has swayed the majority of the committee to introduce a slightly more aggressive operation “twist” than expected. Inflation concerns, while marginally greater than in the August FOMC statement, are clearly insufficient to impress the committee, which remains biased towards further easing even after today’s announcement.
Mervyn King. Image by Getty.
A few weeks ago, the big central banks were calmly embarking on their “exit” strategies from unconventional monetary accommodation. Then the global economy slowed but for a while inflation remained too high for the Fed or the ECB to consider further easing. Their hands were tied until inflation peaked. Recognising this, markets collapsed. But now that there are some tentative signs of inflation subsiding, the central banks are rediscovering their ammunition stores.
There are basically three types of action that they are considering. In order of orthodoxy, and stealing some of Mervyn King’s terminology, here is a taxonomy of possible measures:
1. Conventional liquidity injections
This is safe territory for the central banks, and they are willing to act swiftly and decisively if necessary. Yesterday’s injections of dollar liquidity into the European financial system are a case in point. Some European banks, especially those in France, were finding it very difficult to raise dollar financing, which they needed in order to pay down earlier dollar borrowings, and to make loans to customers in dollars. The resulting strains in the money markets were undermining confidence in the ability of these banks to remain liquid, and markets were increasingly unwilling to accept their credit. This presented a classic case for the ECB to inject liquidity, using conventional currency swap arrangements to raise dollars from the Fed. Although the ECB will incur a minimal amount of currency risk in the process, and will also incur some credit risk (which will be collateralised), this is very much business as usual for any central bank, as it was in 2008. Read more
A couple of months ago, financial markets realised that the developed economies were slowing sharply, while the policy response from central banks and finance ministries was slow, or confused, or in some cases, like the debt ceiling debacle in Washington, directly damaging. Since then, some policy makers have woken up and smelled the coffee. There have been significant policy shifts in the US, and at the ECB. But there has been no progress whatsoever in the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Last week, that became by far the most urgent problem facing the global economy. Read more
The global economy, at least in the developed markets, seems poised on the brink of a renewed recession. The growth in real GDP, at an annualised rate, has dropped to around 1 per cent or less in both the US and Europe, and it seems unlikely that growth can continue to hover at this low level indefinitely. Either unemployment will start to rise, in which case recessionary dynamics will take hold, or growth will rebound towards its 2-2.5 per cent long-term trend, and the world will have experienced a narrow squeak.
Which is it to be? I do not claim to know the answer, but I can suggest a few key indicators to watch. In August, these indicators suggest that growth has stabilised at a very low level, rather than nosediving towards imminent recession. Read more
The outbreak of pessimism about the global economic outlook, which seems easy to justify in the case of the developed economies, has now begun to spread to the emerging economies as well. For example, John Plender and Michael Pettis have recently warned that “miracle” rates of growth in the emerging world, notably in China and the rest of Asia, cannot be expected to compensate for failing growth in the US and Europe. These warnings require us to ask some deeper questions about the longevity of the Asian growth miracle. Read more