IMF

ECB headquarters in Frankfurt. Bloomberg

ECB headquarters in Frankfurt. Bloomberg

(Updated with comments, below) For those of us trying to follow the progression of the eurozone’s leaders towards their critical summit on Friday, it has been a fascinating but somewhat bewildering week. However, the critical point is that, so far, the game still seems to be taking place on a playing field mainly of the Germans’ choosing, so the inevitable concessions and bargains which are reached at the summit will still leave the final outcome lying well within their preferred territory. (See an earlier blog.)

What is basically under discussion is a tightening in the fiscal rules which will apply to, and indeed within, the member states, in exchange for a provision of a limited amount of liquidity to allow these countries to reach the point at which they can regain market access for their sovereign debt. With eurobonds now effectively ruled out, any permanent transfers of resources within the enhanced fiscal union are strictly limited in size and scope. However, if the settlement is to prove durable, Germany will need to give some ground in the coming hours. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor who is nothing if not an arch pragmatist, undoubtedly realises that. So where will the bargains be struck?

The newly published IMF World Economic Outlook for April 2011 is a particularly excellent document, even by the exalted standards of that publication. Since the credit crunch, the IMF has been given increased responsibilities for monitoring the world economy and for cajoling policy makers in the right direction, especially on issues which spill over from one economy to another. And they have improved the depth of their analysis to meet this task.

In the WEO, the IMF warns policy makers not about the dangers of economic pessimism in slowing the pace of the recovery, but instead cautions them about the dangers of too much optimism. Optimism, that is, about the capacity of the world economy to maintain its recent rate of growth.

When the Queen asked asked an academic at the LSE why the economics profession had failed to predict the credit crunch, she raised a topic which continues to resonate. In fact, the IMF’s watchdog criticised the organisation on exactly those grounds yesterday. Although many answers have been given to Her Majesty’s question, I suspect that none of them has really settled the issue. Her question is disarmingly simple, but the answer is not.

The latest academic attempt to tackle the question is this piece by Raghuram Rajan. He is well qualified to write on the matter, having delivered a very perceptive warning about a possible crisis to the entire senior cast of global central banking at Jackson Hole in 2005. They politely ignored him. Prof Rajan now argues that economists had all of the models required to understand the credit crisis, but that the subject suffers from being segregated into increasingly narrow fields. It therefore lacks people with the broad overall view necessary to connect all of the diverse strands. This is indeed a problem, but it may not be the whole answer to the Queen’s question.

There are two massive fixed exchange rate blocs operating in the world economy today, and both of them face severe strains and conflicts. The eurozone is beset by problems which are typical of fixed rate blocs in the past, with the main surplus country (Germany) refusing to increase aggregate demand, thus forcing the deficit countries to reduce demand in order to stay within the currency arrangement. This, they appear willing to do, or at least to try.

Meanwhile, the China/US bloc also has a (nearly) fixed exchange rate, and once again the surplus country (China) is refusing, or is unable, to expand domestic demand enough to eliminate the trade imbalance. But, in this case, the deficit country (the US) is increasingly unwilling to accept the consequences, and is adopting policies which are designed to break up the bloc altogether. Two blocs with somewhat similar problems, but very different responses and outcomes for the deficit countries.

Gavyn Davies

on macroeconomics

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A blog on macroeconomics, economic policymaking and the financial markets. Gavyn usually writes about a key topic of the week on Sunday.

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Gavyn Davies is a macroeconomist who is now chairman of Fulcrum Asset Management and co-founder of Prisma Capital Partners. He was the head of the global economics department at Goldman Sachs from 1987-2001, and was chairman of the BBC from 2001-2004.

He has also served as an economic policy adviser in No 10 Downing Street, an external adviser to the British Treasury, and as a visiting professor at the London School of Economics.

Gavyn Davies is an active investor and may have financial interests and holdings in any of the topics about which he writes. The views expressed are solely those of Mr Davies and in no way reflect the views of Prisma Capital Partners LP, Fulcrum Asset Management LLP, their respective affiliates or representatives. This material is not intended to provide, and should not be relied upon for, investment advice or recommendations. Readers are urged to seek professional advice before making any investments.

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