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When the Brazilian finance minister Guido Mantega complained that the Federal Reserve was waging a currency war against his country in September 2010, his comments led to a wave of sympathy and concern. The Fed’s aggressive monetary easing was causing a capital flight from the US into the apparently unstoppable emerging markets.
Uncompetitive exchange rates and domestic credit booms in the EMs were the result of US quantitative easing. American monetary policy makers showed little sympathy, arguing that the US had its own domestic inflation and unemployment mandates to worry about. If the dollar fell in the process, so be it.
That episode proved short lived. The Brazilian real is now a chronically weak currency. Yet the term “currency wars” has stuck. It is now alleged that almost all the major central banks are engaged in weakening their currencies, if not against each other then certainly relative to commodities, goods and services. Read more
When the Federal Open Market Committee meets on March 17-18, it will be able to drop the word “patient” from its statement without shocking the markets. After some confusion, the Fed’s intentions on the date of lift off now seem fairly priced, with Fed funds rate contracts showing a probability of more than 50 per cent that the first move will come in June. The behaviour of the dollar, and of core inflation, are likely to determine whether June or September is eventually chosen for lift off.
Once that is out of the way, the markets will turn their attention to a much harder question: how rapidly will rates rise after lift off? The market currently expects a much more gradual path than the median shown in the FOMC’s “dot” chart, but there is huge uncertainty about this question on the committee. As the graph above shows, the interest rate forecasts for individual members of the FOMC, which will be updated on Wednesday, have a very wide range.
According to Fed vice-chairman Stanley Fischer, the rationale for rate rises is that the Fed wants to embark on a process of “normalisation”, and he is adamant that today’s rates are “far from normal”. That, of course, raises the question: how should we define normal? On this, the leadership group on the FOMC is not offering much guidance, but a common way of answering the question among macro economists is to consult the Taylor rule. Read more
When Federal Reserve chairwoman Janet Yellen gives evidence to the Senate Banking Committee on Tuesday, she has an opportunity to speak above the heads of the financial markets to Congress and the American people. There is pressure in the Senate to bring the Fed under Congressional “audit”, something that almost everyone in the central bank abhors. So Ms Yellen’s main message is likely to be about how well the Fed has done in recent years, focusing on the generally good out-turns for unemployment and inflation. Read more
The FT’s Martin Wolf has said almost everything that needs to be said about the global economic effects of the 2014 oil shock, but one additional point is worth emphasising. This is the fact that the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank view the consequences of the oil shock entirely differently. The markets have, of course, already been acting on this assumption, but the extent of the gulf between the world’s two leading central banks on this issue has been underlined by Mario Draghi’s dovish speech last month, and particularly by the Fed vice-chairman Stanley Fischer in a somewhat hawkish interview with The Wall Street Journal.
In perhaps his most significant statement since becoming vice-chairman in May, Mr Fischer made it clear that the period of low inflation due to falling oil prices will not deter the Fed from starting to raise interest rates next year. Furthermore, he suggested that the Fed might soon drop the assurance that it would not raise rates for a “considerable time”, replacing it with alternative language that is less constraining on its future actions.
It now seems likely that this language change could happen at the next Federal Open Market Committee meeting on December 16 and 17. By contrast, Mr Draghi and his supporters at the ECB clearly view the oil shock as a reason to shift policy in a more expansionary direction – if not at Thursday’s policy meeting, then sometime fairly soon. Read more
As the market awaits the Federal Reserve’s statements on Wednesday, the focus is on whether the FOMC will choose to signal a significant shift in a hawkish direction since its last meeting in July. Many investors believe that the key litmus test for this will be whether it chooses to drop two words from its July statement.
These words are “considerable time”. If that phrase disappears, then the market will need to absorb the fact that the Fed has deliberately chosen to force an upward adjustment in forward interest rate expectations, for the first time in this economic cycle. Read more
As the US labour market recovers, should investors brace themselves for an earlier rate rise? I spoke to global economy news editor Ferdinando Giugliano about whether the Fed may change course this month.
The leading central banks in the developed economies have, of course, been the main actors underpinning the global bull market in risk assets since 2009. For long periods their stance has been unequivocally dovish as they have deliberately tried to strengthen an anaemic global economic recovery by boosting asset prices.
In the past week, we have had major statements of intent from Janet Yellen, the new US Federal Reserve chairwoman; from the European Central Bank; and from the Bank of England. After multiple hours of fuzzy guidance about forward guidance, the clarity of previous years about the global policy stance has become much more murky. Central banks are no longer as obviously friendly to risk assets as they once were – but they have not become outright enemies, and they are unlikely to do so while they are concerned that price and wage inflation will remain too low for a protracted period.
It is now quite difficult to generalise about what central bankers think. However, a few of the necessary pieces of the jigsaw puzzle slotted into place in the past week. Read more
Ben Bernanke’s tenure as Federal Reserve chairman ends this week. Financial Times markets and investment columnist John Authers speaks to Gavyn Davies, principal of Fulcrum Asset Management, who analyses the massive expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet under Mr Bernanke, and the course he has set for his successor, Janet Yellen
Janet Yellen is likely to be confirmed by the Senate as the next Fed Chair on Monday, and Ben Bernanke delivered an initial version of his own personal history in an address to the American Economic Association on Friday.
Typically objective and analytic, it won him a standing ovation (watch it here ) that accurately reflects what the majority of the academic economics profession thinks of the man and the public servant. Despite the highly controversial nature of his actions, they view him as one of their own. He has risen to greater importance in public office than any previous member of the academic economics profession, including John Maynard Keynes.
The history books will no doubt focus on the Fed’s role in the great upheavals of the age. The outline verdict is already clear for some of this.
The Fed clearly underestimated the impact of the housing bubble on the economy, and failed in its regulatory duties from 2006-08; its reaction to the financial panic in 2008-09 was exemplary; its role in cleaning up the US banking system in 2009 was important and far-sighted; and its balance sheet expansion from 2010-13 was more aggressive than most other central banks, with both good and also some not-so-good effects. (See this blog for a lengthy assessment of QE.)
According to the “great person” view of history, Mr Bernanke will be the individual who gets most of the blame and plaudits for all these developments. The buck stopped on his desk. Yet he was only one actor among dozens in Washington. As a believer in the “great events” view of history, I have been trying to identify the areas in which Ben Bernanke personally made a difference that others might not have made. Read more
As we enter 2014, the five-year bull market in developed market equities remains in full swing. Recently, I argued that equities now look overvalued, but not egregiously so, and that the future of the bull market could depend on when the level of global GDP started to bump up against supply side constraints, forcing a genuine tightening in global monetary conditions.
Today, this blog offers a year end assessment of three crucial issues that relate to this: the supply side in the US; China’s attempt to control its credit bubble; and the ECB’s belief that there is no deflation threat in the euro area. At least one of these questions is likely to be the defining macro issue of 2014 and beyond. Read more
The long farewell to quantitative easing, one of the most remarkable experiments in the history of macroeconomic policy, starts now. In the wake of the strong US employment data in recent months, the Federal Reserve finally announced that it will taper its asset purchases from January onwards. The Fed’s balance sheet will stabilise in 2014, but will not begin to decline for several more years.
Variously described as the saviour of the global economy, totally irrelevant, a drug for the financial system or the harbinger of future inflation, QE is still controversial and insufficiently understood. Macro-economists are destined to be studying its effects for decades to come. Here are some early reflections. Read more
The Federal Reserve told us in December last year that it would maintain its asset purchases until the outlook for the US labour market had improved substantially. Does Tuesday’s rather anaemic jobs data release meet this criterion any more than it did last month, when the Fed decided not to taper its asset purchases? Not really.
The underlying pace of job gains is certainly not rising, and may even have fallen slightly. But the unemployment rate dropped to 7.2 per cent, and the pace of decline suggests that the 6.5 per cent threshold for considering interest rate rises could be reached in mid-2014, ie before the balance sheet tapering has ended! This gives Janet Yellen, the incoming Fed chairman, an early problem: she will surely have to reduce that 6.5 per cent threshold soon.
In this blog, we use some statistical tools which have been developed by the regional districts of the Fed to frame a judgment about the underlying state of the labour market, updated to include this week’s new information . Read more
Janet Yellen has been nominated to take over as Fed chairman when Ben Bernanke steps down. Gavyn discusses with John Authers what a Fed led by Ms Yellen would mean for tapering and interest rate policy
In the endless saga over US fiscal policy, attention has shifted from the closure of some parts of the government (which happened on Tuesday) to the possibility that the Treasury Department will reach the limit of its extraordinary measures to work around the debt ceiling on or around 17 October.
The negotiating tactics of the White House are now clear. They are painting the scenario in which the debt ceiling remains frozen as completely catastrophic, perhaps hoping that market disruptions will increase pressure on the Republicans to waive through the necessary legislation. Markets, however, have so far been reluctant to co-operate. (See this earlier blog.)
In a letter to Congress on 25 September, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew described the ensuing situation as “default by another name”, and Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein has said that “there is no precedent for a default”.
Investors hate the word “default” but they need to be careful about its exact meaning here. Most observers, including the major investment banks, think it very unlikely that the US would ever choose to default on any payments due on its sovereign debt, even if the debt ceiling is left permanently unchanged after 17 October.
The government could, however, go into arrears on many of its normal payments after that date. This would have serious contractionary effects on the economy, and might lead credit agencies to downgrade their ratings on US sovereign debt. Read more
The financial markets, after many months of forward guidance and supposedly “transparent” communication from the Fed, were very surprised by the FOMC’s latest decision to delay the start of tapering its asset purchases. This can be seen most clearly in the immediate 0.15 per cent drop in the yield on ten year treasuries, which reflects the extent of the lurch towards dovishness shown by the committee.
Prior to the announcements, the market thought that it knew two things with a high degree of confidence. First, the Fed chairman had said explicitly that the start of tapering was likely “in the next few meetings” and then clarified that this meant “before the end of the year”. Second, he had given explicit guidance that the end of tapering would occur around the middle of 2014, by which time the unemployment rate was expected to be below 7.0 per cent.
Given that the starting and ending dates for tapering were well pinned down, only the pace in between seemed to be up for debate. This left little room for manoeuvre on the final total for the Fed balance sheet, which was thought to be around $4.1 trillion (or 24 per cent of GDP).
All of this has now been thrown into considerable uncertainty following the chairman’s latest press conference. It is no longer as likely that the start of tapering will come this year, though December now seems to be the best single bet. Not can it be assumed that the 7 per cent unemployment rate is a good guide about the end point. Although the FOMC’s economic projections still show unemployment dropping below this rate somewhere around mid-2014, the chairman seemed to pour cold water on the importance of the 7 per cent figure, a consideration he himself had voluntarily introduced in the June press conference. Read more
In the past decade, the world’s central banks – first in the emerging and then in the developed world – have embarked on a Great Expansion in their balance sheets which is unprecedented in modern times. This blog sketches the anatomy of the Great Expansion and attempts to project what will happen as the US Federal Reserve tapers its asset purchases in the next 18 months.
The latest episode in the saga has, of course, involved the Fed’s attempt to distinguish between “tapering” and “tightening”, a distinction which the markets have been reluctant to recognise . The US forward interest rate curve shows the first rate increase occurring very close to the time when the Fed is planning to stop buying assets in mid-2014. Whether it intended to do so or not, the Fed has de facto tightened US monetary policy conditions and will have to work hard to reverse this. Read more
On Wednesday, the chairman of the Federal Reserve announced that the greatest experiment in the history of central banking might be nearing its end. Ben Bernanke’s announcement included many caveats, but the financial markets did not miss the message. Since 2009, the central bank has been buying financial assets – US Treasury bonds and some types of corporate debt – paid for by an expansion of the monetary base (so-called “printing money”). This kept interest rates low, which damaged savers but helped indebted businesses and households. It has also been the major prop for financial markets. Within about a year, if the Fed’s plans come to fruition, the US government deficit will need to be financed from private sector savings – not by the central bank. Asset markets will be left to fend for themselves as the biggest buyer withdraws from the arena.
That is why some hedge funds sold off bonds this week, causing a big drop in their prices – the flipside of which is a rise in borrowing costs (or “yields”). Mr Bernanke has expressed consternation that adjustments to the path for the Fed’s balance sheet, such as the one he announced this week, can have such a profound effect on the bond market. But investors are making logical inferences from central bank behaviour. The Fed does not change direction often. When it does, tightening often comes in a rapid series of interest rate rises that are not fully anticipated by investors. Read more
When we look back on the FOMC meeting on June 19 2013, it will probably be seen as the moment when the Fed signalled that it was beginning the long and gradual exit from its programme of unconventional monetary easing. The reason for this was clear in the committee’s statement, which said that the downside risks to economic activity had diminished since last autumn, presumably because the US economy had navigated the fiscal tightening better than expected and the risks surrounding the euro had abated.
This was the smoking gun in the statement. With downside risks declining, the need for an emergency programme of monetary easing was no longer so compelling. The Fed has been the unequivocal friend of the markets for much of the time since 2009, and certainly ever since last September. That comfortable assumption no longer applies.
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, however, went to great lengths to mitigate the hawkish overtones of this message in several respects. The asset purchase programme would be ended only when the US unemployment rate has fallen to 7 per cent, which the central bank expects to happen by mid-2014, he said. In the meantime, the pace of asset purchases could be increased as well as reduced, depending on the incoming economic data. Read more
Central bankers nowadays have the power to move the global markets by uttering nothing more than a brief, off-the-cuff remark. “Whatever it takes,” was Mario Draghi‘s version, which saved the euro last year. “In the next few meetings,” was Ben Bernanke’s equivalent last month. There will be rapt attention turned on the Fed chairman’s press conference on Wednesday to see whether he retracts that remark, which of course relates to the time when the Fed might start to slow the pace of its asset purchases.
Mr Bernanke does not carelessly throw out such remarks, so it would surely be incoherent for him to withdraw it completely this week. The Fed is unlikely to have been particularly troubled by the bout of market volatility seen lately. Much of it has come in foreign markets, which are not the Fed’s responsibility. Meanwhile, in the US itself, the reversal of the “reach for yield” is precisely what the Fed has been wanting to see for several months.
The killer phrase “in the next few meetings” is therefore likely to remain on the table after the press conference on Wednesday. However, the Fed chairman will hammer home exactly what he means by this message, since there are signs that it has been misunderstood by investors. In particular, the US Treasury market is sending some messages which should worry the Fed. Read more
The month just ended was the fourth worst month for government bond returns in the past two decades. This abrupt response to Ben Bernanke’s warning that the Fed might think about tapering QE at some point in the next few meetings has naturally raised fears that the great bull market in fixed income, which started in 1982, might now be threatened by a sharp reversal.
Some analysts regard this as the inevitable bursting of a bubble which has been created by the actions of the central banks (see this earlier blog). Others, like Jim O’Neill, regard the rise in bond yields as the start of a return to economic normality, and argue that would be a very good thing as long as it occurs in an environment of recovering economic confidence. Paul Krugman also points out that the pattern of behaviour in the major markets – bonds down, dollar up and equities up – is consistent with greater optimism about the US economy, rather than worries about the Fed or the onset of a debt crisis. Read more