A year ago, Lawrence Summers’ perceptive warnings about the possibility of secular stagnation in the world economy were dominating global markets. China, Japan and the Eurozone were in deflation, and the US was being dragged into the mess by the rising dollar. Global recession risks were elevated, and commodity prices continued to fall. Fixed investment had slumped. Productivity growth and demographic growth looked to be increasingly anemic everywhere.

Estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate in many economies were being marked down. It seemed possible that the world economy would fall into a “Japanese trap”, in which nominal interest rates would be permanently stuck at the zero lower bound, and would therefore not be able to fall enough to stimulate economic activity.

Just when the sky seemed to be at its darkest, the outlook suddenly began to improve. Global reflation replaced secular stagnation as the theme that dominated investor psychology, especially after Donald Trump’s election in November. Why has secular stagnation lost its mass appeal, and has it disappeared forever? Was it all a case of crying wolf? Read more

Professor Christopher Sims

Professor Christopher Sims  © Getty Images

The most far reaching speech at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole meeting last week was not the opening address by chairman Janet Yellen, interesting though it was, but the contribution on the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) by Professor Christopher Sims of Princeton University.

The FTPL is normally wrapped in impenetrable mathematical models, and it has therefore remained obscure, both to policy makers and to investors. But the subject is now moving centre stage, as Prof Sims’ lucid explanation makes very apparent. It has important implications for the conduct of macro-economic policy, especially in Japan and the eurozone member states.

In these countries, Prof Sims is challenging the claim that further quantitative easing can achieve the 2 per cent inflation target, without explicit co-operation with the government budget. In the US, he is disputing Ms Yellen’s assertion last week that the Fed has further unconventional monetary weapons in reserve if the economy is hit by negative shocks in the future. Read more

Ever since the crash of 2008, the global financial markets have been subject to prolonged periods in which their behaviour has been dominated by a single, over-arching economic regime, often determined by the stance monetary policy. When these regimes have changed, the behaviour of the main asset classes (equities, bonds, commodities and currencies) has been drastically affected, and individual asset prices within each class have also had to fit into the overall macro pattern. For asset managers of all types, it is therefore important to understand the nature of the regime that applies at any given time.

This is not easy to do, even in retrospect. There will always be inconsistencies in asset performance which cause confusion and require interpretation. Nevertheless, it is an exercise which is worth undertaking, because it can bring a semblance of order to the apparent chaos of asset markets.

Two main regimes have been in place in the asset markets of developed economies since 2012. (The emerging markets also fit the pattern, with some slight differences.)

These regimes are, first, the period in which quantitative easing was the dominant factor, from 2012 to mid 2015; and, second, the period in which deflation risk has been the dominant factor, from mid 2015 to now.

It is possible that the markets are now exiting the period of deflation dominance, and they may even be entering a new regime of reflation dominance, though this is still far from certain. Secular stagnation is a powerful force that will be hard to shake off. But if that did happen, the pattern of asset price performance would change substantially compared to the recent past. Read more

This blog has been updated to incorporate the Japan GDP data published on Monday.

Japan, it seems, is still stuck between a rock and a hard place. The rather shocking gross domestic product figures just published for the third quarter show that the economy has fallen into yet another technical recession since the sales tax was increased in April. On this evidence, it will be hard to achieve fiscal sustainability without abandoning the economic recovery. Abenomics, which was supposed to resolve this longstanding dilemma, is in trouble.

Although Japanese GDP data are notoriously volatile from quarter to quarter, and this batch was depressed by a temporary burst of inventory shedding, underlying consumer and corporate spending is very weak. Aggressive monetary easing and a huge devaluation have not been enough, as yet anyway, to overcome the effects of even a modest fiscal tightening.

In the next few days, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is widely expected to react to the GDP figures by announcing that the second leg of a sales tax increase, scheduled for October 2015, has been postponed until 2017. Since this delay would be supported by two-thirds of the Japanese electorate, it may be the prelude to a snap general election in December.

In itself, the postponement of the sales tax increase will have a negligible effect on fiscal sustainability, and it will help restore the economic recovery next year. But the fact that it needs to be considered at all raises wider questions about the longer term success of Abenomics. Read more

The month just ended was the fourth worst month for government bond returns in the past two decades. This abrupt response to Ben Bernanke’s warning that the Fed might think about tapering QE at some point in the next few meetings has naturally raised fears that the great bull market in fixed income, which started in 1982, might now be threatened by a sharp reversal.

Some analysts regard this as the inevitable bursting of a bubble which has been created by the actions of the central banks (see this earlier blog). Others, like Jim O’Neill, regard the rise in bond yields as the start of a return to economic normality, and argue that would be a very good thing as long as it occurs in an environment of recovering economic confidence. Paul Krugman also points out that the pattern of behaviour in the major markets – bonds down, dollar up and equities up – is consistent with greater optimism about the US economy, rather than worries about the Fed or the onset of a debt crisis. Read more

Kuroda gives first press conference as governor of BoJThe package of quantitative easing announced today by the new regime at the Bank of Japan is one of the largest monetary injections ever announced by the central bank of a major developed economy. The only rival for that crown is the emergency easing in monetary policy which took place in most economies in late 2008. But today’s BoJ action has not been driven by any short-term emergency. It represents a deliberate change in philosophy, and a complete abandonment of everything that the Bank of Japan has said about monetary policy in the past two decades. Those who believe in quantitative easing certainly have their experiment, writ large in Tokyo.

In effect the new governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, has imported into Japan the whole of the Federal Reserve’s post-Lehman balance sheet strategy, and he will implement it in under two years, instead of the five years or more taken by the Fed. The doubling in the Japanese monetary base over a period of 21 months is in itself remarkable. Taken together with the extension of the duration of bonds purchased from less than 3 years to an average of 7 years, the injection becomes of historic proportions.

The new strategy brings, for the first time, a real prospect of breaking the deflationary psyche which has plagued Japan for so long. But it also brings risks that the strategy might work too well, with inflation expectations unhinging the bond market. Mr Kuroda is trying to pull off a difficult trick, which is “to drastically change the expectations of markets and economic entities”, and to do so in a very particular way. Read more