From Reykjavik
Late last night I returned from a four-day visit to Iceland with Professor Anne Sibert, co-author of a report anticipating the collapse of the Icelandic banking system and joint carer for our cats and children.
Iceland’s largest three banks with border-crossing activities collapsed last fall, as did its currency. The three banks are in administration and new state-owned banks with a purely domestic focus have been set up. Strict capital controls make external borrowing all but impossible and discourage foreign investment. The country now has an IMF program. Strangely enough, the programme does not impose any fiscal pain until 2010. This year the fiscal automatic stabilisers are allowed to work freely, although no further discretionary expansionary fiscal measures are being proposed. Starting in 2010, under the programme, discretionary fiscal tightening of more than 8 per cent of GDP is envisaged between now and 2013. That number could be higher if the external indebtedness of the state turns out to be higher than the 110 per cent of annual GDP estimate of the IMF.
The true state of the gross and net external indebtedness, including contingent off-balance sheet exposure, of the Icelandic state is a mystery even now. In addition to sovereign debt and sovereign-guaranteed debt, there are credit lines and possibly other contingent external liabilities whose take-up has to be estimated/guessed to get an accurate view of the state’s external obligations. It is possible that the IMF figures include an offset against the sovereign’s external liabilities in the form of an estimate of the recovery value of some of the external assets of the sovereign (e.g. its share in the assets of the UK subsidiaries of Kaupthing and Landsbanki). Assigning any positive value to these assets is an act of faith. In any case, it would be helpful to have the hard external liabilities and the soft external assets reported separately.
Iceland’s government had to let the country’s three main banks go into administration because it did not have the fiscal capacity to bail out financial institutions with balance sheets amounting to 600-700 per cent of annual GDP. Any attempt to commit further government resources to the rescue of the banking system would have precipitated a sovereign default.
With each day that passes, estimates of the recovery value of the assets of the three ‘bad banks’ melts away like snow in April. The decision not to guarantee the liabilities or the assets of the banks (other than retail deposits, including retail deposits with foreign branches for amounts up to €20,000) was the only wise thing the Icelandic authorities have done in this whole sorry mess. It isn’t even clear that the Icelandic authorities came up with this sensible idea themselves. More likely the IMF opened their eyes. The creditors of the banks, which include Commerzbank and Bayerische Landesbank will have to explain to their own shareholders and taxpayers why they now in effect own large chunks of three defunct Icelandic banks.
…to London
Returning to London from Reykjavik last night was like coming home from home. Allowing for the differences in the scale of the Icelandic economy and the British economy (the UK population is more than 200 times larger than Iceland’s Coventry-sized population), there are disturbing economic parallels. The excesses in Iceland during the past decade were greater than in the UK, but not qualitatively different.