Economics

California’s public finances are in many ways a microcosm of those of the US as a whole. Admittedly, the state government’s deficit is tiny compared to that of the federal government. The state of California has a budget deficit this year of $26.3bn (about 1.5% of state GDP, which was just over $1.8 trillion in 2007), on revenues of just $113bn.  Its total outstanding stock of state debt is also small, with just $59bn in general debt, $8bn in bonds linked to securitised revenues and about $2bn in commercial paper. In contrast, the US federal government is about to run a budget deficit in the 13 to 14 percent of GDP range (that is, the federal deficit is about the size of the state of California’s GDP!).

California, like every US state, will be hit by federal deficit and by the manner in which this is eventually brought under control again, be it through tax increases, public spending cuts, inflation or sovereign default.  The state deficit, and the manner of its eventual resolution, represents pain for Californians on top of the shared misery they will endure as a result of California’s contribution to the resolution of the unsustainability in the federal public finances.

Just how weak is the UK government’s recent white paper Reforming financial markets? Imagine one small spoonful of tea leaves in a teapot the size of an adult beer barrel. That’s how weak.  I will focus on four areas of weakness: (1) the continued subsidisation of the banking sector’s cost of capital, (2) the failure to address the too big to fail problem, (3) the unholy mess that is the UK’s Tripartite Arrangement, and (4) the foot dragging as regards the creation of new macro-prudential instruments.

Private insurance only works if there is risk.  If the risk is eliminated, profitable insurance is impossible. This holds for health insurance as it holds for credit default swaps.  When risk vanishes, insurance turns into redistribution.  That’s a task for the state, whether through the tax payer or by mandated pooling in quasi-private insurance schemes of individuals with known heterogeneous health profiles.

The rise of genomics -  the branch of genetics that studies organisms in terms of their full DNA sequences or genomes – will in the not too distant future kill off most private health insurance.  That’s probably a good thing, for two reasons.  First, because of asymmetric information, when there is risk and uncertainty about a person’s future health, health insurance markets are badly affected by adverse selection and moral hazard.  Second, because the private health insurance industry is a monument to inefficiency everywhere and, especially in the US, a rent-seeking Leviathan whose ruthless lobbying efforts corrupt all it touches.

Quantitative easing – expanding base money in circulation (mainly bank reserves with the central bank by purchasing government securities) – isn’t working in the US, the UK or Japan.  Credit easing – outright purchases of private securities by the central bank, which can either be monetised or sterilised – is achieving little in the US or the UK, although it has not been pushed too hard yet.  Enhanced credit support in the Euro Area – providing collateralised loans on demand at maturities up to a year at the official policy rate – is not working either.  These policies are not improving the ability and willingness of banks to lend to the non-financial sectors.  They have had little positive impact on the corporate bond market. It is not surprising why this should be so, once we reflect on the actions and the conditions under which they are taking place.

In a nutshell: quantitative easing (QE), credit easing (CE), and enhanced credit support (ECS) are useful when the problem facing the economy is funding illiquidity or market illiquidity.  It is useless when the binding constraint is the threat of insolvency.  Today, liquidity is ample, even excessive.  Capital is scarce.  Capital is scarce first and foremost in the banking sector.  A panoply of central bank and government financial interventions and support measures have ensured, at least for the time being, the survival of most of the remaining crossborder banks.  It has not done enough to get them lending again on any scale to the household and non-financial enterprise sector.

Like most authors, I tend to cringe when I read something I wrote more than a few years ago.  But while engaging in some authorial auto-archeology recently when preparing the index for a new paper (after all, if I don’t cite myself, who will?), I was pleasantly surprised with a few bits from a paper I wrote in 1999 and published in 2000 in the Bank of England’s Quarterly Bulletin, titled “The new economy and the old monetary economics”.

The paper takes aim at the assertion, rampant in 1999, that the behaviour in recent years of the world economy, led by the United States, could only be understood by abandoning the old conventional wisdom and adopting a ‘New Paradigm’. Prominent among the structural transformations associated with the New Paradigm were the the following: increasing openness; financial innovation; lower global inflation; stronger competitive pressures; buoyant stock markets defying conventional valuation methods; a lower natural rate of unemployment; and a higher trend rate of growth of productivity.

I argue, first, that the New Paradigm has been over-hyped. “…Unfortunately, the ‘New Paradigm’ label has been much abused by professional hype merchants and peddlers of economic snake oil.”

Second, I argue that, to the extent that we can see a New Paradigm in action, its implications for monetary policy have often been misunderstood.

I was particularly pleased that I had written following about financial innovation:

Last week the Eurosystem performed a €442bn injection of one-year liquidity into the Euro Area banking system.  They did this at the official policy rate – the Main refinancing operations (fixed rate) – of 1.00 percent, against the usual collateral accepted for Longer Term Financing Operations, effectively anything euro-denominated, not based on derivatives and rated at least BBB-.  It was a fixed-rate tender, that is, the ECB was willing to meet any demand at the 1 percent interest rate, as long as eligible collateral was offered; 1121 banks participated in the operation.

You will not be surprised to hear that this was the largest one-day ECB/Eurosystem operation ever.  Even more remarkable than its scale are the terms on which the one-year funds were made available.  There can be no doubt that this operation represents both a subsidy and a gift from the Eurosystem to the banks that participated in the operation.  I hope to clarify the distinction between a subsidy and a gift in what follows.

As long as the financial stability role of central banks remained in the background, the notion of central bank independence appeared to have something to recommend it.

The too big to fail problem has been central to the degeneration and corruption of the financial system in the north Atlantic region over the past two decades. The ‘too large to fail’ category is sometimes extended to become the ‘too big to fail’, ‘too interconnected to fail’, ‘too complex to fail’ and ‘too international’ to fail problem, but the real issue is size.  The real issue is size.  Even if a financial business is highly interconnected, that is, if its total exposure to the rest of the world and the exposure of the rest of the world to the financial entity are complex and far-reaching, it can still be allowed to fail if the total amounts involved are small.  A complex but small business is no threat to systemic stability; neither is a highly international but small business.  Size is the core of the problem; the other dimensions (interconnectedness, complexity and international linkages) only matter (and indeed worsen the instability problem) if the institution in question is big.  So how do we prevent banks and other financial businesses from becoming too large to fail?

Whenever the cumulative effect of the daily observation, looking out of my window or into the mirror, of human inequity and wretchedness brings me to the point that I am convinced the human race is an evolutionary dead end, something incredible happens to restore my faith that a hunger for freedom and an unquenchable thirst for justice and fairness are part of our genetic code. Crowds often become mobs and mobs are mostly ugly and destructive. The sight of large numbers of unarmed people, most of them young, facing heavily armed police, regular army, militia or other armed thugs is awe-inspiring.

For the past week, I have put the Green Shootometer in the garden and have taken regular readings.  The upshot is: the glass is definitely half empty – or half full.  Let me explain.

Maverecon: Willem Buiter

Willem Buiter's blog ran until December 2009. This blog is no longer active but it remains open as an archive.

Professor of European Political Economy, London School of Economics and Political Science; former chief economist of the EBRD, former external member of the MPC; adviser to international organisations, governments, central banks and private financial institutions.

Willem Buiter's website

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