Monetary Policy

Standard and Poor’s on Thursday, May 21 2009, issued the following statement: “Standard and Poor’s has revised the outlook on the United Kingdom to negative from stable. — The  AAA’ long-term and  A-1+’ short-term sovereign credit ratings were affirmed. — The outlook revision is based on our view that, even factoring in further fiscal tightening, the U.K.’s net general government debt burden may approach 100% of GDP and remain near that level in the medium term.

Is this good news for the UK or bad news? Both the UK’s long-term sovereign credit rating (reflecting the probability of sovereign default in the medium and long term) and its short-term sovereign credit rating (reflecting the probability of sovereign default during the next year) remain at the highest possible levels, AAA and A-1+ respectively. However, the negative outlook is bad, even if it is not bad news. Based on past behaviour, there is a one-in-three chance of a sovereign moving from a negative outlook to a one-notch downgrade.

The fact that one of the three leading credit agencies is publicly hinting at less than complete confidence in the solvency of the British sovereign is not in and of itself terribly significant any longer. Following their incompetent and deeply conflicted performance in rating structured products, the credibility of the rating agencies is badly impaired even in those domains – sovereign debt and the debt of large corporates – where they have not made complete asses of themselves.

Even though the credibility and reputation of the rating agencies is in tatters, the fact that they have not yet been written out of the regulations and rule books governing the investment behaviour of many institutional investors means that a downgrade would still affect market demand for UK sovereign debt. This will probably raise the funding cost of the UK sovereign somewhat.

But even without the input from the rating agencies, it would have been clear that the UK is about to exit its AAA status. It shares this fate with most of the other G7 countries. In two or three years, Canada  may be the only G7 country left to have an AAA rating. France could conceivably join Canada.  There is nothing too shocking about this.  Not that long ago, Japan’s sovereign rating was on a par with Botswana’s (I thought that was rather unfair on Botswana).

I will expand on the case of the UK in what follows, saving a more detailed consideration of the US fiscal predicament (which is much worse than that of the UK) for a future post.

Old papers never die, they just get recycled.  The Den Uyl lecture I gave in Amsterdam on 15 December 2008 has been under continuous redevelopment since then.  Its latest outing was as background paper for a lecture I gave at the 25th anniversary Workshop ” The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons and Outlook”, of the Advanced Studies Program of the IFW, Kiel, Germany, on May 8/9, 2009. The whole current enchilada can be found here.  For those with lives, I reproduce below the Introduction, Section 1, the Conclusion and the 16 recommendations in between.

Introduction

“Never waste a crisis. It can be turned to joyful transformation”. This statement is attributed to Rahm Emanuel, US President Barack Obama’s White House Chief of Staff.  Other versions are in circulation also, including “Never waste a good crisis”, attributed to US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.  The statement actually goes back at least to that fount of cynical wisdom, fifteenth century Florentine writer and statesman Niccolo Machiavelli “Never waste the opportunities offered by a good crisis.” Crises offer unrivalled opportunities for accelerated learning.

I believe that the current crisis teaches us two key lessons.  The first concerns the role of the state in the financial intermediation process and in the maintenance of financial stability.  The second concerns the role of private and public sector incentives in the design of regulation.  Unless these lessons are learnt, not only will the current crisis last longer than necessary, but the next big crisis, following the current spectacular example of market failure, will be a crisis of state ‘overreach’ and of government failure.  Central planning failed and collapsed spectacularly in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The next socio-economic system to fail, after the Thatcher-Reagan model of self-regulating market capitalism with finance in the driver’s seat – finance as the master of the real economy rather than its servant – may well be a stultifying form of state capitalism, with initiative-numbing over-regulation and overambitious social engineering.

Morality

I know of ethical systems that hold all interest to be sinful.  Riba, interest on money, is forbidden by the Quran.  I don’t know what Sharia scholars would have to say about negative nominal interest rates.  If if were viewed as a gift from the lender to the borrower it might even be condoned.  Perhaps an extra-credit question on the next Islamic finance examination?  Medieval Christianity also banned ‘usury’,  which meant any ‘interest’ rather than outrageous interest rates – its modern meaning.

Interest is viewed by some as immoral because it represents an increase in capital without any services being provided.  I don’t share the sense of moral outrage at interest per se, but I can understand where it comes from – something for nothing ain’t right.  However, I know of no ethical system that attaches opprobrium to an intertemporal relative price that is greater than unity but not to an intertemporal relative price that is less than unity – or vice versa.

I spent yesterday in Frankfurt at the European Central Bank to meet people and give a presentation on negative nominal interest rates (the ‘zero lower bound problem’).  For reasons I don’t understand, this topic generates almost as much heat and emotion as a critical piece on Obama.  Some of the reactions to my previous post on the issue made me consider starting further posts on this issue with a health warning. Because the heat and emotion are based on heart-stopping ignorance and lack of elementary logic, I will have another go at explaining the basics.

‘Enough capital for what?’ should be the question prompted by the title of this post. The short answer, amplified below, is “enough capital to be able to engage in effective monetary policy, liquidity policy and credit-enhancing policy (including quantitative easing or QE), without endangering its price stability mandate.”

The President of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, did not say that the recession was bottoming out. He said that it had reached an ‘inflection point’: “As far as growth is concerned, we’re around the inflection point in the cycle, that’s the sentiment,…” . Unlike the gormless arts students, limp-minded lawyers and woolly social scientists that dominate British and American economic policy making, President Trichet actually knows and understands mathematics. An inflection point is not a turning point.

The problem

I agree with Greg Mankiw[1] that it is time for central banks to stop pretending that zero is the floor for nominal interest rates.  There is no theoretical or practical reason for not having the Federal Funds target rate and market rates at, say, minus five percent, if that is what your Taylor rule, or whatever heuristic guides your official policy rate, suggests.

Economics as a science and economic reality have never had problems with negative real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates.  So what is the problem with nominal rates?  In a word, it’s currency.

The modern independent central bank was born in New Zealand in 1989. It had a short life.  The onset of the financial crisis of the north Atlantic region in August 2007 signalled the beginning of the end.  Today, only the ECB still has a significant degree of operational independence left, and it will have to give that up if it is to be effective in the current phase of the crisis. In other words, the ECB is the last central bank to understand that, if it is to play a significant financial stability role, it cannot retain the degree of operational independence it was granted in the Treaty over monetary policy in the pursuit of price stability.

CDS in Kazakhstan

A fascinating contribution by Gillian Tett in today’s Financial Times on the role of CDS in the default of the largest Kazakh bank, BTA, raises a number of wider issues. Last week, BTA went into partial default when Morgan Stanley and another bank demanded repayment of loans they had made to BTA and BTA was unable to comply.  Tett also discovered that, just after calling in its loan to BTA, Morgan Stanley asked the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) to start formal proceedings to settle credit default swaps contracts written on BTA.  I don’t know the aggregate value of the credit default swap contracts written on BTA that Morgan Stanley owned, whether it was smaller or larger than the value of the loans to BTA called by Morgan Stanley, or who the writer(s) of these CDS contracts was or were.  But it raises concerns.

The reason it raises concerns can be made clear with the following hypothetical example.  Assume some large western bank, let’s call it St. Manley Organ Bank, has made a loan of size A to BTA or has bought its debt in amount A.  As a creditor to  BTA, St. Manley Organ would normally want to avoid a default by BTA, because St. Manley Organ is bound not to get paid in full in the event of a default by BTA.

(1) The autodafé of the unsecured creditors is coming to a US bank near you

A binding budget constraint sure concentrates the mind, even for the US Treasury. There is just one way to make the US government’s policy towards the banks work.  That is for the Congress to vote another $1.5 trillion worth of additional TARP money for the banks – $1 trillion to buy the remaining toxic assets off their balance sheets, and $0.5 trillion worth of additional capital.   The likelihood of the US Congress voting even a nickel in additional financial support for the banks is zero.

There is no real money left in the original $700 bn TARP facility – somewhere between $ 100 bn and 150 bn – to do more than stabilise a couple of pawn shops.  The Treasury has been playing for time by raiding the resources of the FDIC (which, apart from the meagre insurance premiums it collects, has no resources other than what the Treasury grants it) and of the Fed.  The Fed has taken an open position in private credit risk to the tune of many hundreds of billions of dollars.  Before this crisis is over, its exposure to private sector default risk could be counted in trillions of dollars.

Maverecon: Willem Buiter

Willem Buiter's blog ran until December 2009. This blog is no longer active but it remains open as an archive.

Professor of European Political Economy, London School of Economics and Political Science; former chief economist of the EBRD, former external member of the MPC; adviser to international organisations, governments, central banks and private financial institutions.

Willem Buiter's website

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