Tag: inflation target

Claire Jones

Central banks are nothing if not dedicated followers of fashion. Less than a month after the Federal Reserve opted for an explicit inflation target, the Bank of Japan has followed suit.

However, the BoJ’s adoption of an inflation target probably owes more to political pressure than the whims of its central bankers; unlike Ben Bernanke, BoJ governor Masaaki Shirakawa has never been a proponent of the framework.

And this perhaps explains why the BoJ has been more original than most on how it plans to target inflation. 

Claire Jones

Our week ahead email helps you track the most important events in central banking. To see all of our emails and alerts visit www.ft.com/nbe

FOMC meeting

The Federal Open Market Committee meets on Tuesday and Wednesday to set monetary policy for the coming month and a half.

The meeting – to be followed by one of chairman Ben Bernanke’s press conferences – could see the FOMC announce an inflation target. This from the FT’s US economics editor Robin Harding:

Claire Jones

Harvard professor and famed textbook writer Greg Mankiw on Sunday argued the Federal Reserve should adopt a price-level target.

A price-level target aims for a certain level of inflation over the course of an economic cycle. In contrast, an inflation target has policymakers focus on a fixed point in the future.

Advocates argue price-level targeting is superior because of its flexibility. It allows for higher inflation when demand is anaemic with a view to reducing inflation below target once the economy recovers. As the Harvard professor notes, this would enable the Fed to reap the benefits that higher expected inflation would have in lowering interest rates without having to argue for the “political non-starter” of targeting inflation of, say, 4 per cent.

Robin Harding

The one question to earn a wry smile from Fed chairman Ben Bernanke today was on whether the Fed will adopt an explicit inflation target.

His answer was one of his most informative. In essence, he said that: (a) he wants one; (b) it’s not imminent; (c) there’s no need for a change in the law; and (d) there would have to be consultation and communication with both Congress and the public.

Robin Harding

Bloomberg have a nice story today about the possibility of an explicit Fed inflation target. I’d also noted the uptick in speeches on the subject recently such as those by Dennis Lockhart and Charles Plosser.

The way I’ve understood it since taking on this job is that a large majority of the FOMC, led by Ben Bernanke, would like to adopt an explicit inflation objective. It was heavily discussed last autumn as a way to anchor inflation expectations when the danger was deflation. Those discussions have continued, and with press conferences out of the way, an inflation objective is the obvious subject for the Fed’s working group on communications.

Robin Harding

Dividing the FOMC up into hawks and doves is only marginally productive but inescapable at the moment. Dennis Lockhart is a moderate member of the committee, and representative of a number of colleagues with backgrounds in banking rather than economics. A speech he has given today suggests he is in favour of further QE barring a change in the data.

To opt for more quantitative easing at this juncture is a big decision. Today I will walk you through the thicket of considerations that lead me, at this moment, to be sympathetic to more monetary stimulus in the near future.

Robin Harding

One of the main things I took from chairman Bernanke’s speech last Friday was a wish to refocus attention on the Fed as an inflation-targeting central bank.

Although attaining the long-run sustainable rate of unemployment and achieving the mandate-consistent rate of inflation are both key objectives of monetary policy, the two objectives are somewhat different in nature.

Most importantly, whereas monetary policymakers clearly have the ability to determine the inflation rate in the long run, they have little or no control over the longer-run sustainable unemployment rate, which is primarily determined by demographic and structural factors, not by monetary policy. Thus, while central bankers can choose the value of inflation they wish to target, the sustainable unemployment rate can only be estimated, and is subject to substantial uncertainty.

Moreover, the sustainable rate of unemployment typically evolves over time as its fundamental determinants change, whereas keeping inflation expectations firmly anchored generally implies that the inflation objective should remain constant unless there are compelling technical reasons for changing it, such as changes in the methods used to measure inflation.

I think this highlights the enormous problems caused by targeting inflation without being willing to be admit that you have an inflation target. The Fed fondly imagines that the world understands it is targeting inflation. It is not a surprise it believes this: it talks to economists who run models in which it has a 2 per cent inflation target and to hacks like me who are misspending our lives studying Fed-speak.

Robin Harding

Today’s speeches by Fed chairman Ben Bernanke and BOJ governor Masaaki Shirakawa are available on their respective websites.

There was also a brief Q&A session, however, during which Mr Bernanke was asked to comment on Olivier Blanchard’s suggestion of a 4 per cent inflation target to increase the scope to cut rates in a crisis. I’ve transcribed his response below:

“In theory, what you would want to do is compare the trade-off between the buffer created by inflation above zero giving you more space to go down in interest rates, versus the costs – the microeconomic and other costs – associated with inflation being too high.”

“There have been studies that have tried to figure out what the balance is and I don’t know how robust they are, but most of them are very low, they find that the optimal inflation rate is relatively low, and a number have found rates of around 2 per cent to be correct. So it’s a difficult question in the abstract to determine what would be the optimal rate of inflation. But now these studies are assuming that we’re starting from scratch in some sense.”

“We’re not starting from scratch. The central banks of the world have, over many years now, established a great deal of credibility for inflation rates in the vicinity of about 2 per cent and it would be a very risky transition if we in any way reduce our commitment to a 2 per cent or approximate 2 per cent inflation target.”

“We’re not sure how expectations would react. It could be that 4 per cent would not be a stable equilibrium and that people would expect an even higher inflation rate after that.”

“So while I certainly understand the logic of the comment, I think that given the tremendous investment that central banks have made in creating very strong expectations of price stability that we’re better off staying essentially where we are.”

“And I’d just add as an example of the benefits that despite increases in inflation a few years ago and now declines in inflation towards very low levels, at least in the United States inflation expectations have been remarkably stable, and that is in turn a factor which helps to stabilise inflation itself.”

Mr Bernanke and Mr Shirakawa were also asked about the future use of their emergency powers, whether the Fed might adopt a numerical inflation target, and whether currency swap lines between central banks should become permanent.

(I can send a full recording of the session to anyone who’s interested, but it’s 66MB.)

Robin Harding

The Bank of Japan is not going to let the government foist an explicit inflation target on it without a fight. In a fascinating speech given in New York yesterday BoJ governor Masaaki Shirakawa argues that inflation targets are one reason that central banks allowed asset price bubbles to develop. For good measure he suggests that the world learned the wrong lessons from Japan’s deflation – and implies that US monetary policy in the 2000s was too loose as a result.

Mr Shirakawa’s argument:

Second, some political, economic and social dynamics influenced central bankers, and it became difficult for them to conduct monetary policy based on factors other than the inflation rate. This mechanism is quite subtle. The logic that price stability is a precondition for economic stability and that the independence of the central bank is necessary for price stability, became gradually but firmly established in the 1990s. At the same time, the granting of independence naturally called for the strengthening of accountability. An easily identifiable benchmark was desired. The framework which best fulfilled such needs was inflation targeting. However, under an inflation targeting regime, the debate tends to center on the relationship between the target inflation rate and the actual or expected inflation rate.

As a result, the cost of justifying adjustments in monetary policy becomes quite high in the eyes of central bankers, when such adjustments are aimed to deal with imbalances which appear in forms other than price indices. Economists focused their attention to the linkage between the output gap and the inflation rate, while awareness toward financial imbalances was limited.

Robin Harding

A little more interest from the back-and-forth about deflation that regularly attends hearings of the finance committee of Japan’s lower house. According to Bloomberg/BusinessWeek:

“I think inflation targeting is an attractive policy,” [finance minister Naoto Kan] said at parliament in Tokyo today. “We could have a goal of 1 percent or something a little higher, like 2 percent, and work with the BOJ until that goal is met.”

That takes Mr Kan a little closer to substantive disagreement with the BOJ. The BOJ is (a) opposed to an explicit inflation target and (b) happy with its existing ‘understanding of price stability’ of a 0-2 per cent positive range centred on 1 per cent.

Money Supply

Central bank blog

About this blog Blog guide
Opinions on market-moving economics and central banks around the world.


To comment, please register for free with FT.com. Read our policy on comments and include your name when submitting a comment.

All posts are published in UK time.

Contact claire.jones@ft.com about the Money Supply blog.

See the full list of FT blogs.

Editor’s choice

David Daokui Li

My lessons from life as a Chinese central banker

Euro in crisis

Fears of a Greek exit mount

The Money Supply team

Chris Giles Chris Giles has been the economics editor of the Financial Times since 2004. Based in London, he writes about international economic trends and the British economy. Before reporting economics for the Financial Times, he wrote editorials for the paper, reported for the BBC, worked as a regulator of the broadcasting industry and undertook research for the Institute for Fiscal Studies. RSS

Ralph Atkins, Frankfurt bureau chief, has been writing about European economics and politics for the Financial Times for more than 20 years following an economics degree from Cambridge. He has been watching the European Central Bank and eurozone economies since 2004. He has previously worked in London, Bonn, Berlin, Jerusalem and Brussels. RSS

Robin Harding is the FT's US economics editor, based in Washington. Prior to this, he was based in Tokyo, covering the Bank of Japan and Japan's technology sector, and in London as an economics leader writer. Robin studied economics at Cambridge and has a masters in economics from Hitotsubashi University, where he was a Monbusho scholar. Before joining the FT, Robin worked in asset management and banking. RSS

Claire Jones is Money Supply economics team writer, based in London. Before joining the Financial Times, she was the editor of the Central Banking journal and CentralBanking.com. Claire studied philosophy and economics at the London School of Economics. RSS

James Politi is US economics and trade correspondent for the Financial Times, based in Washington DC. He joined the Washington bureau in January 2008 following four and a half years as US deals correspondent covering M&A and private equity. James Politi joined the FT in London in 2000 with an MSc at the London School of Economics, and undergraduate degrees from Georgetown University and the University of Florence. RSS

Archive

« AprMay 2012
M T W T F S S
 123456
78910111213
14151617181920
21222324252627
28293031