Iran's President Hassan Rouhani   © Getty Images

Step by step, month by month, the agreement between Iran and the international powers to control nuclear development in the country is moving forward. Beyond the rhetoric about whether the deal will be effective or not — a debate that will surely continue — the prospect of an end to some of the sanctions on Iran comes closer. What could that mean for the oil market?

The question has to be answered in two parts. First, the short term up to the end of 2016. Second, the longer term stretching to 2020 and beyond. On the first there is a clear consensus across the industry. Iran can produce and export perhaps another 400,000 barrels a day by the end of next year. The limit is set by the condition of existing fields and infrastructure. In the latest of a series of excellent and detailed papers, the US Energy Information Administration suggests the number could be a little higher but also cautions that the amount of condensate available may not be exportable because the market is saturated. That number of barrels a day would add a further dampener to the world price and might force producers in the US to shut in some more tight oil. It is not enough to change the game. Read more


Iranians protest against Saudi Arabia after the hajj stampede  © Getty Images

Oil prices are now 50 per cent lower than they were a year ago, and less than 40 per cent of their peak in 2012. Worldwide, there is a continuing surplus of supply over demand of around 2.5m to 3m barrels a day. This is despite the loss of exports from Libya and two bloody wars – the first against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) in Syria and Iraq, the another against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Those two wars, which do not directly affect any significant oil producing areas, are proxy conflicts for the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Now, however, there is a growing risk of open war between Riyadh and Tehran. Oil facilities and exports would inevitably be primary targets and in those circumstances a price spike would be unavoidable. The question is whether such an escalation can be prevented.

Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran have never been close. The conflict is partly religious, partly economic and territorial. Both want to be the clear regional leader. In recent months relations have deteriorated. The latest trigger is the death of 767 Islamic pilgrims at the annual hajj in Mecca. The dead included an estimated 169 Iranians. Since the tragedy – caused by a stampede at a bottleneck as about 2m took part in the journey – Iran’s leaders have used the event as a stick to beat the Saudi authorities in general and the royal family in Riyadh in particular. The failure of the Saudis to return the dead Iranians to their own country has provoked an unspecific commitment of “retaliation” from Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

The heightened language indicates the tension that pervades the region. The situation is comparable to Europe in the months before the first world war, and equally dangerous. Read more

The borders drawn by Churchill and other politicians in the aftermath of the First World War have shaped the Middle East for almost 100 years. Now, however, sectarian upheaval combined with the US withdrawing from day-to-day engagement suggests that those boundaries could be redrawn as a result of the shifting balance of power on the ground. That process has started in northern Iraq and won’t stop there. The redrawing of the maps will have profound implications for the energy business. Read more

China's Jiang Jemin, the CEO of CNPC and Tony Hayward of BP smile after signing a major oil deal with Iraq in 2009 (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images)

Happier days: China's Jiang Jemin, the chief executive of China National Petroleum Corporation, and BP's Tony Hayward, signing a major oil deal with Iraq in 2009 (AFP/Getty Images)

One of the ironies of the current chaotic situation in the Middle East is that a country that could arguably be at risk of losing the most is standing aside.

While the US and some European powers agonise over whether – and how – they should intervene to prevent the disintegration of Iraq, China is absent. But China needs Iraqi oil in growing volumes. The country’s import dependence for crude and products now stands at 8m barrels a day and is rising. According to the latest International Energy Agency estimates, Chinese imports could be well over 11mbd by 2030. That is on modest assumptions about economic growth and generous assumptions about gains in efficiency and substitution out of oil, in sectors where a switch is possible. The figure could be higher if China cannot increase its own production.

The only country in the world likely to be able to provide such an increase in production is Iraq, and it is no accident that China is heavily invested in the development of fields such as Rumaila and West Qurna outside Basra in the South. On the Iraqi government’s own figures, China is the largest foreign investor in the country’s oil sector. As US oil consumption and import requirements decline, energy security has become a Chinese issue. Read more

By common agreement the situation in Iraq is dangerous and deteriorating. By similar common agreement there is no appetite for international intervention to do anything about it. Neither the US or Europe or anyone else will be sending forces into the besieged cities Mosul or Kirkuk. After more than a decade of unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no public or political support for engagement anywhere – not in Syria, Libya or now in northern Iraq. Though totally understandable, I think this is profoundly wrong and very dangerous. Read more