Thanks to everyone who took part in the impromptu Iraq discussion. I was pleased to see that the contributors span the ideological spectrum from "Bush is a war criminal" to "secure the oil and let the hopeless Iraqis slug it out" (I paraphrase obviously). Since much of the blogosphere seems to be chopped up into the ideological equivalent of gated communities, it’s good to see such a range of opinions.

As for myself, I think the discussion helped clarify my thinking a bit – although I don’t think I’ve yet found "the solution". Rather than comment on each and every posting, I thought it might be useful to react to groups of ideas that cropped up.

First – Belgium. I’m fond of the place myself, since I used to live there. And a couple of correspondents seem to regard it as a possible model for Iraq – as does Volker Perthes, whose article I linked to. I’m not convinced however. The temptations of federalism or even partition are obvious – and that may be where we end up eventually. But any attempt to force the situation might involve further mass movements of people and killings – which looked more like the partition of India and Pakistan than the creation of Belgium (which I seem to remember is the only revolution ever to have started in an opera house.) Also partition might invite outside intervention and therefore a wider war. Would Turkey tolerate an independent Kurdistan? How would the Saudis feel about an Iranian-linked Shiastan in the south?

I have written a lot about Iraq in the FT. But readers of my column might have noticed that – while not slow to dish out criticism – I have usually dodged the big question: so what would you do?

There is a simple reason for this evasiveness. I don’t know really know what I would do. Like most people, I am better at defining the question than providing the answer. So once again, I would like to turn to the readers of this blog for ideas and suggestions.

I thought President Bush did a good job in his television address on Iraq last night (view video, transcript). He must have done. For a couple of minutes, I was almost convinced.

As expected, Bush made the case that the “surge” has worked. His speech was full of encouraging little anecdotes. He set out the moral and strategic case for persevering in Iraq with conviction. And he tried to build some sort of bipartisan consensus, by holding out the hope that the troop withdrawals he announced are just the beginning.

But – in the end – it doesn’t convince for two main reasons.

I realise this sounds egomaniacal, but I can’t help reading President Bush’s recent speech to American veterans as a belated reply to a column that I wrote last November. The FT’s dreaded subscription barrier may prevent you reading the whole thing, so let me summarise the basic argument:

I wrote that the parallels between the Iraq and Vietnam wars were becoming increasingly eerie. In both cases, the US went on a war for reasons that were subsequently discredited. In both cases, the administration expressed high hopes about the export of democracy – but disillusionment set in rapidly. As casualties mounted (they were much higher in Vietnam), support for the war in the US drained away.

The big question is whether the two wars will end in the same way? Will it be helicopters off the roof at the American Embassy in Baghdad in a couple of years time? And if so, what will the consequences be for America and the region?

President Bush is now engaged in a two-fronts war over Iraq. There is the battle in Iraq itself, and then there is the political battle back in Washington. To win the struggle in Washington, he needs to convince American politicians and the public that there is hope in Iraq. And that – in a modest and halting way – is what the interim report issued today does. It claims that progress has been made and pleads for more time.

The trouble is, how much time is enough? In a dangerous moment of candour earlier this week, General David Petraeus – the US commander in Iraq – told the BBC that typical counter-insurgenices can take decades to succeed. He cited the British experience in Northern Ireland, which actually took more than 30 years – and ended with a political settlement.

The trouble is that Iraq is considerably more daunting than Northern Ireland. The Americans have lost 3,600 troops, which is far more men than Britain ever lost in Ulster. Nor does there seem to be any prospect of reaching a political deal with the hard core of the insurgency – al-Qaeda.

The decision by Congress to authorise extra funding for the Iraq war – without setting a deadline for withdrawal – is being portrayed in some places as a capitulation by the anti-war crowd. Not at all. It simply means that the crucial political struggle over withdrawal from Iraq has been delayed a few months.

The real battle is going to take place in September. At that point, all of the American troops set aside for "the surge" will have been in Iraq for several months. In September General David Petraeus, on whom so many American hopes are hanging, is also due to give a crucial "status report" to Congress. If the news looks bad, then Congressional moves to get the troops out will begin in earnest. The Iraqi insurgents will doubtless factor this into their calculations. President Bush is already predicting a bloody August.