Category: Russia

Self-Fulfilling ProphecyChristina Larson in The New Republic: A Journal of Politics and the Arts

Obama meets the LobbyStephen M. Walt in Foreign Policy  (Walt returns to the subject of his bitterly controversial book, “The Lobby”)

On Versions of GoodnessBagehot in The Economist

The New Scramble for AfricaMark Weston in EMEA Finance

Someone give the FT a dose of valium, pleaseDaniel W. Drezner in Foreign Policy

Gary Samore is the kind of sane, well-informed and low-key professional who makes me glad that Obama is now in control of US foreign policy. He works on the National Security Council and has a long and complicated title to do with arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, but he says the president refers to him as “my nukes guy”, which about sums it up. That means that Samore spends his days grappling with some of the most sensitive dossiers in US foreign policy – in particular Iran, Russia and North Korea.

Yesterday he was in London on his way back from the Moscow summit and he gave an on-the-record briefing at the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Naturally there are limits to how frank you can be in such a setting, but I still thought he had several interesting things to say:

First, the nuclear-arms reduction deal agreed in principle in Moscow is essentially a modest first step. The START (strategic arms reduction) treaty runs out at the end of the year, and it is important to have an interim agreement on further reduction – if only to keep the mechanisms for mutual inspections and co-operation going. If they can nail down all the details on this initial relatively modest reduction in nuclear weapons, Samore hopes that Russia and the US will then be able to negotiate a deal for much deeper cuts in nuclear-weapons stock-piles. He says that at that point Russian concerns about missile defence will become more valid. The Americans argue that the system they are working on is so modest that it could only be effective against a country with a very small number of nuclear missiles – such as, potentially, an Iran that went nuclear.

A senior European diplomat I met last week predicted that the Obama-Netanyahu talks would be “very tough in private, but very calm in public.” Well, the two leaders have just emerged and staged a brief press conference and – in public – they were indeed leaning over to be nice to each other.

Netanyahu, often self-confident and aggressive in private, was a real pussy-cat. He was clearly eager to sound reasonable and optimistic. There were no dark warnings about impending Armageddons. Instead he talked about a moment of unique opportunity in the Middle East because Arabs and Israelis “see a common threat”. Perhaps it was just a different way of talking up the threat of Iran – but it sounded more positive. The Israeli leader also kept emphasising what a great friend of Israel Obama is; there was no overt effort to question the president’s committment to Israel’s security – even though what Obama had to say (and his manner) was very different from the back-slapping, unquestioning support for the Israeli point of view that George W. Bush used to offer.

Officially, Russia does not use energy as a political weapon – and the gas cut-offs to Ukraine are no laughing matter. Unofficially – well, take a look at this video recorded in a Moscow theatre earlier this year.

As diplomatic gaffes go, it will be hard to surpass Hillary Clinton presenting Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, with a “Re-set” button. This was meant to signify a fresh start in US-Russian relations. But unfortunately the Russian words next to the button actually translated as “Self-Destruct” – which more or less confirms the most paranoid Russian views of what the Americans have in mind for them.

Still – translation problems aside – America’s intent is clear. The Obama administration wants a new and better relationship with Russia. They want Russian help on all sorts of tricky issues, in particular Iran. If at all possible, the Americans want to cool down old arguments over issues like missile defence – and Georgia.

Unfortunately, it may not be possible. A new crisis over Georgia is looming, and could erupt quite soon. On April 9th, large-scale anti-government demonstrations are scheduled to take place in Georgia. The opposition are demanding that President Mikheil Saakashvili resign. That would suit the Russians extremely well – since they loathe Saakashvili. The Russian government is also convinced that there was an American-hand behind the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. They will doubtless be giving support – and perhaps more – to the anti-Saakashvili opposition in Georgia in a couple of weeks time. Even without outside assistance, the demonstrations could easily turn violent – on both sides.

Turmoil in Georgia and the possible downfall of Saakashvili would present the Obama administration with an acute dilemma. Saakashvili still has many friends in Washington – and there would be lots of pressure to come to his support, particularly if it was felt that he was falling victim to a Russian-engineered coup. But a new crisis over Georgia would mean that the thaw in US-Russian relations had lasted little more than a few weeks.

The newspaper headlines in London proclaim that the temperature will drop to -10, and that Russia has just cut the gas supply to western Europe – again. And yet the reaction here, seems rather less alarmed than the first time this happened back in 2006.

Why? For three reasons, I think. First, bad news is always slightly less shocking, the second time around. Second, there is now more of a sense that this is a genuine economic dispute, as much as a Russian power-play. There are real arguments to be had about Ukrainian debts to Gazprom, and the price Ukraine pays for its gas.

But the most important reason is that Europe is actually rather less in thrall to Russian gas than we first thought. In Britain, just 3% of our energy needs are met by Russian gas. Pierre Noel of Cambridge University summarised the situation rather neatly in a recent paper  for the European Council on Foreign Relations called “Beyond Dependence: How to Deal with Russian Gas”.

Funny, how quickly things can go sour. The Russian government is the latest to face social unrest, linked to the global economic crisis. As blog-readers might have gathered, I was in Ukraine last week – and a Russian economist mentioned to me that there were demonstrations in Vladivostock against the new tariff on car imports. The FT is now reporting that the trouble is spreading.

More broadly, the Russian government is facing a serious economic crisis on several fronts. Just six months ago, its huge pile of almost $600 billion in foreign reserves seemed a symbol of the country’s new-found strength. But they have got through roughly a quarter of that in just three months – mainly through supporting the rouble. At this rate, it will all be gone well before the end of 2009. That is not an entirely implausible scenario, because the fiscal pressures on the Russian government are only likely to grow over the next year. Official projections are still that the economy will grow by about 3%; but private-sector economists in Moscow are talking about a deep recession. With oil down at just over $40 a barrel, the cash-spigot has been turned off.

There is a danger that, as the government comes under increasing fiscal pressure, it will be tempted to raid the foreign reserves for ordinary budget spending – espescially if the alternative involves cutting social spending and risking further popular unrest. Local governments are also likely to be screaming for financial support from Moscow.

The whole Putin phenomenon has been based on oil wealth and economic growth. So what happens now?

Here is a sinister little story from Russia. Memorial, an organisation dedicated to documenting the horrors of Stalinism, has had its offices in Saint Petersburg raided. Orlando Figes, the distinguished historian, is outraged and reckons it is all part of an official effort to rehabilitate Stalin and the Soviet Union.

If there is a cult of personality in modern Russia, it is clearly still centred around Vladimir Putin. The prime minister staged his annual phone-in show last week and hugely amused the audience by publicly discussing the rumour that he had threatened to have the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, “hung by one part”. (The balls, in fact.) This kind of remark sounds entirely in character. Putin is obsessed with castration. I was once at a press conference in Brussels with him, when he offered to castrate the Le Monde correspondent, whose offence had been to ask a question about Chechnya.

Meanwhile, Putin’s personal style becomes ever more imperial. I was chatting over the weekend to a senior western European politician who claims that Putin rarely gets into the office before 11am and then usually goes off to the gym for a couple of hours. But this is not to say he is slacking. He likes to make 3am phone calls to his officials. Now who does that remind me of?

During the presidential election campaign Joe Biden warned rather injudiciously that world leaders would test Barack Obama’s mettle within six months of him taking office. Well, it doesn’t seem to have taken them that long. On the very day of Obama’s election, the Russian government announced plans to deploy cruise missiles in Kaliningrad, a tiny Russian enclave that borders Poland.

The Russians deploying missiles in a way that threatens American strategic interests and poses a test for a new, young, charismatic American president – what does that remind you of? JFK and Cuba, of course. A few months ago I heard Robert Kagan, an adviser to McCain, argue that inexperienced and liberal presidents are more likely to end up in dangerous international confrontations because hostile foreigners are more likely to put them to the test, and the new president is going to feel the need to show that he is tough. Eisenhower got through eight years without a truly dangerous confrontation with the Russians. But Kennedy had the Cuba missile crisis

With any luck, however, the Polish missile crisis won’t get anywhere near as dangerous as that. First, the Russians have their timing slightly off. Obama doesn’t take office until mid-January. By then the crisis might have been resolved, or the Americans might have got used to the idea of the new Russian deployment. Second, the missiles are actually going to be deployed on Russian, rather than Cuban soil. That obviously makes a big difference.

But the Russians have still miscalculated. I know that there was debate in Democratic Party circles about the wisdom of the anti-missile system that the Americans are deploying in Poland and the Czech Republic, which the Russians are so narked about. But there is no way that the Americans or the Poles will back down now. In fact, there was no way they could back down, after the Russian invasion of Georgia. The real debate in Obama circles will not be about whether to withdraw the missile system from Poland - it will be about whether to deploy Nato troops and assets in the Baltic states – and so heighten tensions with Russia still further.

In May of this year a close aide to President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia visited me in London. He complained about Russian provocation: the next time a Russian military plane violated Georgian airspace, he said, the Georgians would shoot it down. He added that the Georgian government had informed the US of its intentions and had been given the go-ahead.

I recorded the conversation at the time on my blog (“War over Georgia”, May 16) and wrote: “I think that shooting down a Russian plane would be the stupidest thing they could possibly do. It would give Russia exactly the excuse it needed to launch military operations against Georgia.”

In recalling this conversation now, I do not mean to endorse the accusation of Vladimir Putin, the Russian prime minister, that the war in Georgia was a US-inspired provocation. Who knows what further conversations took place between Tbilisi, Washington and Moscow in the subsequent three months before the Georgians moved in on the separatist enclave of South Ossetia? There is little doubt that the Russians were baiting the Georgians – and actively preparing for war.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Please post comments below.

The World

with Gideon Rachman

About this blog About Gideon Blog guide
Gideon Rachman and his FT colleagues debate international affairs.

Gideon became chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times in July 2006. He joined the FT after a 15-year career at The Economist, which included spells as a foreign correspondent in Brussels, Washington and Bangkok. He also edited The Economist’s business and Asia sections.

His particular interests include American foreign policy, the European Union and globalisation
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