Michael Munger has written the most lucid essay you’re likely read for a while on the theory of the firm:

Then one day, in one firm, one manager, perhaps on a whim, outsources the computer services or janitorial services or the legal advice. Not to India or Ireland but simply to another company across town or across country. The boss signs a contract, after taking bids from several companies that provide similar services.  These companies are forced by the scolding winds of market competition to provide excellent service at low cost. By looking at the different prices in the bids offered in this competition, the boss learns something. He learns how much the service costs to provide. And he learns how much money he saves by laying off the employees who used to provide the service in-house.
It’s hard to fire employees, particularly since most employees are smart enough to work hard enough to get acceptable performance reviews. The boss also has a hard time motivating the in-house staff, because watching each employee is expensive and tiresome. But it’s easy to fire contracted employees, because you just sign a new contract with a competitor. Why not let the market system do your motivation work? Let’s suppose that our outsourcing boss sees the company’s profits rise dramatically, and the stock price goes up 18% in six months. Life is good, for the boss.
So, one day the boss has this crazy thought. He asks himself a question that has never occurred to him before: Why have any employees at all? Why have a building? Why not just sit home, wearing his jammies and bunny slippers, sipping a nice cup of tea, and outsource everything? He can write contracts to buy parts, he can pay workers to assemble the parts, and he can use shipping companies to box and transport the product.

You can tell that this parable is not going to end happily ever after. As Munger argues, there’s a balancing act: too little outsourcing and a firm becomes a socialist state, denied incentives or price signals; too much and the problem of coordinating all the contracts becomes impossible.
It’s worth thinking about how changing technology may alter this balancing act. The answer is not obvious. Some outsourcing decisions are made much easier to coordinate thanks to the internet and all the rest. At the same time, inter-firm communications also improve. And if the world is full of firms making more complex, intangible products, that may favour more implicit contracts and therefore larger firms. I simply don’t know the answer and I’m not sure anyone else does either.
(HT: Free exchange.)

January 24th, 2008 in Everyday economics | Permalink