By Martin Wolf

When will the next financial crisis come? We do not know. Yet of one thing we can be sure: unless we learn from this crisis, another one will put the world economy back on to the rocks in the not too distant future.

The FT has published a number of contributions on the lessons: Charles Goodhart of the London School of Economics and Avinash Persaud of Intelligence Capital offered “a proposal for how to avoid the next crash” (January 31); Francisco González of BBVA discussed “What banks can learn from this credit crisis” (February 4); and Daniel Heller of the Swiss National Bank argued for three ways to reform bank bonuses (February 4). The substance of Mr Heller’s argument was similar to a contribution of my own (“Regulators should intervene in bankers’ pay”, January 15), but without the regulatory coercion.

The big question, indeed, is whether lessons must be embedded in regulation. Optimistic opponents of regulation argue that the banks have learnt their lesson and will behave more responsibly in future. Pessimistic opponents fear that legislators might create a Sarbanes- Oxley squared. The Act passed by the US Congress in 2002, after Enron and other scandals, was bad enough, they say. The banks might now suffer something worse.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our panel of economists appears below.

By Kenneth Rogoff

Given the highly vulnerable state of the US and European economies, what would happen to global growth if the Chinese juggernaut also started sputtering? Few investors or policymakers seem to be seriously contemplating this scenario.

China’s remarkable resilience to both the 2001 global recession and the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis has convinced almost everyone that another year of double-digit growth is all but inevitable. In fact, the odds of a significant growth recession in China – at least one year of sub-6 per cent growth – during the next couple of years are 50:50. With Chinese inflation spiking, notable backpedalling on market reforms and falling export demand, 2008 could be particularly challenging.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our panel of economists appears below.

By Lawrence Summers

Markets and perceptions of the economic outlook change rapidly. Even two months ago most observers doubted predictions of a US recession, saw no need for a fiscal stimulus, and thought that inflation fears should constrain monetary policy. Now, Washington is more or less settled on a stimulus package that will exceed $150bn; markets at one point last week expected a Fed funds rate below 2 per cent by September. The debate about recession is now about how deep and global its impact will be.

There is enormous uncertainty around economic or financial forecasts. It is possible that pessimism will recede as declining interest rates and dollar exchange rates increase demand. It is more likely, though, that the situation will deteriorate further as perceptions of declining growth increase credit spreads and risk premiums in financial markets, leading to reduced lending, borrowing and spending exacerbating the pessimism about growth.

Perhaps inevitably given the complexity of the problems, policy measures have seemed ad hoc and reactive: measures to increase bank liquidity one week; to help homeowners avoid foreclosure another; to work towards fiscal stimulus another; to lower interest rates most recently. Confidence would be well served by a comprehensive programme of measures that offers the prospect of accelerating growth and insures against a prolonged downturn. Until that happens, it will be difficult for confidence to return.

Substantial monetary and fiscal stimulus is now in train. This will reduce the severity of any recession and provide some insurance against a protracted downturn. Along with macro-economic stimulus in the US, there is the need for further policy development in three other areas – repair of the financial system, containing the damage caused by the housing sector and assuring the global co-ordination of policy.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our panel of economists appears below.

By Martin Wolf

“I was gradually coming to believe that the US economy’s greatest strength was its resiliency – its ability to absorb disruptions and recover, often in ways and at a pace you’d never be able to predict, much less dictate.” Alan Greenspan, ‘The Age of Turbulence’.

We all hope that Mr Greenspan proves right about the US economy. The Federal Reserve’s rate cut on Tuesday will succeed if Mr Greenspan’s view is correct. Yet many fear he is wrong. Many, too, blame him for the current mess. So how did the world economy fall into its predicament?

One view is that this crisis is a product of a fundamentally defective financial system. An email I received this week laid out the charge: the crisis, it asserted, is the product of “greedy, immoral, solely self-interested and self-delusional decisions made throughout the 2000s, and earlier, by very real human beings at the very top of the financial food chain”.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our panel of economists appears below.

By Kenneth Rogoff

US Federal Reserve officials were jolted last week by the cacophony of booing that greeted their quarter-percentage-point interest rate cut. Markets badly wanted double the amount. It is part of a growing town/gown rift between a model-oriented Fed and a profit-oriented financial community.

Market commentators, including some former Federal Open Market Committee members, almost unanimously expressed deep disappointment that the Fed did not seem more attuned to the growing risk of recession. The critics were especially peeved that the Fed’s statement did not contain a clear acknowledgement that short-term growth risks easily trump short-term risks to core inflation.

The negative rhetoric cooled a bit later in the week as the big central banks announced new measures to maintain market liquidity, and as high November inflation readings made the Fed’s balance of risk assessment seem somewhat more plausible.

Nevertheless, markets remain extremely sceptical. As housing prices sink and the credit crunch grinds on, top private forecasters have been scurrying to downgrade their 2008 growth estimates.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our panel of economists appears below.

By Martin Wolf

These are historic moments for the world economy. I felt the same during the emerging market financial crises of 1997 and 1998 and the bubble in technology stocks that burst in 2000. This “credit crunch” may, I believe, be an equally important turning point for financial markets and the world economy. Why do I believe this? Let me count the ways.

First and most important, what is happening in credit markets today is a huge blow to the credibility of the Anglo-Saxon model of transactions-orientated financial capitalism. A mixture of crony capitalism and gross incompetence has been on display in the core financial markets of New York and London. From the “ninja” (no-income, no-job, no-asset) subprime lending to the placing (and favourable rating) of assets that turn out to be almost impossible to understand, value or sell, these activities have been riddled with conflicts of interest and incompetence. In the subsequent era of “revulsion”, core financial markets have seized up.

Second, these events have called into question the workability of securitised lending, at least in its current form. The argument for this change – one, I admit, I accepted – was that it would shift the risk of term-transformation (borrowing short to lend long) out of the fragile banking system on to the shoulders of those best able to bear it. What happened, instead, was the shifting of the risk on to the shoulders of those least able to understand it. What also occurred was a multiplication of leverage and term-transformation, not least through the banks’ “special investment vehicles”, which proved to be only notionally off balance sheet. What we see today, as a result, is a rapid shrinkage of markets in asset-backed paper.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our guest economists appears below.

By Daniel Gros The global economy has been hit by two shocks: the subprime lending crisis and high oil prices. The latter have faded into the background as prices have stabilised near record levels. But it would be a mistake to underestimate their importance. The recent surge in oil prices makes a rebalancing of the global economy more difficult, but it might in fact facilitate adjustment to the “subprime” credit crisis. The core of the issue is simple: oil producers tend to save about half of their windfall gains from higher oil prices. If the oil price stays around $90 a barrel, oil producers will increase their current account surpluses by $200bn-$300bn a year. The question will then be: who is willing and able to run corresponding deficits? Apart from the US, there are only two regions large enough to contemplate a shift in the external position of this order of magnitude: the eurozone and Asia (Japan and China).

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our guest economists appears in the comments below.

Small earthquake: few hurt. This is what the International Monetary Fund is saying in its latest World Economic Outlook: world output grew 5.4 per cent last year and will grow 5.2 per cent this year and 4.8 per cent in 2008, only 0.4 percentage points less than expected last July. What conclusion, then, are we to draw? Is a substantial financial shock at the core of the world economy nigh on irrelevant? The answer is: maybe so, but there are also appreciable risks.

According to the IMF, the world is in the midst of a period of growth unrivalled since the early 1970s. Between 2004 and 2008, it forecasts, global growth will average 5.1 per cent a year and the rate of growth of world output per head will average 4 per cent (see chart). The driver of global growth has been emerging economies in general and Asian emerging economies in particular. Between 2004 and 2008, says the IMF, growth of emerging economies will average 7.8 per cent a year, while high-income countries will average only 2.7 per cent. Never before has world growth been so much higher than that of high-income countries.

The remainder of this column can be read here. Debate from our guest economists appears below.

Globalisation was supposed to mean the worldwide triumph of the market economy. Yet some of the most influential players are turning out to be states, not private actors. States play a dominant role in ownership and production of raw materials, notably oil and gas. Now states are also emerging as owners of wealth. This is creating widespread concern. Does that narrow focus make sense? The broad answer is No.

Fevered attention is currently focused on so-called "sovereign wealth funds". As Standard Chartered shows in an intriguing analysis, carried out with input from Oxford Analytica, these are not a new phenomenon: the oldest dates back to 1953. But today there are more funds, with far more money at their disposal than before. In all, they control some $2,200bn, with $2,100bn in the top 20 funds. The seven biggest belong (in order of estimated size) to Abu Dhabi ($625bn), Norway ($322bn), Singapore - GIC ($215bn), Kuwait ($213bn), China ($200bn), Russia ($128bn) and Singapore - Temasek ($108bn).

By definition, these funds exist because a country has a surplus of savings over investment that ends up in the hands of the government. In practice, this has happened for two reasons: ownership of commodity wealth (particularly oil and natural gas), and what amounts to forced savings from an export-oriented manufacturing economy, as in the cases of China and Singapore.

The remainder of the column can be read here . Comment from our expert panellists appears below.

The world economy is in its fourth year of buoyant growth. It has survived a host of perils: collapsing stock markets, terrorism, wars, soaring prices of oil and other commodities, protectionist pressures, a failing round of multilateral trade negotiations and persistent "global imbalances".

Yet new challenges are emerging - notably, this summer’s crisis in credit markets and the weakness in the US housing market - that may prove harder to cope with. At best, big adjustments lie ahead. At worst, the world economy may face a period of upheaval.

The driving forces behind today’s buoyant world economy are globalisation and the entry of countries with almost limitless human resources. China and India contain between them not far short of two-fifths of the world’s human population. The developing countries of east and south Asia contain slightly more than half of all the people on the planet and more than three times as many people as do all of today’s high-income countries.

The entry of these nations into the modern world economy is an event that falls short only of the industrial revolution in significance.

Driven by the collapse in the costs of collecting and communication of information, the low costs of transport by sea and air and ongoing economic liberalisation, the new players are becoming increasingly significant in world output, trade, consumption of resources and supply of capital.

In the first decade of the third millennium, the growth of the advanced countries has been remarkably weak. What has been outstanding is the soaring growth of the emerging economies. Never before has the gap between the performance of emerging and advanced countries been so large.

The remainder of the column can be read here. Comment from our expert panellists appears below.